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Abstract 
This thesis is about grounding an increasingly common practice in an established 
theory where no explicit theory currently exists. The common practice that is the 
subject of this study is information security. It is commonly held that information 
security means maintaining the confidentiality, integrity (accuracy) and availability of 
information. 
It seems that a whole industry has built up with tools, techniques and consultants to 
help organisations achieve a successful information security practice. There is even 
a British Standard containing around 130 controls, and a management system to 
guide organisations and practitioners. In the absence of many alternatives this British 
Standard has grown into something of a requirement for organisations who are 
concerned about the security of their information. 
The British Standard was developed almost entirely through the collaboration of 
some powerful blue-chip organisations. These organisations compared their 
practices and found some key areas of commonality. These common areas became 
the foundation of many information security practices today. Although there has been 
considerable evolutionary change the fundamentals, and not least the principles of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, remain largely the same. 
It is argued in this thesis that the absence of a theoretical grounding has left the 
domain as weak and unable to cope with the rapidly developing area of information 
security. It is also argued that there was far too little consideration of human issues 
when the standard was devised and that situation has worsened recently with greater 
reliance on information security driven by more threats of increasing complexity, and 
more restrictive controls being implemented to counteract those threats. 
This thesis aims to pull human issues into the domain of information security: a 
domain which is currently dominated by non-social and practical paradigms. 
The key contribution of this thesis is therefore to provide a new model around which 
information security practices can be evaluated. This new model has a strong and 
established theoretical basis. The theory selected to underpin the new model is in the 
broad domain of critical social theory. 
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Navigating the thesis 
To assist the reader in navigating this thesis the sections within each chapter are 
identified using a chapter structure model. An example is shown for section 1 in 
chapter 2 at Figure 0-1 below. 
2. Current Practice 
2.1 Structure of this 2.2 Introduction to 
2.3 Information 
chapter information security security current practice 
2.4 Rationale for 2.5 Summary 
proposed approach 
Figure 0-1 Chapter structure model (example) 
This model shows all of the sections within the current chapter and highlights the 
current section. 
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Glossary 
Paul Drake 
Term Meaning 
Availability One of the three guiding principles of the existing 
information security domain. Availability represents the need 
to ensure information is available to those authorised to 
access it, when and where they need it. 
CIA The three guiding principles of the existing information 
security domain. Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
Confidentiality One of the three guiding principles of the existing 
information security domain. Confidentiality represents the 
need to ensure information is only available to those 
authorised to access it; when, where and how they are 
authorised to access it. 
Crisis A high impact (q. v. ) incident (q. v. ) 
Determinism The principle that 'free will' (q. v. ) is an illusion and that the 
outcomes of all future events have already been 
determined. 
Exploit The act of a threat (q. v. ) adversely affecting the effective 
operation of an organisation. A threat exploits a vulnerability 
(q. v. ) 
Falsifiable/Falsifiability For an assertion to be falsifiable, it has to be possible to 
carry out an observation or experiment that could prove the 
assertion to be false. 
Free Will An idea whereby there are two or more possibilities that are 
genuinely open when a choice is faced and where that 
choice is not forced. 
Ideographic Characterised by ideas and perceptions 
Impact The extent to which a threat (q. v. ) would adversely affect the 
effective operation of an organisation. Wherever possible 
this is represented as a monetary value 
Incident " The state of the organisation when a threat (q. v. ) 
exploits a vulnerability (q. v. ) 
" Incident management is the process by which 
threats are contained and eradicated and by which 
the organisation recovers to normal operation 
Information Security The prevention and detection of unauthorised actions by 
users of information systems 
Integrity One of the three guiding principles of the existing 
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information security domain. Integrity represents the need to 
ensure information is always accurate and up to date. 
Likelihood How probable it is that a threat (q. v. ) would affect the 
effective operation of an organisation 
Malicious code Generic term for a variety of well know, and less well known 
means of disrupting or damaging computer systems and 
users 
Metaphysics The study of any of the most basic concepts of reality. 
Nominalism The idea that reality is what is perceived by human 
consciousness 
Nomothetic Characterised by universal laws about the reality that is 
observed. 
Normative A normative statement is one regarding how things should 
or ought to be. Such statements are, by definition impossible 
to prove or disprove (see also the antonym positive). 
Paradoxically, in the domain of 'standards' (e. g. British 
Standards), normative is considered the prescriptive part of 
the standard. Within a standard, pages such as Contents, 
Introduction, Preface and Summary are generally 
considered non-normative whilst the main body of the 
standard is considered normative. To be compliant with the 
standard, a party must be compliant with the normative parts 
of the standard and not necessarily the non-normative parts. 
Ontology Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that describes 
existence and being. 
Payload What malicious code does to a target computer system over 
and above simply replicating itself onto another computer 
system 
Positive/Positivism A positive statement is falsifiable (q. v. ) and attempts to 
describe ontology (q. v. ). 
Realism The idea that reality is external from the perceptions of 
individual consciousness 
Risk " Risk is the state of an entity being subject to threats (q. v. ) 
and vulnerabilities (q. v. ) 
" Risk assessment is the process for determining the 
likelihood (q. v. ) that a threat will exploit (q. v. ) a 
vulnerability, and if it does what the impact (q. v. ) would 
be. 
" Risk management is the process of avoiding risks. 
Security Profile A way of comparatively representing the security practices 
XI 
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of organisations being studied 
Threat Something or things that could adversely affect the 
operation of an organisation 
Virus A program or code that replicates; that is, infects another 
program, boot sector, partition sector, or document that 
supports macros, by inserting itself or attaching itself to that 
medium. Most viruses only replicate, though, many do a 
large amount of damage as well. 
Vulnerability A weakness that would allow a threat (q. v. ) to adversely 
affect the effective operation of an organisation 
Worm A program that makes copies of itself; for example, from one 
disk drive to another, or by copying itself using email or 
another transport mechanism. The worm may or may not do 
damage and/or compromise the security of the computer. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis is about Information Security. For the purposes of this introduction, a 
working definition of Information Security can be considered the intent, principles, 
processes, means and controls necessary to ensure that information is: protected 
against access by those not authorised to access it; accurate and up to date; and 
available to those authorised to access it, when and how they need it. 
It is argued and demonstrated in this thesis that the current information security 
domain is pragmatically informed and maintained, and is dominated by technology 
and instrumentalism which leaves social issues largely unexplored and substantially 
unresolved. With the flow of information such an important part of organisational 
operations this lack of social consideration when securing information could, it is 
argued in this thesis, lead to unexpected results. 
Overall Aim of the Research 
The current research project therefore proposes to design and test an evaluative 
model of information security which will provide a credible basis through which a 
broad range of organisations could adopt a sound socially informed approach to 
information security. 
The above aim yields the following specific research questions and objectives for the 
research. 
Research Questions 
1. Can social theory be applied to a practical and instrumental domain? 
2. How would the current domain be improved through the application of a suitable 
theoretical underpinning? 
3. How can managers be assisted in their practice of information security through 
the application of social theory? 
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Objectives 
1. Devise a new model for the evaluation of information security practice which is 
explicitly based on recognised social theory. 
2. Establish a means of embedding information security into organisations rather 
than relying on a set of rules and functions around which information security is 
practised. 
3. Empirically test and revise the model. 
4. Critique this study. 
5. From the outcomes of the critique, record contributions to knowledge provided by 
this study, suggest additional contributions that could be made and recommend 
additional research projects for the domain. In particular, ways to bring about 
action-based remediation should be proposed. 
The aim, research questions and objectives are critically reviewed in Section 7.1 
(Critique of the Study). 
2 
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Overview of thesis 
The following diagram provides an overview of the thesis. To further aid in navigating 
the thesis, this diagram will be reproduced at the beginning of each chapter with the 
current chapter highlighted. 
Chapter Outcomes 
" Introduction to this thesis 
Introduction " Hypotheses and and objectives of the research, and where in the 
thesis they are fulfilled 
" Information security domain and how information security is 
Current Position currently practiced. 
" Rationale for approach to improving the domain 
Explorations in Development and detailed analysis of new model for evaluating 
Social Theory 
information security practice 
Critical information security reforms 
Explorations in Rationale for research approach 
Research Development and detailed analysis of research model 
Methodologies Research plan and validation process 
Action Research Tested information security model in AR context 
" Use of evaluative model and author's experiential framework as Project basis for empirical research 
Empirical Tested evaluative model against British Standard and two cases N. Refined and revised evaluative model 
Research Completed research validation model 
Critical Review Key contributions made by this research 
" Critique of research from philosophical standpoint 
and Conclusions Future research opportunities 
Figure 1-1: Overview of thesis 
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Introductory Chapter 
Provides an overview of the other chapters in this thesis together with a record of the 
hypotheses and objectives of the research. 
Current Position Chapter 
Reviews the current Information Security domain and the way in which it is 
constructed through development of a series of models and through reference to 
available literature and industry surveys. 
Theory Chapter 
Searches for a theoretical basis for the research. The chapter gradually builds 
through established critical theory towards an evaluative framework which, it is 
argued, will enable organisations to determine whether their security practice is in 
line with establishing a socially-aware security culture. The model also provides 
outline means to move from a functional approach to a critically informed one. 
Research Methods Chapter 
The first stages of research design. An approach is developed which provides a 
pluralistic design which builds towards a highly flexible research model. 
Action Research Chapter 
Takes the evaluative model, as refined by the empirical chapter, and applies it to an 
action research based intervention. This provides an opportunity to test the model in 
practice and also provides means for further refinement if required. 
Empirical Chapter 
Tests the evaluative model within 2 organisations and also against the British 
Standards. This testing allows the evaluative model to be refined and improved. 
4 
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Critical Review and Conclusions Chapter 
Critically reviews the study to surface what aspects of the research went well and 
which were unsuccessful. The chapter also highlights areas for future research and 
tabulates the contributions to knowledge developed in this research. Finally, this 
chapter provides a review of the research and draws conclusions including the 
success or otherwise of meeting the objectives. 
5 
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2 Current Position 
Paul Drake 
Chapter Outcomes 
" Introduction to this thesis 
Introduction " Hypotheses and and objectives of the research, and where in the 
thesis they are fulfilled 
Information security domain and how information security is 
Current Position currently practiced. 
" Rationale for approach to improving the domain 
Explorations iný-' Development and detailed analysis of new model for evaluating 
information security practice Social Theory Critical information security reforms 
Explorations in Rationale for research approach 
Research fl Development and detailed analysis of research model 
Methodologies Research plan and validation process 
Action Research Tested information security model in AR context 
" Use of evaluative model and author's experiential framework as Project basis for empirical research 
Empirical 
. --J 
Tested evaluative model against British Standard and two cases 
" Refined and revised evaluative model 
Research Completed research validation model 
Critical Review Key contributions made by this research 
" Critique of research from philosophical standpoint 
and Conclusions Future research opportunities 
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2.1 Structure of this Chapter 
Paul Drake 
2. Current Practice 
2.3 Information 2.1 Structure of this 2.2 Introduction to 
chapter information security security current 
practice 
2.4 Rationale for 2.5 Summary 
proposed approach 
This chapter contains five sections. This first section outlines the structure of the 
chapter. The second section provides an introduction to information security, which 
provides the focus for this study. The third section discusses the information security 
domain as it stands today. The fourth section provides the rationale for this study. In 
particular, a theoretical grounding is discussed and an approach argued. The fifth 
section provides a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 Introduction to Information Security 
2. Current Practice 
2.1 Structure of this 2.2 Introduction to 
L 
2.3 Information 
chapter information security security current practice 
c4Raflocor 
2.5 Sum mary proposed approach 
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Currently, information security represents practice which is employed to protect 
information and to ensure it is available to those authorised to access it. However, 
even that fairly simple definition presents problems in a thesis that sets out to adopt a 
critical approach to the research. What is meant by information; what is meant by 
protecting it; protecting it from whom or what; how is authorisation determined; and 
who determines it? If those questions can be adequately explored and answered a 
further layer of complexity then emerges. Is there a common understanding of what 
information is; how can the protection be provided; how effective is the protection; 
how can the information be made available? Once that is determined then another 
layer emerges. How can the effectiveness of the protection be determined; how 
effective is the means for making information available and how can that be 
measured? So the exploration goes. Peeling back layer after layer to find further 
questions and further complexity towards some kind of adequate definition of the 
domain. Of course, this is a single line of enquiry towards a definition. There are also 
explorations in different directions concerning, by way of example, whether any 
definition is valid or indeed whether there is some level of shared understanding or 
acceptance of any definition, and if so to what extent the understanding is shared 
and by whom. There are then further dimensions of complexity that are peculiar to a 
critically informed study such as defining the domain in terms of what ought to be 
rather than defining what the domain is. 
The following Figure (2-1) provides a basic schema of some of this complexity. 
8 
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Definition of information? 
Information 
Purpose of information? 
Who authorises? 
Authorised on what basis and 
Criteria? 
Availability How effective is the process of 
making information available? How can reformation be made 
What the domain is available. 
wno decides? 
How measured? 
Meaning of protection? 
Who decides? 
Information security 
Protect from whom or what? 
On what basis and criteria? 
Protestfon 
How is protection provided? 
How effective is the How measured? 
protection? pn what basis? 
be 
Shared understanding of Now determined? 
what is or ought to be To what e cent? 
Figure 2-1 Schema of complexity of defining the domain 
One well established definition can be found in the US Department of Defense (sic) 
`Orange Book' (DOD 1985: 3) 
"In general, secure systems will control, through use of specific security features, access to 
information such that only properly authorised individuals, or processes operating on their behalf, 
will have access to read, write, create, or delete information" 
Another, more widespread and perhaps broader definition can be found in UK 
Government publications, for example the Communications-Electronics Security 
Group' (CESG 1994: G-3), The British Standard for Information Security 
Management (ISO 2000c; BSI 2002a), and in the documentation and practice within 
a large number of organisations who have adopted information security practices. 
That definition concerns the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of 
information. CIA will be explored in some depth in the following section. For the 
' CESG is a UK Government sponsored body that provides advice to both Government and 
industry on best practice approaches to the delivery of information security 
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purposes of this introduction, and due to its widespread adoption as the 'meaning' of 
information security, CIA will be used as a working definition. 
Whether CIA is used as a definition, or something else, it is clear that one outcome of 
an effective implementation of an information security system will be to either 
reinforce or modify the behaviours of people; to either bring about change or to resist 
change; and to determine whether external factors are desirable or undesirable. If the 
behaviours of a person or group of people is considered desirable then the 
information security system will seek to recognise and reinforce that behaviour, and if 
the behaviours are considered undesirable then the system will seek to modify those 
behaviours. Likewise, if a change is either proposed or taking place that is desirable 
then the system will embrace that change, if the change is undesirable then the 
system would resist it. If the environment is acceptable and there are no visible 
opportunities to improve security, then the system would seek to maintain the current 
position. If the environment is unacceptable then the system will seek to positively 
change the current position. The methodology used to determine the effectiveness 
and acceptability of these issues is risk assessment - is the risk presented 
acceptable or not? Figure 2-2 below summarises this flow. 
To be clear, Figure 2-2 provides a simplified flow of current information security 
practice wherein decisions about the acceptability of behaviours, changes and 
environments are made by management and information security consultants with 
little consideration for the needs of users and other people affected by the system. At 
the most basic level, it is argued that these three aspects are what motivate most 
information security practices. 
10 
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Risks identified through 
risk assessment process 
Understand risks 
Are current 
behaviours N Change behaviours 
acceptable? 
Y 
Reinforce 
behaviours 
Are proposed N Resist changes hanges acceptable 
y 
Support changes 
Is current Change current environment N 
position acceptable? 
y 
Risks remediated 
Maintain current 
position 
Figure 2-2 Basic flow of an information security system 
It follows from Figure 2-2 that an information security system must have means for 
assessing a position, answering the questions and carrying out the actions that result 
11 
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as shown in Figure 2-2. One way of determining the presence and effectiveness of 
these means is to model them. 
This thesis does precisely that: models the current practice to determine its 
effectiveness both from a pragmatic point of view and from a socially aware one. The 
thesis also develops an evaluative model for information security that organisations 
and practitioners can use to determine the effectiveness of their information security 
practice. This new model is tested, refined and ultimately critiqued during the course 
of this research. 
It will be seen through the development of this study that information security can be 
defined in many different ways and viewed from a number of different perspectives. 
This research project applies these alternate views to the information security domain 
and delivers an improved model for understanding and evaluating information 
security. 
2.3 Information Security Current Practice 
2. Current Practice 
2.1 Structure of this 1ntroduction to 
23 Information 
chapter ormation security security current 
practice 
2.4 Rationale for 
2.5 Summary 
proposed approach 
Few, but by no means nobody, would argue that it is a bad idea to protect sensitive 
information against unauthorised access and maintain its accuracy. Few are likely to 
argue that it is a bad idea to make information available to people who should have it. 
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Whilst this view is admittedly superficial, it is arguable that only those within 
academic or anarchic circles are likely to consider trying to challenge and change it. 
Most just accept it as rather obvious. The term 'motherhood and apple pie' is perhaps 
an unwritten principle in the design of information security systems. This difficulty in 
arguing against the core information security principles, together with difficulty in 
providing a suitable definition and purpose for information security, make the plotting 
of some kind of history for information security troublesome. When did somebody first 
think it a good idea to stop someone else seeing their information? When did 
someone first think it a good idea to share some information they possess with 
someone else? It is unlikely in the extreme that there is any accurate answer to either 
of these questions. It is therefore not proposed that the following exploration of 
current practice represents the only historical model for information security, the first 
or even the best. However it does represent a model that is in common use, and one 
with which the author has some experience. 
In the early 1990's, a group of security professionals formed a committee under the 
auspices of the British Standards Institute and with the support of the UK 
Government's Department of Trade and Industry to document current'best 
information security practice' based on the current experience, knowledge and 
practice of those contributing. The product of this effort was the Code of Practice for 
Information Security Management (BSI 1993). The committee continued to work 
towards maintaining and improving the code of practice, and today it has developed 
into the British Standards for information security mentioned previously (ISO 2000c; 
BSI 2002a). The same committee continues to maintain and revise this standard, and 
in 2005 a new version will be published. During the various iterations, part 1 of the 
standard has been accepted by the International Organization for Standardization 
(sic), commonly known as ISO, as an international standard, ISO-17799. 
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One model for information security practice and the key controls required to improve 
security is embodied in the British Standard for information security (ISO 2000c; BSI 
2002a). Part 1 of the standard (ISO 2000c) is a code of practice which contains 
around 130 controls which should be considered and implemented. Part 2 of the 
standard (BSI 2002a) contains the same number of controls but specifies their use 
and is therefore auditable. The author of this thesis is a member of the BSI 
committee that wrote and maintains these standards, and is a qualified lead auditor 
for BS7799, and therefore has some experience with using this model. Both parts of 
the standard provide guidance around the development and implementation of a risk- 
based management system that allows the continued assessment and management 
of risks. This is delivered through an Information Security Management System 
(ISMS) that incorporates a cycle which, in essence, compiles a list of the 130 controls 
mentioned above and determines whether the absence, or inadequate 
implementation of these controls is likely to harm the organisation and if so, by how 
much. Proper management of risks and correct implementation of applicable controls 
can attract certification to the standard and the right to use the British Standard kite 
mark to signify appropriate management of information security. There are implicit 
benefits in gaining certification for an organisation. These include a perception of 
reduced variability in the processes surrounding the information security practice, 
and an increased confidence in sharing information between business partners when 
both have been certified. There are also explicit benefits in providing an automatic 
'pass' for some regulations and other standards. For example, the British Standard 
for IT Service Management (BSI 2002b; BSI 2003) contains specific security 
requirements under Section 6.6 but explicitly states that security requirements will be 
fulfilled if an organisation gains certification to BS7799 (the British Standard for 
information security management). 
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2.3.1 An Assessment of Current Information Security Practice 
This section models the British Standard as a reference point, expands this with an 
exploration of some of the available information security literature to plot a definition 
of current practice, and then assesses current information security practice. 
As discussed previously in this chapter, the British Standards adopt the common 
definition of information security: confidentiality, integrity and availability, as the 
guiding principles of the standards (ISO 2000c: viii & 1; BSI 2002a). Figure 2-3 below 
draws together the two parts of the British Standard (ISO 2000c; BSI 2002a) to 
provide a single model. 
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Figure 2-3 Model of information security practice as defined by the British 
Standard 
In Figure 2-3 the red area represents the contribution from part 1 of the standard and 
the green represents that of part 2. The yellow area represents the ten sections 
within the standard that contain the security controls and the number of controls in 
each 
2.3.1.1 Part 1 of the Standard 
This part of the standard defines information security as the preservation of 
confidentiality (ensuring information is accessible only to those authorised to have 
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access); integrity (safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and 
processing methods); and availability (ensuring that authorised users have access to 
information and associated assets when required). The availability clause does not 
give consideration to how users should have access or in what form the information 
is preferred to be presented. 
Part 1 also provides information on why security is needed. It suggests that 
information and supporting processes and technologies are important business 
assets, argues that they are under increasing threat of damage or destruction. Not 
least because dependence on these assets is growing and the trend towards 
distributed computing weakens specialist central control. Part 1 also argues that 
achievement of security (as defined) through technical means is very limited and 
requires participation from all employees and visible support from management. 
There is also a suggestion that participation from customers and suppliers might be 
required. 
This part of the standard advises on how to establish security requirements. It 
provides 3 sources of requirements: derived from assessing risks to the organisation; 
the legal, statutory, regulatory and contractual framework within which the 
organisation operates; and the particular set of principles, objectives and 
requirements for information processing within the organisation. The suggested 
approach to the assessment of risk is defined as the systematic consideration of the 
business harm likely to result from a security failure, and the realistic likelihood of 
such a failure occurring in light of prevailing threats and vulnerabilities, and the 
controls currently implemented. 
Part 1 also provides guidance for selecting controls, establishes a starting point 
based on those controls considered to be essential and commonly held best practice, 
and suggests those factors that experience has shown are likely to be critical to the 
success of an information security practice. 
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Finally, Part 1 provides recommended controls with which information security could 
be managed within an organisation. 
2.3.1.2 Part 2 of the Standard 
This part of the standard focuses on a process approach to the management of 
information security within an organisation through the deployment of an Information 
Security Management System (ISMS). At the centre of this process approach is the 
Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) approach to process management devised by Shewhart 
(1939), although Shewhart's contribution is not acknowledged in the standard. 
The ISMS using PDCA approach is summarised in Figure 2-4 below. 
Plan 
Do Implement and 
operate the ISMS 
Establish the 
ISMS 
Development, 
maintenance and 
improvement cycle 
Maintain and 
improve the ISMS Act 
Monitor and review 
the ISMS 
Check 
Figure 2-4 PDCA model applied to ISMS processes (BSI, 2002: p 2) 
2.3.1.3 Controls within the Standard 
As mentioned previously, part 1 of the standard is a code of practice and part 2 is a 
specification. The former provides recommendations and the latter providing 
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requirements. Part 2 delivers a basis for auditing and certification and part 1 does 
not. 
To illustrate the difference between the two, the following is a transcript of Section 
5.2.1 (Classification Guidelines) of part 1: 
Classifications and associated protective controls for information should take account of business 
needs for sharing or restricting information, and the business impacts associated with such 
needs, e. g. unauthorized access or damage to the information. In general, the classification 
given to information is a shorthand way of determining how this information is to be handled and 
protected. 
Information and outputs from systems handling classified data should be labelled in terms of its 
value and sensitivity to the organisation. It may be appropriate to label information in terms of 
how critical it is to the organisation, e. g. in terms of its integrity and availability. Information often 
ceases to be sensitive or critical after a certain period of time, for example, when the information 
has been made public. These aspects should be taken into account, as over-classification can 
lead to an unnecessary additional business expense. Classification guidelines should anticipate 
and allow for the fact that the classification of any given item of information is not necessarily 
fixed for all time, and may change in accordance with some predetermined policy (see 9.1). 
Consideration should be given to the number of classification categories and the benefits to be 
gained from their use. Overly complex schemes may become cumbersome and uneconomic to 
use or prove impractical. Care should be taken in interpreting classification labels on documents 
from other organisations which may have different definitions for the same or similarly named 
labels. 
The responsibility for defining the classification of an item of information, e. g. for a document, 
data record, data file or diskette, and for periodically reviewing the classification, should remain 
with the originator or nominated owner of the information. 
Whereas the following is a transcript from the corresponding section (Classification 
Guidelines) in part 2: "Classifications and associated protective controls for 
information shall take account of business needs for sharing or restricting 
information, and the business impacts associated with such needs. " 
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There is a direct correlation between the two sets of controls in parts 1 and 2 and this 
is represented by the yellow area in Figure 2-3. 
2.3.1.4 Comparison of the British Standard With Other Models 
Whilst the British Standard represents one of the main models, and arguably the 
most prevalent model within the information security domain, it does not represent 
the only model. To provide more balance in this exploration, an alternative model will 
now be discussed and contrasted with that within the British Standard. 
The Best Practice for Security Management 
This is a publication under the auspices of the Information Technology Infrastructure 
Library (ITIL). ITIL consists of a series of books giving guidance on the provision of 
quality IT services, and on the accommodation and environmental facilities needed to 
support IT. ITIL has been developed in recognition of organisations' growing 
dependency on IT and embodies best practices for IT Service Management. The 
current ITIL library of publications is represented in Table 2-1 below. 
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Publication Purpose 
Software Asset Software is a critical element of information and 
Management communications technologies and many organisations have 
large investments in software, whether internally developed 
or externally procured. This book defines Software Asset 
Management (SAM) and explains what is required to perform 
it effectively and efficiently as identified in industry'best 
practice'. 
Service Support Service Support focuses on ensuring that the customer has 
access to appropriate services to support business functions. 
Issues covered include Service Desk, Incident Management, 
Problem Management, Configuration Management, Change 
Management and Release Management. 
Service Delivery This book covers the service the business requires of the 
provider in order to enable adequate support to users. Issues 
covered include Capacity Management, Financial 
Management for IT Services, Availability Management, 
Service Level Management and IT Service Continuity 
Management. 
Planning to This book answers the question 'Where do I start with ITIL? ' It 
Implement Service explains the steps necessary to identify how an organisation 
Management might expect to benefit from ITIL and how to achieve those 
benefits. 
It will help organisations in identifying their strengths and 
weaknesses, enabling them to develop the former and 
overcome the latter. 
ICT Infrastructure ICT Infrastructure Management is concerned with the 
Management processes, organisation and tools needed to provide a stable 
IT and communications infrastructure, and is the foundation 
for ITIL service management processes. 
The book covers Design and Planning, Deployment, 
Operations, and Technical Support. 
Application Application Management provides an outline of the 
Management Application Management lifecycle and is a guide for business 
users, developers and service managers of how applications 
can be managed from a service management perspective. 
This book positions service management at the heart of the 
provision of information services to the business. Based on 
this perspective, applications should be managed throughout 
their lifecycle with the business objectives in mind. 
The Business This book is concerned with helping business managers to 
Perspective understand IT service provision. Issues covered include 
Business Relationship Management, Partnerships and 
Outsourcing, and continuous improvement and exploitation of 
Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) for 
21 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
business advantage. 
Security Management This book looks at security from the service provider stand- 
point, identifying how security management relates to the IT 
Security Officer and how it provides the level of security 
necessary for the provision of the total service to the 
organisation. The guide focuses on the process of 
implementing security requirements identified in the IT 
Service Level Agreement, rather than considering business 
issues of security policy. 
Table 2-1 ITIL publication family 
It can be seen that the management of security is one of the eight fundamental ITIL 
publications and represents an important process within ITIL management. 
Within the ITIL publication for managing security (Cazemier, Overbeek et al. 2003), 
security management is defined as "the process of managing a defined level of 
security on information and IT services. " (Cazemier, Overbeek et al. 2003: 3 & 10). 
According to Cazemier, the purpose of security management is the assurance of the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of services and information. This is exactly the 
same purpose as the British Standard. Cazemier also provide an IT Security 
Management process which will now be explored. The fundamental building block for 
Cazemier's process is represented in Figure 2-5 below 
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" Pte: 
" Service level agreement 
" Underpinning contracts 
r Operational level agreements 
" Policy statements 
" Implement: 
" C t l 
Create awareness on ro : 
" Get organised 
Classification and registration 
" Maintenance: Establish Management of personnel & 
" Learn management physical security " Improve - plan & framework Control of access rights implementation 
Allocate Security incident handling 
responsibilities 
Security management of 
computers, networks, 
applications etc 
Evaluate: 
" Internal and external audits 
" Self assessments 
" Security incidents 
Figure 2-5 Part of IT Security Management process (Cazemier, Overbeek et at. 
2003: 15). 
Referring to Figures 2-4 and 2-5 above it can be seen that the security management 
processes within the British Standard and within Cazemier are remarkably similar. 
The Plan-Implement-Evaluate-Maintenance phases from Cazemier are almost 
exactly the same as the Plan-Do-Check-Act phases of the British Standard. 
Cazemier has also plotted the principle sections and controls from the British 
Standard onto the ITIL security management process. According to Cazemier's 
references, the 1995 version of the British Standard has been used and only a draft 
version of the 1999 revision. 
Although Cazemier's book does not specify any particular controls that should be 
implemented, it does specify the inclusion of a security section within SLAB. However 
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the specimen security section (Cazemier, Overbeek et al. 2003: Appendix A), lists all 
of the controls in the British Standard, in full, and includes their section numbers. 
Whilst there are some very stark similarities between the ITIL and British Standard 
publications, there are two specific departures from the latter by the former. 
Cazemier pursues at length the establishment of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) 
between the security provider and other stakeholders. In particular, Cazemier seeks 
defined customer requirements (Cazemier, Overbeek et al. 2003: 15). Although this 
theme of delivering security in accordance with customer needs is not explored by 
Cazemier, and the needs of system users as distinct from customers are not 
mentioned at all, there is at least some tacit recognition that there are social issues at 
play within information systems and in the delivery of an information security practice. 
2.3.1.5 Exploration of Current Information Security Practice Literature 
Baskerville (1988), Cooper (1989), and Peltier (2001) provide a substantially risk 
based means for developing and implementing information security. Russell and 
Gangemi (1991) recognise that information security is predominantly perceived as 
secrecy, although they, along with Langford (1995) propose that other aspects such 
as availability may be more important in some situations. This line is extended further 
by Gollman (1999) who also considers the possible prominence of accountability 
(personal responsibility) and dependability (reliance that can be placed on the service 
the system delivers). Warman (1993) considers information security as being widely 
regarded as the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) model. Forrester and 
Morrison (1994) explore computer ethics and reframe the computer criminal as a 
modern day Robin Hood. In this regard, Forester and Morrison are perhaps amongst 
the first to consider information security as some kind of socially informed domain. 
Neumann (1995) develops this a little further by considering where to place the 
blame when things go wrong. Wylder (2003) takes a slightly different approach and 
tries to integrate the importance of information security into an organisation's 
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business goals. Killmeyer-Tudor (2000) by contrast seeks to establish a security 
architecture of several components each one focusing explicitly on a particular and 
acceptable level of control. There are numerous examples of bringing regulation and 
legal issues into the domain of information security. Birch looks at the concept of the 
Internet Driving Licence as a means of securing electronic transactions (Birch 1997). 
Whereas Baum describes the American Bar Association Digital Signature Guidelines 
and other initiatives designed to authenticate electronic transactions (Baum 1997). 
McCauley explores some of the ethical issues arising from the increasing use of the 
Internet by law firms (McCauley 1997). These regulatory issues can be very 
troublesome when trying to balance the need for confidentiality and protection 
against the desire for freedom to choose. This is taken to a much greater degree in a 
well known example of the state taking centralised control. Leng reports on 
Singapore's rules designed to control Internet access to objectionable content (Leng 
1997). 
Then there is the huge body of literature around specific technical threats. From 
Internet security, authored by a well known 'hacker' called Longbough (1996), 
through network and perimeter security (Northcutt and al 2002), to client/server 
control and security (Kuong 1996), and just about every flavour of information and IT 
security in between. However, one approach that has been largely ignored is a 
socially informed one. In support of this, Wright comments on the scarcity of literature 
in the current domain "The empirical literature related to computer security ... is 
sparse" (Wright 1993: 56). He does not seek a theoretical grounding though. Instead 
for his theoretical material he draws "... from the recorded area of employee theft" 
(Wright 1993: 56) which, it is argued, is something of a missed opportunity to develop 
an approach which is underpinned by established theory rather than records of thefts 
by employees. 
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Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
Figure 2-6 below represents further analysis of the literature within the information 
security domain. This is the result of a search of a sample of currently available 
information security literature which is considered representative on the basis of a 
quantitative literature review which is broadly in line with the expectations of both the 
author and other key information security practitioners with whom this has been 
discussed. 
Q Risk Management 
Q Pseudo-Humanistic 
Q Business/Organisational 
Q Operational/Technical 
Figure 2-6 Spread of information security categories within current domain 
The pattern seems to emerge of a domain that includes some broad risk-based 
theory and becomes progressively more specific and technically biased over time 
with some excursions into business and humanist domains. How successful these 
humanist excursions have been is unclear as they typically focus on superficial 
ethical issues such as data privacy, and how to get people to accept the required 
information security practice. Business-aligned literature tends towards the 
attainment of resources to maintain the security practice rather than a true attempt to 
align security with the business objectives. In terms of quantity of literature there is a 
massive bias towards technical and operational controls within the domain. In 
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fairness, as technology continues to evolve there is an almost continual need to 
update the technical security literature base to keep pace. However, this does not 
adequately explain the relative absence of social literature within what is essentially a 
domain that radically affects people and how they are expected to behave. 
The very presence of a British Standard seems to be one of the problems with the 
information security domain as it stands today. British Standards can be shown to be 
useful tools in differentiating between one product and another. Many assume that 
the presence of the BSI kite mark on a child's safety harness for example, will mean 
that the target product is more reliable than one that does not have a kite mark. It is 
assumed that certain criteria are observed in the manufacture of certified products 
and that their quality and reliability is tested using established industry practices. Few 
consumers probably know the detailed tests, tolerances and manufacturing practices 
that are used to gain and maintain certification. Most probably trust that the product 
will be 'better' and perhaps even as good as it's possible to get as a result of 
certification. However it is unclear how these certification principles that seem to work 
so well with products can be satisfactorily applied to services, processes and controls 
such as those embodied in BS7799 to achieve a better result than one which does 
not meet the certification requirements. Other British Standards appear to suffer from 
the same problem. For example, the standard for Quality Management (ISO 2000a), 
the standard for Environmental Management (ISO 2000b), and the standard for 
Service Management (BSI 2002b; BSI 2003) all suffer, it is argued, by trying to bring 
standardisation to a domain where standardisation does not readily fit. Generally 
speaking where there is human free will present in a domain, the opportunities to 
truly remove variability through standardisation are constrained by the unpredictable 
nature of human behaviour. In the case of the information security standard, as well 
as the examples cited above, the response from the standard is to further constrain 
human behaviour within a rule-based framework of technical controls. This seems 
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perilous in a domain where social issues would appear to be significant, if not 
dominant. To ignore social issues within the information security domain is to imply 
that the security of an information system is not changed if all of the people involved 
in it, or affected by it are changed. This implication seems nonsensical in the extreme 
given that two of the three guiding principles of current information security practice 
are that information should be accessed only by people who are authorised to access 
it, and that steps should be taken to ensure information is available when authorised 
people need it. This theme of social issues within the information security domain is 
THE central issue of this study and is explored further in the next section of this 
chapter (Rationale) and throughout this thesis. 
2.3.1.6 Towards a Determination of the Success of Current Practice 
As indicated earlier, for information security there is no measurement in terms of 
whether an implementation of information security practice has been successful. 
Information security practices that are based around control structures such as that in 
the British Standard include quantitative measurement. For example the number of 
controls implemented, how long it took to implement them, and how much it cost. 
However, there is very little qualitative measurement such as how successful the 
implementation was in reducing risk. There are also means whereby the presence or 
absence of controls can be audited and certified. It can be determined whether 
security failures have become greater or reduced following implementation of 
controls. However this doesn't seem a very acceptable means of measuring success 
as any reduction could be due to some unknown factor outside of the scope of the 
practice. Consequently there seems to be no effective means of determining whether 
a system is fully secure or even more secure as a result of deploying information 
security controls. Nor does there seem to be any way of establishing how much 
security is enough to afford the protection that an organisation may desire to have. 
Information security and the supporting British Standard represent best available 
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practice in ensuring the confidentiality of sensitive information, and the integrity and 
availability of important business information. With such high claims one would 
expect BS7799 to have received great attention and to be an essential tool in the 
armoury of any successful organisation. There is good quality quantitative data 
available to demonstrate trends in information security and the use of BS7799. Every 
two years the DTI sponsors an Information Security Breaches Survey (DTI 2000; DTI 
2002; DTI 2004). The following table (Table 2-3) summarises the results pertinent to 
information security generally and BS7799 in particular. 
The yellow cells provide an indication of the seriousness with which information 
security in general, and BS7799 in particular appears to be taken. An information 
security policy is considered a fundamental and first step towards current information 
security practice. This can be contrasted with the importance that senior managers 
say they place on information security (green cells) and the effects of not paying 
sufficient attention in this domain (purple cells). The blue cells provide some basic 
demographic data. The industry sectors shown are the largest represented in the 
sample. Further detailed analysis of the results appears below the table. 
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2000 Survey 2002 Survey 2004 Survey 
Number of UK 
businesses with a 
documented 14% 27% 33% 
[information] security 
policy 
Number of those 
responsible for IT No data 15% 12% Security that are aware 
of contents of BS7799 
Number of UK business 
that have BS7799 No data 5% 5% 
Implemented 
Amount of IT budget 
spent on [information] No data 2% 3% 
security 
Number of UK 
businesses believe 
information security is 53% 73% 75% 
high priority for senior 
management 
Number of UK 
businesses have 
suffered at least one 24% 44% 78% 
malicious security 
breach in past year 
Number of UK 
businesses that have No data 83% 93% implemented anti-virus 
software 
Number of UK 
businesses that have 
carried out a detailed 37% 66% No data 
risk assessment of their 
IT systems and the 
threats to them 
Number of staff a) 51% a) 51.9% employed by No data b) 29% , b) 31% 
respondents. a) 1- 49, c) 20% c) 17.1% b) 50 -249, c)250+ 
Sample size 1000 1000 1000 
% of respondents in No data 24% 24% 
manufacturing sector 
% in retail & distribution No data 15% 15% 
% in technology No data 14% 14% 
Table 2-3 Information security breaches surveys 
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It can be seen that, in spite of significant increases in the number of UK businesses 
that have suffered security breaches (24% in 2000,44% in 2002, almost doubling to 
78% in 2004) the number of organisations with a security policy remains low at a 
third in 2004. Remarkably, amongst those responsible for information security, only 
12% were aware of the contents of BS7799 in the 2004 survey. This shows a slight 
drop from the 2002 survey! The number of businesses who have implemented 
BS7799 also remains a disappointing 5%. However, the number of organisations 
who have installed anti-virus software has significantly increased to 93%. Other 
areas showing significant improvements include the perceived importance of 
information security and the number of organisations that have carried out a risk 
assessment. Clearly the disappointing awareness and use of the standard is not 
matched by the perceived importance of information security, the need for risk 
assessment and the value in investing in key protective measures such as anti-virus 
software. So what is causing this lack of interest in the standard? The 2002 and 2004 
surveys both cited the top reason given by respondents - the cost of purchasing the 
standard. When you consider that the cost of IS017799 is currently £94 and the cost 
of BS7799 is currently £56 that is a little surprising. You can also buy them both for a 
discounted £110. The second most common reason cited is that the standard is seen 
to be only relevant to large organisations. If that is the case then the uptake in large 
organisations might be expected to be significant. The proportion of people 
responsible for information security in large organisations was 42% in the 2002 
survey and dropped back to just over a third in the 2004 survey. 
2.3.1.7 Information Assurance -A Survey 
The purpose of this section is to further validate the outcomes of the analysis of the 
Information Security Breaches Surveys presented in the previous section. 
The Information Assurance Advisory Council (IAAC) surveys corporate leaders, 
public policy makers, law enforcement and the research community to address the 
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challenges of information infrastructure protection. They are engaged in the 
development of policy recommendations to government and corporate leaders. IAAC 
recommendations tend to be influential because their sponsors and members 
comprise leading commercial end-users, government policy makers and the research 
community. IAAC's stated aim is to work for the creation of a safe and secure 
Information Society. 
In October 2002 the IAAC published a survey (Modhvadia, Daman et al. 2002) which 
explored the concept of Information Assurance, contrasted it with information 
security, and surveyed organisations' awareness of the British Standard for 
Information Security (ISO 2000c; BSI 2002a). The survey was undertaken only 
amongst IAAC members. A total of 58 surveys were distributed; all were followed up 
by telephone. Full responses in writing and in telephone interviews were received 
from sixteen members (31% response rate). Approximately half the organisations 
surveyed were large, a quarter medium-sized and a quarter small. The survey 
contains no further information on the meaning of large, medium and small 
organisations. The organisations were simply asked to categorise themselves. The 
following sectors were represented: Finance 8%; Government 15%; Retail 4%; Risk 
Management 15%; IT 23%; Telecoms 12%; Utilities 12%; Manufacturing 7%; and 
Legal 4%. 
The study provides a comparison between the terms 'Information Security' and 
'Information Assurance. ' The study suggests that the term information security often 
leads to an over-emphasis on confidentiality whilst missing other aspects of the 
problem, for instance: integrity, accessibility and reliability. Moreover, use of the term 
security and an emphasis on IT often mean that this type of risk is too easily seen as 
a low-level and niche activity, which falls outside the interests of senior management 
and the board of directors. 
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It is clear that those surveyed do not see BS7799 as being sufficient to cover all 
business requirements; the lack of other standards is leading many organisations to 
develop in-house, bespoke standards and processes. Nearly two-thirds of 
respondents found that BS7799 does not go far enough in protecting information 
systems and there is a clear demand for further standards and clearer guidance. 
From detailed responses to the survey, it was found that the companies who thought 
there was no better alternative did so not because of the merits of BS7799 but 
because of the lack of alternatives. 
(Modhvadia, Daman et al. 2002) propose a recasting of information security as 
'Information Assurance' with less emphasis on confidentiality and more on other 
aspects such as integrity, availability and reliability. However, they still strongly 
propose a controls biased approach driven by the assessment of risk. 
2.3.1.8 Section Conclusions 
This exploration of current practice has surfaced a surprising willingness in the 
literature and in the practice of organisations to accept information security as a 
concept even though the tools available to implement it are often considered lacking. 
Through a detailed examination of the British Standard and an extensive review of 
available information security literature a model has emerged which clearly shows a 
domain which is dominated by a set of practical controls which are seen as rigid, 
unclear and largely irrelevant to the business needs of most organisations. This view 
is largely supported by the findings of the two surveys (outlined in Sections 2.3.1.6 
and 2.3.1.7). 
What has become clear, even within some recent developments that have sought to 
provide a more accessible model for managing information such as information 
assurance, is that all current practice is centric around the needs of the technology 
and of information rather than the needs of people in general and users in particular. 
36 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
Where human issues are explored in this domain, it is to confer responsibilities and 
education on people to conform to the needs of the system and to regulate their 
behaviour. 
What emerges then is a domain which is to all intents and purposes technological as 
proven by the absence of sufficient consideration for human issues, and a domain 
dominated by pragmatism as demonstrated by the way in which the principle models 
in the domain were constructed and are maintained. That is, constructed through the 
collation of the practical experiences of practitioners, and maintained through 
practical experiences of practitioners and by reference to surveys and in response to 
user groups and new regulatory frameworks. 
2.4 Rationale for the Proposed Approach 
2. Current Practice 
2.1 Structure of this 2.2 Introduction to 
2.3 Information 
chapter information security security current 
practice 
2.4 Rationale for 2.5 Summary 
proposed approach 
The domain of information security can be viewed in a variety of different ways and 
from a variety of different perspectives. Each of these perspectives could be likened 
to a lens through which the domain is viewed which brings certain aspects into 
sharper focus. 
Amongst the more basic models for this is that which represents STEP functions: 
Social, Technological, Economic and Political. In this model a domain is viewed 
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through each of these functions to surface issues and identify opportunities for 
improvement. 
It has already been argued that the information security domain has developed over 
the past 15 years as one highly dominated by practical experience. It has been seen 
in the previous sections contained in this chapter that current information security 
practice has some issues of credibility, relevance and effectiveness. It can be argued 
that the absence of an established theory to underpin the domain contributes greatly 
to its lack of credibility and restricts its development as a domain which has broad 
relevance across a variety of organisations. 
At this point it would be of value to explore in some depth the approach that was 
taken to the development of the British Standard which carries such dominance over 
the information security domain. 
To simplify matters, but still allow the central point to be made, the effective 
information security practice of three of the contributors to the development of the 
British Standard could be represented by the shaded circles in Figure 2-7 below. 
These represent real organisations with significant investment in information security. 
Figure 2-7 Representation of individual information security practice of three of 
the contributors to the development of the British Standard 
The British Standard was developed, and is still maintained by agreement between 
these contributors. This collaboration can be represented by the circles in Figure 2-8 
below. 
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Figure 2-8 Representation of collaboration between individual information 
security practices of three of the contributors to the development of the British 
Standard 
As the British Standard was developed through agreement and areas of common 
practice between the contributing organisations, it is largely situated in the area 
identified as 'A' in Figure 2-8 above with some practice drawn from areas 'B'. Matters 
are complicated when it is considered that there were not just 3 contributors, there 
were in fact 13. One of whom is the author of this thesis. So, not only is the British 
Standard, and therefore security practices based on the British Standard, constrained 
by an approach which is technical and pragmatic, it is further constrained by its 
construction as a subset of the practices of the 13 contributing organisations. In 
summary, with reference to Figure 2-8: Area 'D', which represents the non-technical 
and non-pragmatic aspects of the domain (such as social and theoretical issues), is 
all but ignored; areas 'C' are largely ignored; areas `B' contribute somewhat to the 
development of the domain; and area A forms the core of the standard. The 
development of the British Standard and its continued maintenance is therefore 
bounded by the subset of common experience and practical knowledge of its 
authors. It is therefore argued that the information security domain is dominated by a 
British Standard which is in turn to all practical purposes constrained by the practice 
and experiential knowledge of its authors. It is further argued that this in turn leads 
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directly to the credibility and relevancy crisis that continues to restrict the 
development of the domain. 
Furthermore, it is a given that the domain has social aspects to it because people are 
affected by it. It can be argued that these social factors have so far been largely 
ignored by those who have influenced the development of the domain. There is 
certainly little evidence of such considerations in the 130 controls that form the heart 
of the British Standard. The absence of social considerations leaves the domain 
dominated by technology. Controls and practices are geared to the needs of 
information and technology rather than to the needs of the people that interact with it 
and use it. The implicit assumption of a technical system would therefore be that if all 
the human elements related to the system were to be changed; this would make no 
discernable difference to its operation or to its security. 
These discussions can be readily summarised in a two-dimensional grid which is 
presented at Figure 2-9 below. The grid has been developed in a purely social 
context. When considering issues such as how people behave there are other 
dimensions that could be considered such as anthropology and cognition. It would 
likely be highly valuable to carry out research in these areas too, although out of 
scope for this study. 
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Theoretical 
Domain based on one or more 
established theories that may inform 
a debate concerned with what 
people do, how they behave, what 
they need etc 
(U 
U 
0 
Social Practice 
Domain based on the experience 
and knowledge of key stakeholders 
who attempt to inform a debate 
concerned with what people do, 
how they behave, what they need 
etc 
Paul Drake 
Domain based on one or more 
established theories that may inform 
a debate concerned with how 
technology will perform, how its 
performance might be measured etc 
Technical Practice 
Domain based on experience and 
knowledge of key stakeholders who 
attempt to inform a debate 
concerned with how technology will 
perform, how its performance might 
be measured etc 
Practical 
Figure 2-9 Theory vs. practical and social vs. technical comparison grid 
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It has been argued that the current information security domain can be best 
represented as a technical practice as there is no explicit theory present and there is 
scant regard to social needs within the domain. It has been further argued that a 
successful information security domain will have elements of all four zones 
represented on the grid. This theme of the information security domain requiring a 
combination of social and technical components is explored in much greater depth in 
Chapter 2, Theoretical Explorations. In that exploration it is demonstrated that there 
is a need for socially aware measures as well as a series of essential technical 
controls. 
It is therefore concluded that the information security domain is socio-technical in 
nature which would benefit from both practical experience and a theoretical 
underpinning. 
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A socio-technical approach provides additional lenses through which the domain can 
be viewed. One such lens would be that which could be represented as the 
subjective-objective debate, seen from a social or socio-technical perspective. 
The objective theme is characterised by a view that reality can be observed and is 
governed by universal laws, whereas the subjective theme is characterised by ideas 
and perceptions. At the most fundamental ontological level, objectivism is dominated 
by the idea that reality is external from individual perceptions, whilst subjectivism is 
dominated by the opposite view: that reality is what is perceived in the human 
consciousness. 
These characteristics, together with a positivistic epistemology in the case of 
objective domains and phenomenological epistemology in subjective domains, are 
summarised in Burrell & Morgan (1979: 3) and are represented below at 
Figure 2-10. 
Subjective Objective 
Nominalism Ontology Realism 
Anti-positivism Epistemology Positivism 
Voluntarism Human nature Determinism 
Ideographic Methodology Nomothetic 
Figure 2-10 A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social 
science (Burrell & Morgan, 1979. p3) 
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Another view within a socially informed analysis of the domain would be the 
regulation-radical change debate. The sociology of regulation is concerned with the 
sustenance of the status quo, social order and the integration and cohesion of 
society. In a sense a regulated society is satisfied with what is. By contrast, the 
sociology of radical change is concerned with breaking the status quo, with conflict, 
and with contradiction and argument. In a sense a society dominated by radical 
change is dissatisfied with what is and seeks what ought to be. It will be seen as the 
thesis develops that these objective-subjective and regulation-radical change axes 
are significant contributors to a better understanding of information security. Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) model these two axes into four paradigms which can assist in 
analysing social theory. This model is represented below at Figure 2-11. 
The sociology of radical change 
Radical Humanist Radical Structuralist 
2 
O 
Interpretive Functionalist 
The sociology of regulation 
Figure 2-11 Four paradigms for the analysis of 
social theory (Burrell & Morgan, 1979. p. 22) 
So far it has been established that the current information security domain is 
dominated by pragmatism over theory and is dominated by the needs of information 
and technology over the needs of people. It has also been established, or at least 
argued, that it would be beneficial to provide an explicitly social perspective and also 
to provide explicit and established theory to underpin the domain. 
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Although the model at Figure 2-11 is now over a quarter of a century old, it still 
provides a useful basis from which to navigate and explore available social theories. 
This exploration takes place in the next chapter. The remainder of this section will 
seek to map current information security practice onto the grid at Figure 2-11. This 
will form a useful base for the theoretical explorations that take place in the next 
chapter. 
In preparation for this mapping exercise it is necessary to synthesise Figure 2-9 
which condenses the preceding discussion about the way in which the British 
Standard was constructed and is maintained, with Figure 2-10 which provides a 
means to analyse social theory, and Figure 2-11 which develops four paradigms for 
analysing social theory. This mapping forms a very important and explicit bridge 
between the technical-pragmatic nature of the current domain and the social- 
theoretical aims of this thesis. 
Orientation: with reference to Figure 2-9, this indicates whether a domain is oriented 
towards pragmatism or theory. 
Nature: with reference to Figures 2-10 and 2-11, this indicates whether the nature of 
the domain is subjective or objective 
Aim: with reference to Figure 2-11, this indicates the fundamental aims of the four 
paradigms. 
Epistemology: with reference to Figure 2-10, this indicates structured from a positivist 
or phenomenological stance. 
Dominant Theory: with reference to Figures 2-9 and 2-11, this indicates the principal 
underlying theory within the paradigm. 
Action Bias: with reference to Figure 2-11, this indicates the manner in which change 
can be actioned within each paradigm. 
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The first steps in this mapping exercise are to summarise the current information 
security domain in terms of the indicators developed above. This summary is 
presented at Table 2-4 below. 
Indicator Current ISec domain 
Orientation Pragmatic 
Nature Objective 
Aim Problem resolution 
Epistemology Positivist 
Dominant Theory Technical 
Action bias Linear 
Table 2-4 Grid indicators versus current ISec domain 
These same indicators can now be used to further analyse the social-theoretical 
domain as presented by Burrell and Morgan (Table 2-5 below) to surface the 
paradigm which would dominate the current information security practice if it had 
been developed with a social-theoretical underpinning. This forges a link between 
current practice and the desired underpinning which will be developed in the next 
chapter. 
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In striving to 'improve' the security of information and information systems there is an 
implicit assumption that security can be measured in the first place. It is also implicit 
that it is possible to control the security of an information system and improve it. Both 
of these facets are typical of a domain which is dominated by functionalist thinking. 
Further, there is much talk amongst information security practitioners and their 
customers towards achieving a 'secure system'. This implies that: a) there is such a 
thing as a secure system, b) that those involved in the system would know a secure 
system if they experienced it, and c) assuming that a) and b) are true, that the secure 
system can be achieved. The British Standard holds that a secure system is one in 
which confidentiality, integrity and availability are preserved (ISO 2000c: 1). This is 
certainly a common definition of a secure system amongst practitioners. Again, this 
idea of a clear end point and a linear progression to achieve it is highly indicative of a 
functionalist domain. 
Information security is reckoned to be improved by the implementation of a 
continuous stream of projects and initiatives that move closer to the panacea of a 
secure system. Imposing good password management on IT systems and their 
users, maintaining standby systems in the event of system failure, laying down 
requirements that ensure ongoing legal and regulatory compliance and providing 
rules for additional safeguards when travelling are just a few examples of common 
information security controls. It is therefore argued that current practice is 
functionalist because within an organisation, and indeed across organisations, these 
types of controls are applied uniformly with little or no regard to the effect on the 
people concerned. The purpose of the security control is determined prior to 
implementation, together with the means for measuring success. The implementation 
is monitored, often in terms of keeping within financial projections and predicted time 
scales. 
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2.5 Summary 
Paul Drake 
2. Current Practice 
2.1 Structure of this 
chapter 
2.2 Introduction to 
information security 
2.3 Information 
security current 
practice 
2.4 Rationale for 2.5 Summary 
proposed approach 
In this chapter, following a brief introductory section, the current information security 
domain is extensively explored and analysed. Figure 2-2 above provides a simplified 
but still effective overview of an information security system. Figure 2-3 provides a 
model of the inter-relationships between the two parts of the standard in a way that 
has not been provided before. Further development of this model is outside of the 
scope of this thesis but further research and development of the model may well 
deliver benefits to the current domain. 
Section 2.3.1.5 provides a detailed analysis of previous and contemporary 
information security literature which even embraces the writings of a well known 
computer 'hacker'. The breadth and depth of this review is believed to be rare in a 
domain which is, as has been established in this chapter, highly practical. Section 
2.3.1.6 utilises a range of industry-wide surveys to establish how effective current 
practice is perceived to be. The main conclusions of this section have been that 
current information security practice has poor credibility and is seen by many 
organisations to be irrelevant. These two issues have become key drivers for the 
design of the rationale for the new model. 
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The rationale section provides a sound basis to establish a theoretical underpinning 
for the domain. A well established, perhaps even seminal work has been used to 
form the basis of the key explorations into social theory, both as a means for further 
analysing current practice and also to drive towards a new evaluative model for 
information security. 
The remainder of this chapter summarises the rest of this thesis and provides a 
discussion around the aims and objectives for this research project. 
The following chapter continues the underlying theme of social theoretical 
explorations. This chapter has established that current practice is functionalist in 
nature together with the disadvantages with this as a concept in a domain such as 
information security. This leaves the next chapter open to use social theory to 
establish a new model for information security 
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3 Explorations in Social Theory 
Paul Drake 
Chapter Outcomes 
" Introduction to this thesis 
Introduction " Hypotheses and and objectives of the research, and where in the 
thesis they are fulfilled 
" Information security domain and how information security is 
Current Position currently practiced. 
" Rationale for approach to improving the domain 
Explorations in Development and detailed analysis of new model for evaluating information security practice 
Social Theory . Critical information security reforms 
Explorations in ' Rationale for research approach 
Research [ Development and detailed analysis of research model 
Methodologies ), Research plan and validation process 
Action Research Tested information security model in AR context 
" Use of evaluative model and authors experiential framework as Project basis for empirical research 
Empirical J Tested evaluative model against British Standard and two cases 
" Refined and revised evaluative model 
Research -7ý " Completed research validation model 
Critical Review Key contributions made by this research 
" Critique of research from philosophical standpoint 
and Conclusions Future research opportunities 
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3.1 Introduction 
Paul Drake 
3. Explorations 
in Social Theory 
3.3 Linguistic 3.5 Theory of 3.7 Summary 
En 
communicative explorations action and conclusions 
3.2 Investigations 3.4 An outcome 3.6 After 
in social theory 1 model 
for ISec 1 Parsons 
In the previous chapter, through a series of explorations and discussions it was 
concluded that the British Standard for information security (ISO 2000c; BSI 2002a) 
suffers from a lack of relevance to many organisations and also suffers from a lack of 
credibility. The manner in which the British Standard was created and is maintained 
was discussed at length. Chapter 2 argued that the absence of due consideration of 
social factors in the development of the British Standard, and the absence of 
established theory to underpin it, have contributed to this perceived lack of relevance 
and credibility. The dominance of the British Standard within the current information 
security domain has been argued through reference to recent independent surveys 
and a review of key information security literature. It is argued that this dominance 
has brought the problems of relevance and credibility present in the standard to the 
whole domain and this view is further strengthened by the literature review where the 
needs of information and technology are common and the needs of people are rare, 
and seldom developed beyond a superficial commentary. 
In this chapter an explicit theory for the domain of information security is explored. 
The chapter begins with a series of explorations in social theory which are ultimately 
drawn together into an evaluative model. This model is proposed as a means of 
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evaluating information security practice. This model comprises a number of themes 
and concepts which are all explored within this chapter. 
3.2 Investigations in Social Theory 
3. Explorations 
in Social Theory 
3.3 Linguistic ' 3.5 Theory of 3.7 Summary 3.1 Introduction 
explorations communicative and conclusions action 
3.2 Investigations 3.4 An outcome 3.6 After 
in social theory model for ISec Parsons 
It was argued in Chapter 1 that the domain of information security should be 
considered a sociological or socio-technical domain. First and foremost, not to 
consider the domain in this way would imply that changing all the people in an 
information system (IS) would not make the IS any less or more secure. This is 
ridiculous because risks and security issues are created by people, and security 
controls affect people. For example, who writes a virus? Who gains unauthorised 
access? Who discloses confidential information? Who has to think of a password that 
meets required standards in terms of length and format? Who has to enter the 
password every time they want to access their system and think of a new one every 
30 days? 
However it is recognised that this is a practical argument. The current chapter is 
specifically required to explore theories and so it seems appropriate to explore the 
need for a social bias from a theoretical point of view at this point. 
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Figure 3-1 below provides a schematic of the broad philosophical and theoretical 
constructs involved in this chapter. For the purposes of this discussion the starting 
point is taken as the same subjective/objective debate that was used in the previous 
chapter to drive towards the Burrell and Morgan grid as a way of analysing types of 
social theory. This debate seems a reasonable place to start as it has been taking 
place since the birth of Greek Philosophy. The question of what is reality versus what 
we can perceive as reality is fundamental to this analysis. 
From a philosophical view point, this leads to an epistemological debate - how do we 
know what we know? 
There are two main schools of thought concerning how this question might be 
answered. The first, empiricism, holds the view that knowledge is grounded in 
experience. John Locke (1632-1704) is one of the most important empiricists and 
believed our minds began as tabula rasa (blank slate) and therefore we are the sum 
of our experiences rather than anything being a priori knowledge. In other words, our 
knowledge is experiential rather than rational. The other approach, rationalism, is 
used to identify a way of thinking in which reason is substantially equivalent to truth. 
Important rationalists include Descartes and Leibniz. 
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Figure 3-1 Development of Critical Social Theory from Greek Philosophy 
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Locke believed that no ideas or concepts were innate to humans. Whereas, 
Descartes did not believe the senses can be relied upon, as they sometimes deceive. 
Therefore Descartes discarded all knowledge acquired through senses and 
employed the exercising of the mind to find true knowledge. 
Amongst Kant's greatest works is the "Critique of Pure Reason" (1787). In this work 
Kant attempts to reconcile the extreme views of the rationalists and empiricists by 
making the required provision for perception through senses and through reason. 
Kant's critique was aimed first at too much emphasis on senses. He showed that 
impressions drawn from senses alone cannot provide the connections and laws 
which are required for understanding. These can only be supplied through human 
intellect. These connections and laws form what Kant called categories: which enable 
empiricism through innate faculties; which in turn provide an inbuilt sense of quality, 
causality and other similar attributes. There seems to be a significant difference 
between the innate ideas that Locke rejected and the innate faculties required by 
Kant's approach. These innate faculties were first postulated by Hume as cognitive 
faculties which have characteristics which cannot be traced back to experience. 
Principally, innate ideas are a replacement for empiricism, whereas innate faculties 
enable empiricism. 
As these faculties are enablers they are not by themselves sufficient for knowledge, 
they cannot be known in the sense that humans know things because faculties are 
what humans know with. Since they are merely attributes, they require some material 
to work with, and that material is provided by the senses. In this way Kant made each 
of the two schools of thought dependent on the existence of the other. Kant called 
this crystallisation of empiricism and rationalism transcendental idealism and 
synthetic a priori knowledge; that is provision for a proposition which can be known or 
justified independently of sense-perception but within a scheme of knowledge in 
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which sense-perception has to exist. These interrelationships are summarised in 
Figure 3-2 below 
Is perceived by: Do not yield Senses 
understanding 
without: 
Empiricism 
Intellect 
Enables people 
to make sense 
of. 
Figure 3-2 Interrelationships between empiricism and senses 
Having established the path from subjectivity/objectivity through to transcendental 
idealism in Figure 3-1, it is necessary to explore one other concept before proceeding 
to the core theoretical underpinning for this thesis. That concept is Historical 
Materialism (Marx, Engels et al. 1972) which accounts for developments and 
changes in human history according to economic, technological and, more broadly, 
material developments as opposed to other more idealistic views such as philosophy 
and art. Marx also saw capitalism as a transient concept that would eventually be 
superseded by socialism. This is key to the development of critical theory and is 
summarised at Figure 3-3 below. 
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Humanity moving through history driven by resolution of material needs 
Stage: Hunter-gatherer Tribal Feudal Capitalism Socialism 
Characterised by: Basic shelter and Family Class system Alienation 
survival 
Figure 3-3 Schema of Marx's Historical Materialism 
Kant's work, together with Marx's Historical Materialism led to the formation of what 
became known as the Frankfurt School in 1923. That is, a group of philosophers, 
sociologists and theorists within, or associated with the Institute of Social Research in 
Frankfurt, Germany. Within the context of this thesis four men made significant 
contributions to this school: Theodor W. Adorno (1903 -1969), Herbert Marcuse 
(1898 - 1979), Max Horkheimer (1895 - 1973) and Jurgen Habermas (1929 - ). 
According to Held (1980: 15), "These four men [referring to Horkheimer, Adorno, 
Marcuse and Habermas] are the central figures of critical theory". Each of these 
philosophers believed in, and shared Karl Marx's theory of Historical Materialism. 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse observed the beginning of communism in Russia, 
and the rise of fascism in Italy. Habermas was one of Adorno's students and his 
assistant. They observed the devastation of the Holocaust and its aftermath. They 
attempted to reconcile Marxist theory with the reality of what was happening to 
people. These men, together with others in the Frankfurt School adjusted Marxism to 
establish a benchmark that modern society should meet. These ideas came to be 
known as "Critical Theory. " 
In his work One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse (1964) criticises both communist and 
capitalist countries for their lack of true democratic processes. He believes that 
people are not free because they function within systems such as the economy. If 
people were really free, they would be free from these systems. 
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In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer (1947) wrote their critique of 
modernity. The ideological components of the enlightenment can be revealed most 
clearly, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, in the thought of Kant. In his work, the 
radical separation of subject and object, and humanity and nature can readily be 
traced according to Horkheimer and Adorno. 
Finally, in his work on the theory of communicative action, Habermas (1984; 
Habermas 1987) draws together strands of thought and theory from such 
philosophers as Weber, Parsons, Austin and Mead, as well as Marcuse, Horkheimer 
and Adorno, to create a schema for using communication to facilitate the pursuit of 
reason. 
Within this thesis aspects of communicative action are employed to explore the 
separation of the domain of shared understandings and values from the domain of 
systems. This exploration considers the concept of rationalisation through which the 
system domain invades and supplants the domain of understandings and values. 
In summary, there is a direct line of development from the seminal debate around 
objectibity/subjectivity, through two distinct modes of reason which were eventually 
crystallised into a single mode of reasoning by Kant. This in turn was brought 
together with the work of Marx into the birth of critical theory. Three men from the 
'first wave' of critical theory: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse, had a profound effect 
on arguably the greatest exponent of the 'second wave' - Jurgen Habermas. The 
influence of Habermas' teachers can be clearly seen. In one-dimensional man the 
dominance of system draws a direct parallel with Habermasian 'system' in 
communicative action, and in dialectic of enlightenment, the invasion of the 
subjective (values and shared understandings) by the objective (system) can be 
readily observed. 
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Although now over 25 years old Burrell and Morgan's (1979) work with sociological 
paradigms as an aid to organisational analysis remains seminal. This provides an 
excellent starting point to help make sense of the ways in which a sociological 
perspective can be introduced into the information security domain. In this influential 
book Burrell and Morgan draw on Kuhn's (1975) earlier work on paradigm shift to 
propose that organisational theories could be classified into four incommensurable 
paradigms. Burrell and Morgan then used this framework to classify some twenty 
social and organisational theories - from Russian social theory and Objectivism to 
Solipsism, from Social system theory to Anarchistic individualism and French 
existentialism. However it would be a mistake to see this framework as simply a 
means for classification. Burrell and Morgan see their four paradigms as providing 
"distinctive analyses of social life. " (Burrell and Morgan 1979: ix). In the following 
figure (Figure 3-4), Burrell and Morgan's grid has been used to negotiate the social 
theories that might be relevant to Information Security. 
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Drake after Burrell & Morgan, 1979. pp 22. 
Sociology of Radical Change 
Subjective 
Radical Humanism 
Shared understanding amongst all 
information system stakeholders of 
meaning of security 
Shared understanding of need for 
security 
Shared understanding of how to 
achieve it and the benefits & drawbacks 
Means to overcome coercive 
constraints in use and distribution of 
information 
Equal availability of information to all 
Indication that above may be achieved 
through removal of barriers to and 
distortion of discourse 
Consideration of who ought to have 
access rather than who does 
Radical Structuralism 
Paul Drake 
" Overthrow limitations placed on existing 
social and organisational arrangements 
" No constraints on flow and use of 
information as it is owned by all 
" Concepts such as 'confidentiality and 
'privacy' have no meaning 
Objective 
Interpretivism 
S 
. 
Use of surveys to determine "customer 
experience 
Customers encouraged to provide 
feedback but left with feeling that their 
comments won't make any difference 
Availability of information through 
discourse 
Bias to share information favoured over 
need to conceal 
Functionalism 
" Need for security and how to achieve it 
determined by senior management. 
" Programmes to implement 
" Main success indicators are budgetary 
and time to complete 
" Implementation based on own previous 
experience and empirical knowledge of 
others 
" Rigid adherence to controls and 
compliance with them 
" Consideration of who has access 
Sociology of Regulation 
Figure 3-4 Information security application of Burrell & Morgan grid 
Table 3-1 below provides a brief explanation of each of the bullets in Figure 3-4 
above. 
61 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
Element Explanation 
Radical Humanism 
Shared understanding amongst all All stakeholders within, and affected by 
information system stakeholders of the information system know what 
meaning of security 'security' means. Generally it is taken to 
mean the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information but in a 
particular systems it might mean 
something less, else or additional. 
Shared understanding of need for Drawn from the point above, all 
security stakeholders within, and affected by the 
information system, having agreed and 
understood what security means in the 
particular context will presumably 
understand why it is needed 
Shared understanding of how to achieve Drawn from two points above, having 
it and the benefits & drawbacks understood what security it and why it's 
needed, presumably how it can be 
achieved, what benefits will ensue and 
what drawbacks need to be avoided will 
be understood. 
Means to overcome coercive constraints The three points above need to be 
in use and distribution of information achieved, as far as possible, without 
anyone involved being coerced into 
agreeing. 
Equal availability of information to all 
Consideration of who ought to have Consideration of who ought to have 
access rather than who does access although there may be 'good 
reasons' why they are not given the 
information 
Indication that above may be achieved Use of 'free' discourse to achieve aim of 
through removal of barriers to and normative understanding within the 
distortion of discourse information security domain 
Radical Structuralism 
Overthrow limitations placed on existing Stakeholders within, and affected by the 
social and organisational arrangements information system overthrow the 
limitations imposed by the security 
practice by ignoring it and/or destroying it 
(e. g. with malicious code) 
No constraints on flow and use of Chaotic situation in which individuals and 
groups ignore and destroy as in point 
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information as it is owned by all above. I 
Concepts such as'confidentiality' and 
'privacy' have no meaning 
These concepts are meaningless 
because they are ignored 
Interpretivism 
Use of surveys to determine "customer Surveys somewhat structured to get the 
experience" 'right answer' but stakeholders within the 
system, and some of those affected by it 
given opportunity to influence it. 
Customers encouraged to provide Opportunity to influence with feedback 
feedback but left with feeling that their but may not deliver intended result. 
comments won't make any difference Coercion may be present in means of 
feedback, for example when individuals 
giving feedback are identified. 
Availability of information through 
discourse 
Discourse is hard to control and 
becomes a significant means of sharing 
information `unofficially'. 
Bias to share information favoured over Information is shared 'where possible' 
need to conceal but no real or effective shared 
understanding around what `possible' 
means. 
Functionalism 
Need for security and how to achieve it 
determined by senior management. 
Generally using some standard or 
common practice 
Programmes to implement 
Main success indicators are budgetary 
and time to complete 
Projects with predefined outcomes and 
predefined measures of success. 
Significant desired outcomes from 
projects as in above point. 
Implementation based on own previous Rather than being based on established 
experience and empirical knowledge of theory (in the case of the present 
others domain, social theory) and on what ought 
to be rather than what was 'successful' in 
the past 
Rigid adherence to controls and 
compliance with them 
As the measure of a successful 
information security practice. If controls 
are set and people comply with them the 
practice may be considered successful. 
Consideration of who has access Based on their position or job function 
rather than why they need access to 
information systems 
Table 3-1 interpretation OT information security application of eurretu and 
Morgan Grid 
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One significant cause for concern since its publication has been the 
incommensurable nature of the proposed four paradigms. Burrell and Morgan 
crystallise the debate as a battle with no tenable middle ground u... the four 
paradigms are mutually exclusive. They offer alternative views of social reality ... 
[t]hey are alternatives, in the sense that one can operate in different paradigms 
sequentially over time, but mutually exclusive, in the sense that one cannot operate 
in more than one paradigm at any given point in time, since in accepting the 
assumptions of one, we defy the assumptions of all the others. " (Burrell and Morgan 
1979: 25). This view has been extensively debated, for example (Willmott 1990; 
Jackson and Carter 1991; Aldrich 1993; Jackson and Carter 1993; Willmott 1993a; 
Willmott 1993b). Notwithstanding the intended incommensurability of the four 
paradigms, Burrell and Morgan's framework provides an effective means to focus 
thinking about domains and their theory within a social theory context. 
Another paradigmatic framework arrived some ten years after Burrell and Morgan's 
from Hirschheim and Klein (1989). In this work four paradigms are proposed by 
mapping two types of dimension. A subjective/objective dimension and an 
order/conflict dimension. This work clearly draws on and parallels the work of Burrell 
and Morgan. This yields the framework shown below (Figure 3-5). 
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Order 
Functionalism 
Objective 
" Need for security and how to achieve it 
determined by senior management. 
" Programmes to implement 
" Main success indicators are budgetary 
and time to complete 
" Implementation based on own 
previous experience and empirical 
knowledge of others 
" Rigid adherence to controls and 
compliance with them 
" Consideration of who has access 
Social Relativism 
" Use of surveys to determine 'customer 
experience" 
" Customers encouraged to provide 
feedback but left with feeling that their 
comments won't make any difference 
" Availability of information through 
discourse 
" Bias to share information favoured 
over need to conceal 
" Consideration of who ought to have 
access rather than who does 
Radical Structuralism 
Overthrow limitations placed on 
existing social and organisational 
arrangements 
No constraints on flow and use of 
information as it is owned by all 
Concepts such as' confidentiality' and 
'privacy' have no meaning 
Neohumanism 
Subjective 
" Shared understanding amongst all information 
system stakeholders of meaning of security 
" Shared understanding of need for security 
" Shared understanding of how to achieve it and 
the benefits & drawbacks 
" Means to overcome coercive constraints in 
use and distribution of Information 
" Equal availability of information to all 
" Strong indication that one of the ways to 
achieve the above is by removing barriers to. 
and distortion of discourse 
Conflict 
Figure 3-5 Information security application of Hirschheim & Klein grid 
It can be seen that in the context of Information Security at least, there are many 
similarities between Burrell and Morgan's and Hirschheim and Klein's frameworks. 
This is not surprising. The latter was derived from the former, and Hirschheim and 
Klein refer to Burrell and Morgan extensively throughout their article. 
It has been demonstrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis that information security as it 
stands today is highly practical and as a domain, devoid of sufficient consideration for 
the people involved in the information system. Following the arguments in the 
Rationale section (2.4) of this thesis, it has been shown that current information 
security practice is rooted firmly in the functionalist paradigm of Burrell and Morgan's 
and Hirschheim and Klein's frameworks. 
65 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
3.2.1 Selecting a More Socially Aware Paradigm 
Having determined the paradigm in which the current information security domain 
exists, the next step is to determine a more appropriate paradigm for the domain. 
The Burrell and Morgan framework is a useful tool for determining this. As before, the 
alignment between practice and the principal differentiators within the paradigms 
have been determined. However, for this analysis the aspects of the desired practice 
rather than current practice are surfaced. Table 3-2 below summarises these aspects 
together with an explanation of each and why it is considered important. 
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Before proceeding too far it seems appropriate to take a step back and revisit some 
of the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity and their relationship to reality. First and 
foremost, what is meant by the term 'reality'? As a working definition, reality can be 
considered that which exists on its own, independent of what people think. Reality is 
there whether or not people perceive it or understand it. Generally speaking people 
try to portray reality accurately in their perceptions and thoughts, unless they are 
deliberately developing fiction, but it is possible for people to be mistaken. 
In everyday life, people consider the things that they perceive and use to be real. 
These 'real' things have certain characteristics that make up their 'realness'. These 
characteristics include: continuous existence, even when they are not being 
perceived and used; the capacity to be perceived and used by other people with 
similar faculties; the ability to have causal effects on other things. 
Many philosophers and theorists maintain that what people perceive as reality is not 
the true reality. They claim that there is an ultimate reality which 'lies behind' our 
perception of reality and which is qualitatively different from it. Amongst the strongest 
theories for another ultimate reality lies religion. One example is the notion of life 
after death, in which the soul enters another realm of existence distinct from the 
ordinary world. Also the idea of God and Oneness wherein the things that people 
ordinarily consider being independently existing are, in reality not distinct from one 
another. A tree, a person, a table, an ocean are all part of the same matter and exist 
as one. 
Plato claimed that there are degrees of reality. What is most real is eternal, 
unchanging and perfect. No ordinary thing has these characteristics because 
everything in the ordinary world occurs in time, is subject to change and is imperfect. 
Plato believed there was another realm of fully real things called 'forms' that exist 
behind and support the ordinary world. Forms are the universals that define ordinary 
things as what they are. No tree is eternal, unchanging and perfect, but what it is to 
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be a tree, the form of tree and the essence of `treeness' does carry these 
characteristics. In these way things that exist in the ordinary world, particulars, 
depend on forms for their existence and are never more than approximations of their 
respective forms. Others, such as Kant, believed that there is an ultimate reality but 
that it is intrinsically unknowable to us. In this view the ordinary world is a kind of 
interaction between the unknowable and the structures of peoples' minds. We can 
never know the thing in itself. It is real because it provides data that allows people to 
perceive it, but the source is unknowable. To some extent this goes back to the 
discussion earlier in which Kant's crystallisation of empiricist and rationalist modes of 
reason yielded synthetic a priori knowledge. It was shown that this form of knowledge 
depends on the existence of something outside of our perception (the unknowable 
reality) and our innate faculties (structures of peoples' minds). 
Finally, there is the concept of alternative realities. That is, the idea that there are 
different realities for different people, groups, cultures etc. Scientific entities might be 
real for scientists whereas social interactions might be real for sociologists. 
One other fundamental element is required for this exploration into objectivity and 
subjectivity. That element is the notion of truth. Beliefs are true when they depict 
things as they are. Beliefs are false when they depict things inaccurately. Ordinarily, 
people accept the notion of reality. Although it can be seen from the discussion 
above that there are number of different ways of viewing it. Most of the different 
perspectives described above assume that some reality exists even if it is 
independent of people's senses and thoughts. Truth then, is a full alignment between 
what is believed and reality. Alternatively, and in a more practical sense, a belief can 
be considered true if, in terms of meeting objectives and getting what people want, it 
is useful to consider it so. The third notion of truth is particularly important to this 
thesis. In an extreme case, for those that consider there to be no reality, truth is the 
coherence between beliefs of a number of people. In the less extreme case, if reality 
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exists but is unknowable, truth is the coherence between what people believe the 
unknowable reality to be. This latter case, along with the search for what ought to be 
rather than what is, is known as normative validity - if enough people consider a 
belief to be a true representation of reality, then to all intents and purposes it is so. 
Generally speaking this coherence of beliefs is based on some justification which 
provides sufficient reason to believe. In a sense, it is this justification, its essence and 
characteristics that drive the different paradigmatic approaches that are embodied in 
the grids represented at Figures 3-4 and 3-5 above. 
3.2.2 The Objectively Biased Paradigms 
This section explores objectivity in general and the Radical Structuralist and 
Functionalist paradigms in particular. 
An objectively biased paradigm will presuppose that there is a reality and that it can 
be known. This thesis argues that this functionalist approach is very limiting. The 
drive towards a technically dominant underpinning has left the social perspective 
unexplored and ignored. The effect of this is that human causes of information 
security systems failure have received far too little attention. This in turn has led to 
ever more stringent and frustrating constraints being applied to information systems 
in doomed attempts at controlling information security failures. This thesis accepts 
the arguments of Lyytinen and Klein (1985: 219) that "... the design process is a 
social act", and "... design must be viewed as a social process that interacts with 
both a physical and social world" (Lyytinen and Klein 1985: 220). Whilst Lyytinen and 
Klein are referring to the totality of information systems design. This is just as valid in 
the context of how we design in the security of those information systems. 
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3.2.3 The Subjectively Biased Paradigms 
In Table 3-3 it has been demonstrated that the two subjectively biased paradigms 
provide greater alignment to the stated requirements of the desired information 
security domain. The previous section, 3.2.2, adds weight to this view through an 
exploration of some of the problems that surround objectivity, and therefore to the 
paradigms that rely on objectivity as an underlying principle. Having determined that 
the desired domain for information security should be underpinned by subjective 
theory, this section carries out a brief exploration of these paradigms. The main focus 
of the exploration is the Burrell and Morgan Grid which has been discussed at length 
in these first two chapters. Some contrast is provided through reference to 
Hirschheim and Klein's Grid. The two subjective paradigms are: Radical Humanism 
(RH), which sits in a similar, some would probably say the same, critically informed 
paradigm as Neohumanism; and Interpretivism which is very similar to Social 
Relativism. 
Both subjective paradigms seek understanding within human consciousness and 
consider people as actors within the information system rather than as observers of 
it, (see for example (Hirschheim and Klein 1989: 1201) and (Burrell and Morgan 
1979: 28 - 33). One of the principal differences between the two paradigms is that, 
amongst other things, RH seeks emancipation whereas Interpretivism seeks 
explanation. What is critical to the current debate though is that both rely heavily on 
communication as a means toward a normative understanding of many of the 
concepts in the information security domain. That means the exploration of language 
and in particular the removal of barriers and distortions in the pursuit of 
understanding. In their "Story IV" Hirschheim and Klein propose a lens through which 
we can see "Emancipation through Rational Discourse" (Hirschheim and Klein 
1989: 1207). This leads to two societal arenas of human action "One is the realm of 
work where people extract their sources of livelihood. The second is connected to the 
72 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
medium of language use for the purpose of establishing mutual understanding [ ... ] 
and engaging in emancipatory discourse. " (Hirschheim and Klein 1989: 1207). This 
concept of stories is explored by Forman (1999) and further strengthens the case for 
language as a means of achieving an emancipatory framework in which normative 
validity can be achieved: 
"A strategic story that incorporates the language representing people's shared 
experience of the organisation's core values in likely to be a story that is heard. " 
(Forman 1999: 9). 
Finally, to add some weight to the need for a language that yields common 
understanding Berger and Luckmann (1967: 54) propose that the "... reality of 
everyday life further presents itself to me as an inter-subjective world, a world that I 
share with others. " and that "... others have a perspective on this common world that 
is not identical to mine. " Berger and Luckmann proceed to relate the importance of 
how knowledge is distributed within the context of the knowledge itself "The social 
distribution of knowledge thus begins with the simple fact that I do not know 
everything known to my fellow men, and vice versa, and culminates in exceedingly 
complex and esoteric systems of expertise. Knowledge of how the socially available 
stock of knowledge is distributed [... ] is an important element of that same stock of 
knowledge. " (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 54). The point here is that each actor in a 
system has a rare, perhaps unique perspective on the knowledge within the system. 
How it works, its scope, relevance, etc. are all critical to gaining a grasp of how the 
system might be improved. How this can be communicated is just as important as the 
information itself. This forms a central thread for this thesis. 
3.2.4 An Initial Outcome Model for Information security 
Lyytinen and Klein (1985) provide a useful means of analysing the types of action 
that might be pursued as the theoretical underpinning for information security. They 
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call this the `Habermas typology of action' (Lyytinen and Klein 1985: 221) which maps 
domain of action to the type of action. This relationship is shown in Table 3-4 below. 
Adapted from Lyytinen and Klein, 1985. pp 221 
domain of action 
non-social 
social 
Table 3-4 Typology of 
oriented to 
success 
instrumental 
actions 
strategic action 
purposive-rational 
action 
type of action 
oriented to 
agreement 
type of 
interactions 
individual 
cognition/reason 
action 
communicative 
instrumental action 
social interaction 
It was demonstrated earlier in this thesis that there are a number of ways of 
representing reality, and a number of ways of determining the extent to which people 
can understand and access reality. One way of representing the reality of information 
security is that it is possible to make an information system secure. The opposing 
view is that it is not possible to secure an information system. Similarly, in the context 
of securing information systems, the view could be taken that people would know and 
understand if an information system reached the panacea of being fully secure. 
Whereas the opposing view is that people would not. 
With reference to the grid at Table 3-3 of this thesis, it can be argued that: 
9 Functionalism represents a world in which it is possible to achieve a secure 
information system, and that people would know when it is achieved. To 
achieve a secure system a series of controls should be deployed which 
gradually, but measurably, move the information system towards a state of 
being fully secured. 
74 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
" Radical Structuralism represents a world in which a secure system can be 
achieved and can be accessed and understood by people. The means of 
achieving this state is through the over-throwing of the current practice in 
favour of one which the majority of people agree would achieve greater 
security. 
9 Interpretivism represents a world in which the ideal reality of a secure 
system may not be achievable, and may not be recognised by people even if 
it were achievable. It is however possible to make a system more secure, or 
appear more secure, by doing things that enough people agree would 
achieve greater security. 
" Radical Humanism is, in this context, very similar to interpretivism except 
that there is significant effort put into ensuring that people agree without 
feeling coerced into a particular view. The process for getting enough people 
agreeing on what would make a system more secure, and that a system has 
achieved greater security, is known as normative validity. 
It is argued in this thesis that the pursuit of a fully secure system is futile. It is simply 
not possible to achieve such an aim. It is therefore argued that an effective 
information security system will determine a normatively valid approach to securing 
information systems amongst all stakeholders in and of the system. That is, ensuring 
that people understand the need for securing systems, agree on how much security 
is necessary, and agree on how to achieve it. 
This argument roots the exploration firmly in the "oriented to agreement" column in 
Table 3-4 above (shaded yellow). It has also been extensively argued that a social 
rather than non-social context should be used (shaded blue). This places the 
exploration in the "social" row. The point of intersection is Communicative Action 
(shaded green). 
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Lyytinen and Hirschheim (1989) refined their typology of action (see Table 3-4 
above) with a simplified model and a clearer mapping of Habermas' topology in terms 
of the domain of action versus the actor's prevalent orientation. This is summarised 
in Table 3-5 below. 
Adapted from Lyytinen and Hirschheim, 1989. pp 118 
actor's prevalent orientation 
social action in: success shared agreement justification of 
(teleological) claims 
non-social instrumental action not applicable determination of 
(natural) domain truth or fact 
social domain strategic action communicative discursive action 
action 
Table 3-5 Typology of Social Action 
Again, the point of intersection between a social domain (shaded blue) and an actor's 
orientation towards shared agreement (shaded yellow) is Communicative Action 
(shaded green). 
The originator of this work, Habermas (1984) informs this still further and at the same 
time simplifies it. It is necessary to determine whether interpersonal relationships 
matter and accordingly decide whether actions are social or non-social (shaded 
blue). Habermas maps this against whether the main focus is to seek success or 
understanding (shaded yellow). Again the point of intersection (shaded green) is 
communicative action (see Table 3-6 below). 
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Action 
Situation 
Adapted from Habermas (1984, p. 285) 
Paul Drake 
Action Orientation 
Oriented to success 
Oriented to reaching 
understanding 
Non-social Instrumental action Individual cognition/reason 
Social Strategic action Communicative action 
Table 3-6 Types of Action According to Habermas 
Note: In Table 3-6 the italicised text does not appear in Habermas' original work. 
Habermas shows no relationship, 
It should be recognised that, although useful to assist in exploring a focus for this 
thesis, the previous three tables are greatly over-simplified. For example, referring to 
Table 3-5, it would be very unusual to find an action orientation which is not oriented 
to understanding AND success. For that matter, it would be unusual to find an action 
situation which does not have both social and non-social aspects. These flaws are 
recognised and accepted in the context that the purpose here is not to shrink the 
exploration down to a single approach. Rather, the purpose is to determine a more 
appropriate bias for the domain than currently exists. 
Some justification for the pursuit of language, and social theory in general within the 
context of Information Systems can be found in Klein and Hirschheim (1987). Table 
3-7 below reproduces their 'basic views of IS'. 
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Adapted from Klein and Hirschheim, 1987. pp 286 
Nature of 
Information 
Technical 
Systems Social 
Table 3-7 Types of IS Action 
Nature of consequences 
Paul Drake 
Technical Social Both 
'hard' socio- 
computer behaviourist technical 
science systems 
software human factors 
engineering 
functionalism transaction cost critical socia theory theory 
sense-making: language 
phenomenological/ action view ethnomethodological 
of IS 
The point of intersection between a socially informed view of the nature of 
information systems (shaded blue) and an acceptance that the implications of 
information systems can be both social and technical (shaded yellow) brings the 
debate into the domains of critical social theory and language action (shaded green). 
These two domains are brought together quite neatly by Ulrich (2001) where 
importance of language in critical social theory informed information systems is made 
explicit "... it follows that a proper design ideal for information systems must not 
design human cognition and communication out of the system" Ulrich (2001). The 
melding of critical social theory and language once again brings the debate firmly to 
the Theory of Communicative Action. 
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3.3 Linguistic Explorations 
3. Explorations 
in Social Theory 
3.5 Theory of 3.3 Linguistic 
communicative 
3.7 Summary 
Euion 
explorations and conclusions action 
3.2 Investigations 3.4 An outcome 3.6 After 
in social theory model for ISec Parsons 
Austin (1975) was an important contributor to the idea of speech acts. These speech 
acts, according to Austin are a complex group of things which are typically performed 
when speaking. Locutionary speech acts are the simple generation of sounds that 
are linked together by grammatical conventions so as to say something meaningful. 
So, among speakers of English "it is snowing" would perform the locutionary act of 
saying something about the weather. Illocutionary speech acts do something else in 
the process of uttering meaningful language. For example, "I will take you to the zoo" 
performs the illocutionary act of making a promise. Perlocutionary acts bring about 
an effect on those hearing the meaningful utterance, and in the previous example 
may bring about the effect of causing someone to get their coat in readiness for the 
trip. 
To summarise these three into a single example, in saying to a friend, "That's an ugly 
necktie", I perform the locutionary act of saying something about his clothing, I may 
also insult him (illocution) and persuade him to dress differently (perlocution). 
Illocutionary acts are orientated to reaching understanding. Habermas defines 
communicative action as a type of speech act in which the participants 'pursue their 
illocutionary aims without reservation' (Habermas 1984: 294), and goes on to warn 
about the drawbacks of using perlocutionary acts to bring about some strategic aim 
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to deceive the recipient of the speech act. By without reservation, Habermas means 
to "exclude cases of latently strategic action, in which the speaker inconspicuously 
employs illocutionary results for perlocutionary purposes" (Habermas 1984: 305). 
These strands are brought together by Habemias in the idea of a criticisable validity 
claim. That is, where the validity of a speech act can legitimately be contested by its 
recipient. In the context of communicative action, Habermas (1984: 307) claims three 
means by which speech acts can be rejected: on the basis of normative rightness; on 
the basis of subjective truthfulness; and on the basis of existential presupposition. 
Finally, to have criticisable validity a speech act must achieve mutual understanding 
between its sender and receiver(s). That is, all understand the linguistic expression in 
the same way. In summary, it must be possible to take issue with or argue with a 
speech act for it to be considered communicative action. This implies mutual 
understanding and the absence of hidden perlocutionary aims. "Thus I count as 
communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions in which all 
participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary aims" (Habermas 
1984: 295). 
In the context of the purpose of communicating it can be argued that in an objective 
social domain the main purpose of speech is to bring about an effect on the recipient. 
In many senses it is not required or perhaps even desirable that the recipient 
understands the meaningfulness of the speech act. Only that the speech act brings 
about the intended result. Whereas in the subjective domain and certainly one in 
which communicative action is dominant it is extremely undesirable. In this context 
the meaning of the speech act and the effect of the speech act on the recipient (e. g. 
did the recipient find it coercive? ) are of paramount importance. 
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3.4 An Outcome Model for Information security 
Paul Drake 
3. Explorations 
in Social Theory 
3.3 Linguistic 3.5 Theory of I 3.7 Summary 
n 
explorations communicative action and conclusions 
Eruc"o( 
3.2 Investigations 3.4 An outcome 3.6 After 
in social theory model for ISec Parsons 
By summarising the discussion above into a single table (Table 3-8 below) the 
domain versus the desired outcome can be mapped thereby demonstrating the 
required theoretical grounding for this thesis (shaded blue). 
Social 
action in: 
Type of 
domain 
Social 
paradigm 
Nature of 
discourse Type of action 
Desired 
outcome 
Technical/ 
Objective 
domains Non- 
Functionalist Perlocutionary Instrumental 
action 
Success 
social 
Subjective 
Social/ Radical Locutionary/ 
Communicative Critically 
domains Socio- 
Humanist/ 
action normative 
technical Interpretivist 
Illocutionary agreement 
Table 3-8 Action/Outcome Model for Information Security 
So far it has been established that information security should be a socially informed 
domain due to the human elements inherent in information systems in general, and 
the impact that humans have on the security of information systems and the impact 
of security controls on humans in particular. 
Radical Humanism and Interpretivism have been selected as suitable sociological 
paradigms to help position the research because they provide greater reliance on 
capturing the needs of the people involved in, or affected by information security. A 
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means to capture these needs as well as a means to act upon them has been 
established, that being the pursuit of improved communication. As communication 
has been established as a means for bringing about improvement, there is a need to 
determine some guidance for what is probably one of the most important facets of 
communication: speech. The purpose of speech acts within the domain has therefore 
been established: Locutionary and Illocutionary, because these are most closely 
aligned to Radical Humanism. Critically normative agreement has been determined 
to be the desired outcome from the application of the new information security 
framework as this gives a socially aware theoretical underpinning to the domain. 
Finally, a means by which the desired outcome can be achieved has been 
established: Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action, which will be further 
explored in the next section. 
3.5 Theory of Communicative Action 
3. Explorations 
in Social Theory 
3.3 Linguistic 
3.5 Theory of 3.7 Summa 3.1 Introduction lorations ý 
1iomunicative 
Summary 
exp 
action and conclusions 
3.2 Investigations 3.4 An outcome 3.6 After 
Lin social theory model for ISec Parsons 
Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action encompasses and draws together a 
large number of `strands' of sociological and linguistic philosophy. It consolidates the 
seminal sociological works of (amongst many others) Weber (e. g. (Weber 1947)), 
Marx (e. g. (Marx and Engels 1968)) and Durkheim (e. g. (Durkheim 1982)), and the 
linguistic work of Austin (discussed earlier in this chapter (Austin 1975)). It includes 
82 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
debates around the roots of such critical linguistic and sociological principles as 
Functionalism (Parsons (1951) and Merton (1957)), and Symbolic Interactionism 
(Mead (1934)). Another significant strand of thought in the Theory of Communicative 
Action is the concept of lifeworid' and 'system', the legitmation crisis' and the 
'colonisation of the lifeworid by the system' (Habermas 1984; Habermas 1987). 
The focus of this chapter is to consider how information security would look if it was 
informed by some of these key theoretical concepts. It builds on the work of the 
aforementioned theorists and philosophers to provide a model against which the 
information security practice of organisations can be evaluated. 
3.5.1 Talcott Parsons 
Parsons (1902 - 1979) was one of the main contributors to the development of 
functionalism, a theoretical approach originally pioneered by Durkheim (1858 -1917) 
and Comte (1798 - 1857). According to the functionalist viewpoint, in studying any 
given society, we should look at how its various 'parts', or institutions, combine to 
give that society continuity over time. Parsons modelled the functionalist 
prerequisites critical to the survival of social systems. He argued (Parsons 1951) that 
all social systems performed four functions: (1) adaptation, (2) goal-attainment, (3) 
integration, and (4) latency. Collectively these functions are referred to as the AGIL 
model which is represented in Figure 3-6 below. 
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L A 
Latency Adaptation 
I G 
Integration Goal-Attainment 
Figure 3-6 Representation of Parsons' model of 
functional prerequisites critical to the survival of 
social systems 
3.5.1.1 AGIL Functional Pre-requisites 
Paul Drake 
Parsons argued that social, cognitive and cultural structures are functionally 
differentiated. They need to deal with an external environment and they need to 
maintain their internal integrity. Both with respect to the outside and to the inside, 
there is a need to both accumulate further resources, and to mobilise and use the 
resources 'one' already has. Accumulating and using up resources with respect to 
the outside and the inside give rise to the four kinds of functional pre-requisite: 
. Adaptation. This function is concerned with securing and distributing the means 
from the environment for social systems' survival. The information security 
system implementation of adaptation includes: 
o Getting organisational support though funding, equipment, and skilled 
personnel. 
o Developing a channel of improvements to the information security system 
o Building trust with users and management and maintaining a consistently 
professional service 
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. Goal-attainment. Concerned with defining and prioritising social system goals. 
The information security system implementation of goal-attainment include: 
o Determining short term and long term needs 
o Differentiating between local/on-site security requirements from the needs 
for remote working 
o Distinguishing between security standards for internal users and those for 
third-parties 
. Integration. Concerned with co-ordinating relationships within the social system. 
The information security equivalent would include: 
o Demonstrating to stakeholders that risks are managed and resources are 
being used appropriately 
o Having due consideration for those affected by the system and 
information security controls. Ensure they understand the purpose of the 
information security requirements and listen to their suggestions for 
improving the system 
o Appreciating the concerns of the practitioners implementing the system 
. Latency. Concerned with motivating the desired behaviours and managing 
tensions within social systems. The information security version includes: 
o Providing incentives and rewards for the right behaviours - positive 
reinforcement 
o Clarifying disincentives and consequences for the wrong behaviours - 
negative reinforcement. 
o Frequently reviewing the information security system (policies, procedures 
etc) to ensure the administrative processes support and align with 
organisational objectives 
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3.6 After Parsons 
Paul Drake 
3. Explorations 
in Social Theory 
3.5 Theory of 
Eructbon1 
3.3 Linguistic 
communicative 
3.7 Summary 
explorations J action and conclusions 
3.2 Investigations 3.4 An outcome 3.6 After 
in social theory model for ISec Parsons 
Parsons and the functional approach to sociology became dominant in the 1950s to 
the extent that functionalism and sociology became more or less identical (Adams 
and Sydie 2001: 345). By the late 1980s, Parson's functionalism was being replaced 
by a variety of sociological models designed to provide a non-functionalist view of 
society. For the purposes of this thesis, pre-eminent authors of these models were 
Robert Merton (1957), and Jurgen Habermas (1984; Habermas 1987). 
3.6.1 Robert Merton 
Merton distinguishes between manifest and latent functions (not to be confused with 
latency in Parson's AGIL functions although they are very similar in terms of 
commentating on relationships). Manifest functions are those known to, and intended 
by, the participants in a specific type of social activity. Latent functions are 
consequences of that activity of which participants are unaware (Merton 1957). This 
will be seen to be of high significance as the evaluative model is developed and 
explained. Often when an existing practice is 'improved' because of some perceived 
benefit in terms of efficiency, cost control and the like, there is some unexpected 
result which may or may not be desirable. These intended improvements are all 
manifest functions insofar as they can usually be measured and supported by 
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realisation of the perceived benefit or improvement. What is generally less well 
understood or even considered are the latent functions or unexpected consequences 
of the principal actions. For example, closing down a fitness centre within an 
organisation would likely bring economic benefits. This would be a manifest function. 
It might also be expected that staff would be less fit. If anticipated then this would be 
manifest. If not it would be latent. Staff may seek alternative places to get fit 'off-site' 
thereby being less available. They might take more time off work due to ill health. 
The fitness centre might have become a meeting place where ideas were 
brainstormed and collaborations developed which are beneficial. In all these cases, 
and others there are likely to be unexpected results which would be latent. It is also 
worth mentioning that not all latent functions are negative or undesirable. 
3.6.2 Development of the Evaluative Model 
Like Parsons, Habermas believes that societies require integration. However 
Habermas and Parsons would differ in their understanding of how this integration 
should be achieved and the barriers to its successful achievement. Whereas Parsons 
considers the problem to be how order is maintained, for Habermas it is how to 
create conditions for communicative action. Habermas believes that as capitalist 
society has developed, it has caused the disablement of the core integrative function; 
that is communication. 
It would be of value at this point to consider some key concepts which will be used to 
construct the evaluative model. These concepts will be explored more fully later in 
this chapter. The concept of 'lifeworld' is the embodiment of subjective human values 
and ideas such as morals and ethics. It also seems to parallel Jungian collective 
unconsciousness insofar as it stores the "interpretive work of preceding generations" 
(Habermas 1984: 70). In terms of the Parsonian functional prerequisites (Figure 3-6) 
the lifeworld is represented by the functions on the left: Integration, which is 
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concerned with human relationships; and Latency which is concerned with human 
motivation and social tension. 
The concept of 'system' in this context is the embodiment of the objective world. 
Within Figure 3-6 the system functions are on the right: Adaptation, concerned with 
the securing of resources; and Goal-attainment which is concerned with the 
functional definition and prioritisation of goals. 
As the systemised aspects of society continue to gain prominence through increased 
efficiency of system delivery, this has the effect of invading the `softer' and more 
subjective aspects of society insofar as their importance is reduced. As described 
above, these subjective aspects are characterised by Habermas as lifeworld. In 
Habermasian terms this process is known as the colonisation of lifeworld by system. 
In Weberian terms it is known as rationalisation. This process is undesirable because 
"in a rationalised lifeworld the need for achieving understanding is met less and less 
by a reservoir of traditionally certified interpretations immune from criticism" 
(Habermas 1984: 340), and °... colonisation of the lifeworld by system imperatives 
that drive moral-practical elements out of private and political-public spheres of life" 
(Habermas 1987: 324). It is this colonisation process that forms the disablement of 
communication in the broader context of communicative action explored within this 
thesis. 
Habermas therefore introduces the concept of a 'legitimation crisis', that is how 
communicative action has become colonised, and how that colonisation undermines 
legitimacy. By 'legitimation' he means that a society's citizens sense that the 
institutions within which they live are just, benevolent and in their best interests and 
therefore are deserving of their support, loyalty and adherence. 
The following two figures (Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8) show how the concepts in the 
previous paragraph can be mapped onto Parsons' AGIL media. Figure 3-7 shows the 
division of functions into public and private sphere centric operations. By 'public 
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sphere' Habermas means the sphere of private people who join together to form a 
public. Habermas has identified 3 types of public sphere: 
9 Representative publicity operated in the feudal states of medieval and early 
modern Europe. Essentially, it consisted of the King or the nobility 
representing their political power before the people. They merely displayed 
their power; there was no political discussion, because there was no "public" 
in the modern sense. In order for political power to exist at all, an audience 
was required. Habermas sees elements of this style of publicity returning in 
the behaviour of modern political parties and public relations experts. 
Representative publicity gave way to: 
" The literary public sphere which developed in the eighteenth century; its key 
institutions are literary journals, periodicals, and the coffee houses and salons 
where these publications were discussed. The literary public sphere 
represented the first time that the public could critically discuss art and 
literature, drawing on the emotional resources they developed within the 
family. It developed into: 
" The political public sphere which represents private people who have come 
together as a public to use their reason critically. It is not so much a place as 
a series of actions. It depended on private people's status as both property 
owners and human beings; its roots were in the family and in the world of 
property ownership. In the past, the political public sphere represented a 
critical voice that analysed and often opposed government action, and 
prevented domination by the powerful state. In its modern form, however, the 
public sphere is no more than a manipulative form of publicity, as politicians, 
advertising agents and public relations experts try to create and manipulate a 
false public. 
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The public sphere can be considered a part of the lifeworld in which private 
individuals emerge from their "private spheres" (families, homes, work places etc. ) 
and mobilise to create a check on the authority and dominance of the state. 
Private 
Sphere 
L A 
Latency Adaptation 
G 
Integration Goal-Attainment 
Public 
Sphere 
Figure 3-7 Representation of Habermas contribution to 
Parsons Model: Public and Private Spheres 
L A 
Latency Adaptation 
I G 
Integration Goal-Attainment 
Society requires certain boundaries between these spheres, but also mutual 
interchange between them. Vertically, G&A represent what Habermas calls system 
functions. I&L represent what he calls lifeworld functions. Figure 3-8 below models 
this vertical boundary between the system and the lifeworid. 
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LA 
Latency Adaptation 
Lifeworld System 
Functions Functions 
G 
Integration Goal-Attainment 
Figure 3-8 Representation of Habermas' contribution to Parsons Model, system and 
lifeworld boundary 
Finally, Figure 3-9 below draws together Habermas' contribution and also Merton's 
refinement into a single model. This model draws on the strands that have been 
pursued throughout this chapter. 
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Public 
Sphere 
Latent ........... .... Latent 
Figure 3-9 Evaluative Model for Information Security Practice 
A representation of Habermas' and Merton's contribution to Parsons' Model, showing 
public and private spheres, system and lifeworld boundaries and manifest & latent 
functions 
It is important that a fundamental difference between these four types of media is 
surfaced at this point. The A&G media, money and power (votes) are quantitative 
media. Both money and votes can be counted, and whoever has the most, wins. The 
I&L media on the other hand are qualitative. It is not possible to quantify value- 
commitments or influence, since these are only enacted in communication between 
persons. 
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Using this model, and bearing in mind the quantitative vs. qualitative media 
discussed above, it is now easier to understand the meaning of colonisation. In social 
settings formerly operated by communicative media (I & L), the quantitative (A & G) 
media now dominate. In some circumstances the colonisation process has become 
so dominant that the domain or social setting may no longer be understood or 
represented as a social domain at all! It is the central theoretical hypothesis of this 
thesis that this is exactly what has happened to the domain of Information Security. 
Such has been the dominance of the functionalist dogma surrounding information 
security that the rule-based system epitomised by the British Standard (ISO 2000c; 
BSI 2002a) has all but supplanted the idea of communicative action - people talking 
about their differences and similarities and coming to a common understanding. 
Through colonisation one (person, party, or interest) dominates the other by having 
more money or more votes. In the case of information security one standard (or one 
`Standard'l) way of `doing security' dominates the richness inherent in a multitude of 
ways of understanding what is appropriate and what is needed and desired. 
Colonisation reduces the sphere in which communicative, qualitative media operate 
(Lifeworld in Figure 3-9) and therefore more of society and societal operation relies 
on non-communicative, quantitative media (System in Figure 3-9). However, there is 
hope! Just as Habermas makes clear the need for the system to legitimise the 
lifeworld, the reverse is also true. The legitimacy of the quantitative (system) 
functions ultimately depends on the qualitative (lifeworld) functions. The value of 
money and votes requires continual acts of influence and value-commitment; 
otherwise the system functions become worthless. Money and votes are after all only 
worth as much as shared understandings assert them to be worth. Money depends 
on mutual understandings that we will treat these pieces of paper a certain way for 
purposes of exchange, and at times in history that understanding has been 
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withdrawn. Votes are only worth as much as a common understanding that we will 
abide by the final count; as is often said on election night, "the people have spoken". 
Again that understanding can be withdrawn, as in military coups. Crisis in Habermas' 
specialised sense occurs when those qualitative media (influence and value- 
commitments) are too weak to generate the legitimacy of the quantitative media. This 
is an extremely powerful and valuable consideration as it assures the future of both 
types of function. The one function unable to exist without the continued existence 
and influence of the other. There is an interesting parallel here with concepts 
mentioned previously in this chapter. Just as lifeworld (a subjective concept) and 
system (an objective concept) rely mutually on the existence of each other, so it has 
already been argued that rationalism (a subjective concept) and empiricism (an 
objective concept) rely mutually on the existence of one another. 
3.6.3 Lifeworld Colonisation 
It can be argued that there isn't just a single lifeworld that provides an overall cultural 
richness to everything. Anything that is cultural and can be colonised by a system to 
functionalise it could be considered a lifeworld. Table 3-9 below provides some 
examples. 
Lifeworld of: Can be colonised by system of: 
Faith Religion actioned by self-interest 
Power Abuse of power/coercion 
Interpretivism Functionalism actioned by ignoring human elements 
Subjectivism Objectivism 
Table 3-9 Lifeworld Colonisations 
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Table 3-10 below summarises some lifeworlds that are colonised by information 
security based `systems' 
Lifeworld of: Can be colonised by information 
security system of: 
Knowledge (inc pursuit of knowledge) confidentiality 
Discourse (especially the richness and 
freedom of discourse) 
confidentiality 
Culture policy 
True meaning of availability principle in 
information security 
disaster recovery 
Table 3-10 Information security influenced colonisations 
3.6.4 Boundaries within Evaluative Model 
This purpose of this section is to provide authority for the vertical and horizontal 
boundaries in the evaluative model represented in Figure 3-9 above. 
The assumption is made that it is accepted that there is a boundary between public 
sphere and private sphere. In other words they are accepted as different things. The 
purpose of this section is to support the argument that A&G are `system' media 
whereas I&L are lifeworid' media, and that A&L are private sphere media whereas 
G&A are public sphere media. 
Habermas (1984: 4, Figure 1) assigns: Adaptation as Economy; Goal-setting as 
Polity; Societal Community as Integration; and Latency as Culture. Habermas 
(1984: 5) says "Both disciplines [Culture (Latency) and Societal Community 
(Integration)] are concerned with everyday practice in lifeworld contexts" and goes on 
to say "Here I would like only to stress that the investigation of societal community 
[Integration] and culture [Latency] cannot be as easily detached from the lifeworld 
paradigm as the investigation of the economic [A] and political [G] subsystems can. " 
(Square brackets are author's additions). Here Habermas is making a clear 
95 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
distinction between system and lifeworld and justifies the placement of I&L as 
lifeworld media and A&G as system media. 
Habermas (1987: 320, Figure 39) places the 'Economic system' (Adaptation) in the 
private sphere and the 'Administrative system' (Goal-attainment) in the public sphere. 
He also establishes A&G as system functions in the same diagram. Habermas 
(1987: 325) says that "As the private sphere is undermined and eroded by the 
economic system, so too is the public sphere by the administrative system". This 
provides further authority for A being private sphere oriented and G being public 
sphere oriented. It also shows the colonisation effect (erosion) of the lifeworld by the 
system (A & G). 
So far, it has established that I&L may be considered lifeworld functions, and A&G 
system functions. It has also been established that A can be assigned to the private 
sphere and G to the public sphere. 
Habermas (1984: 4) aligns L with culture/cultural anthropology and I with sociology 
and societal community. Habermas (1987: 321) explicitly links culture (L) into the 
private sphere when he says "These norms [referring to legal norms] have to be filled 
in with action orientations expressing a private way of life or the cultural and political 
form of life of sociated individuals°. Habermas (1984: 4) refers to sociology as a 
function of Integration (see Habermas (1984: 4, Figure 1)). The final piece of authority 
comes from Habermas (1987: 242) where he provides a useful link between the four 
functions and significant institutions that illustrate them. He shows culture (L) as 
private to church and family and integrative subsystem (I) as public law. 
3.6.5 Max Weber and the Colonization Process 
In the previous section reference was made to the colonization effect of the lifeworld 
by the system. The purpose of this section is to provide some insight into what 
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causes this colonisation process. That is, the process by which the system colonises 
the lifeworld. In his theory of rationalisation Weber (1921) described how the modern 
Western world managed to become increasingly rational - that is, dominated by 
efficiency, predictability, calculability, and non-human technologies that control 
people. According to Weber there is a particular kind of rationality which was peculiar 
to Western civilization and distinct from other types of rationality that existed in all 
other societies. None of these other societies produced what Weber called formal 
rationality though. 
For Weber formal rationality means the search for the optimum means to a required 
end through the formation of rules, regulations and larger social structures. Within 
such a process there is little or no scope for individuals to search for alternative ways 
of meeting a given objective. In other words, in a fully rationalized world, individual 
initiative has been removed and culture has been superceded by efficiency. 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
1 
3. Explorations 
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In this chapter social theory has been used to underpin a framework for evaluating 
information security practice, and for driving change towards a richer information 
security system. The following section (3.7.1) provides some critical information 
security reforms. That is, some things that must be done if a more socially aware and 
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informed information security practice is to be employed. The next section (3.7.2) 
provides some guidance on using the action cycle in Figure 3-9. Finally, Section 
3.7.3 provides a summary of this chapter. 
3.7.1 Critical information security reforms 
By analysing the Evaluative Model at Figure 3-9 and applying it in an information 
security environment it is possible to establish a series of critical reforms to the 
current practice of information security. In a manner of speaking, this section 
represents a call to action to move existing system-biased information security 
practices towards a lifeworld-bias whilst still maintaining the integrity of the practice. 
Implementation of essential controls 
Typically, these essential controls would include mitigation against threats that would 
yield high negative impact (e. g. business failure) and those generated outside of the 
organisation's social system (e. g. malicious code). Such threats are generally not 
launched from within an organisation and so cannot be addressed through the 
implementation of a lifeworld-biased security practice, since they are not dependant 
on social issues within the organisation. These threats are often launched against 
large monopolistic organisations such as Microsoft Corporation by smaller interest 
groups. In terms drawn from the evaluative model, interest groups (private spheres) 
launch attacks on targeted organisations (the manifest intent) which have a disruptive 
effect on other organisations (the latent effect) which in turn affects all users (the 
public sphere). This cannot be addressed within the evaluative model as it stands, 
although the evaluative model has explicated this as an issue, and identified the 
need for specific functionalist and systematic controls, such as malicious code 
protection programs, to be deployed. 
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Adaptation controls 
Identify any controls that have been implemented as a prerequisite for a successful 
information security practice, such as the means to sustain the security system (e. g. 
money, people, and resources). 
Goal-attainment controls 
Derive a set of commonly held goals that should be attained if an information security 
system is to be considered successful. This should focus on a common 
understanding of the meaning of risk (as opposed to how to manage it) and any such 
risks that are both damaging/destructive and non-specific in transport, i. e. their 
mitigation cannot be achieved through integration nor requires any value- 
commitment. 
Integration and Latency initiatives 
Recast existing system-biased controls into lifeworld-biased initiatives. This would 
include a range of activities from the simple rewording of an existing control through 
to the formation of focus groups and user forums to assess and inform the debate. 
Then remove any remaining system-biased controls that do not form part of the 
preceding three critical reforms. 
Avoiding colonisation and re-colonisation 
Form focus groups and user forums to help minimise any unnecessary rules and 
regulations that would promote recolonisation of any newly formed lifeworlds. 
3.7.2 Summary of Chapter 
Through a series of investigations and arguments this chapter has derived an explicit 
path from a core philosophical construct (objectivism versus subjectivism) to a 
specific social theory (communicative action). 
This path then proceeds through a variety of social paradigms and core issues such 
as the meaning of reality and truth to an initial outcome model for information 
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security. That is, a theoretically grounded application of social issues into the 
information security domain. This second phase of discussion and argument again 
yields communicative action as a useful tool for making sense of the domain which 
further validates the initial conclusion summarised in the paragraph preceding this 
one. 
This emphasis on communication drives an exploration of language which forms the 
third major phase of the theoretical underpinning and results in a refined outcome 
model (Section 3.5) which includes strands of linguistic theory. 
The chapter then moves into the final phase which is the development of the 
theoretical model (Figure 3-9) based on the theory of communicative action. The 
model employs the work of Talcott Parsons for the core discriminatory functions 
within the model, the work of Robert Merton to help understand the actions and 
effects that are intended (manifest) versus the reactions and effects that are not 
intended (latent) and, most significantly the work of Habermas to help draw it 
altogether and identify the alignments and dynamics within the model. Finally, the 
work of Max Weber is drawn in to help navigate the model and explain the process of 
colonisation, or as Weber would have it, rationalisation. 
It could be argued that the basic AGIL model (Figure 3-6) is a useful tool for 
establishing the functional pre-requisites of a social system but, on its own, is too 
one-dimensional to provide a rich evaluative framework or to drive change into an 
organisation. However, the model represented in Figure 3-9 and underpinned with 
the theory that precedes it provides a richer means for evaluating an information 
security system. The cycle represented in Figure 3-9 also provides a means for 
driving change if it is considered desirable to move from a system-dominated 
environment to a more balanced, or lifeworld-dominated environment. 
Significant reasoning and navigation also takes place within and around the various 
social theories employed in the development of the evaluative model at Figure 3-9 to 
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provide a theoretically grounded and verifiable model that can be used in the 
empirical research. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Paul Drake 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
4.3 Towards an 4.5 Role of the 4.7 Research 4.1 Introduction Interventionist Researcher Plan Framework 
4.2 Positivism vs. 
4.4 Analysis of 4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology Framework Success of 4.8 Conclusions Constituents Intervention 
This chapter comprises the first stages of research design. Later chapters will test 
and refine the approaches developed here in light of additional empirical and 
theoretical knowledge. The general approach taken in the design of this research is 
that "The choice between approaches, or combination of them, should primarily be 
determined by the problem which the research is trying to answer. " (Oulton 1995: 65). 
Furthermore, the approach is rather what some have described as `methodological 
pluralism'; the assertion that there is no one best method but many methods 
contingent on the issue being studied (Gill and Johnson 1991: 9). The aim of this 
chapter is therefore to construct a research model that provides flexibility in research 
approach (see for example Thomas (2003) which explores a variety of research 
methods and how they might be combined) whilst avoiding the problems of 
contingency. Contingency is defined by Strauss and Corbin (1990) as "an 
unanticipated/unplanned happening that brings about a change in conditions". Such 
happenings are undesirable as they tend to destabilise the research environment 
making it troublesome to bring about a controlled change and measure the result. 
The first section seeks to address the paradigmatic debate (positivism vs. 
phenomenology) as it may be applied to this study. Using a series of models and 
reasoning the section builds towards a position that can broadly be summarised as 
the need for multiple methodologies in carrying out this research. 
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The next two sections develop this theme into a research model and underpinning 
analysis of the initial methodologies selected and broadly how they will be used. 
Section 4-4 analyses some techniques for testing the success of the intervention. 
Particular focus is given to triangulation as a way of minimising misconceptions and 
unreliability in the conclusions. 
In the final section conclusions are drawn and the next stages in using the framework 
developed in this chapter identified. 
4.2 Positivism vs. Phenomenology 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
4.3 Towards an 4.5 Role of the 4.7 Research 4.1 Introduction Interventionist 
Framework 
Researcher Plan 
4.2 Positivism vs 
4.4 Analysis of 4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology 
Framework Success of 4.8 Conclusions 
Constituents Intervention 
There is a long-standing debate (see for example Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 
1991) concerning the most appropriate paradigmatic position from which research 
methods should be derived. This debate could usefully be represented as a 
continuum of methodologies with Positivism and Phenomenology at the two 
extremes. This position can be summarised as shown in Table 4-1 (derived from Gill 
and Johnson (1991: 36)). 
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Positivist Phenomenological 
Nomothetic methods emphasising: Ideographic methods emphasising: 
1. Deduction Induction 
2. Explanation via causal relationships 
3. Quantitative data focus 
4. Controlled research 
Explanation of subjective meaning 
Qualitative data focus 
Research in 'normal' setting 
5. Highly structured Minimal structure 
I Experiment I Survey Case study I Action research I Ethnography 
Table 4-1 A paradigmatic approach to the selection of research methodology 
These facets of the two paradigms have the following principal features: 
4.2.1 Deductive/Inductive 
An inductive approach is a process by which the researcher reflects upon social 
phenomena and seeks to formulate explanations that can be used to predict future 
experiences. A deductive approach by contrast conceptualises a structure prior to 
any empirical work and then seeks to test it through the application of 'facts' from the 
real world. 
Positivist methodologies rely on logical reasoning, typically where conclusions flow 
from initial premises. By contrast phenomenological methodologies provide a 
conclusion framework based on experiential and experimental reasoning. See for 
example (Phelan and Reynolds 1995) who discuss the importance of sound 
arguments, and (Strauss 1987), (Silverman 2000), (Murray-Thomas 2003), 
(Richardson 2000), and (Symon and Cassell 1998) where different types of 
qualitative research are explored. 
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4.2.2 Explanation 
Positivist methods rely on the analysis of causal relationships and explanation by 
deriving and testing laws and theories. As mentioned previously in this chapter, such 
research generally comprises a model to explain expected behaviours and then uses 
deductive techniques to 'prove' the model. In contrast to this, phenomenological 
methods provide for the explanation of subjective meaning and understanding by 
using inductive techniques to explain behaviours based on sociological observation. 
4.2.3 Quantitative/Qualitative 
Qualitative research adopts assumptions about social life and documents real events 
by observing what people say and how they say it, studying behaviours, reviewing 
documents, and other phenomena. Qualitative research focuses on subjective 
meanings, symbols, metaphors and descriptions of specific cases and subjects. The 
aim is to capture social aspects for which it is difficult to provide precise 
measurements through use of numbers. Quantitative research takes a more positivist 
approach which is characterised by linearity and the pursuit of a precise order of 
steps. The results of quantitative research would frequently be represented in the 
form of measurable and comparable numbers. 
It can be argued that qualitative research has more to do with the strong reliance on 
symbolic interaction inherent in phenomenological studies where quantitative studies 
by contrast are rooted in empiricism. 
Perhaps one of the most significant differences between the two approaches in the 
context of research application is in the respective goals. Where qualitative research 
seeks understanding and to describe in some depth through a flexible and evolving 
approach, quantitative research tends towards the identification of a 'truth' that will 
explain the mass of data collected. The quantitative research outcome is often 
predetermined and in most cases structured in design. 
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These factors and other characteristics of the two approaches are summarised in 
Table 4-2 below. 
Comparative Point Qualitative Quantitative 
Focus Quality (nature, essence) Quantity (how much, how 
many) 
Philosophical root 
Phenomenology, 
symbolic interaction 
Associations 
Ethnography, naturalism 
Goal of investigation 
Understanding, 
description, hypothesis 
generation 
Design characteristics 
Flexible, evolving, 
emergent 
Setting Natural, familiar 
Sample Small, theoretical 
Data collection Researcher as primary 
instrument 
Mode of analysis Inductive 
Findings Comprehensive, holistic, 
expansive 
Positivism, logical empiricism 
Experimentation, empiricism, 
statistics 
Prediction, search for truth, 
control, hypothesis testing 
Predetermined, structured 
Artificial, unfamiliar 
Large, representative 
Surveys, questionnaires 
Deductive 
Precise, narrow, reductionism 
Validation processes Normative reliability Repeatability and refutability 
Table 4-2 Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative focus 
4.2.4 Controlled vs. Normal Setting 
Nomothetic methods seek to eliminate variables in a subject environment to allow the 
'true' issues to surface. This calls for some control over the environment as well as of 
the research data itself. Ideographic methods seek a setting which is as normal as 
possible so that underlying phenomena can be surfaced and understood. The 
Hawthorn experiments provide evidence that the intervention itself can have a 
dramatic effect on the 'normal setting'. When George Elton Mayo carried out 
experiments at General Electric's Hawthorn works in Chicago into productivity and 
work conditions, the extra attention that the employees received seemed to instil in 
them a greater sense of importance for themselves and their jobs (see for example 
107 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
(Elton Mayo 1949)). This improved their performance rate. In certain configurations 
when the conditions where worsened, production still increased 
4.2.5 Structure 
Referring to Table 4-1, it can be argued that positivist methodologies employ highly 
structured research to ensure replicability of deductive methods and causal 
explanation through quantitative data focus. Phenomenological methods have 
minimal structure to ensure subjective explanation is consistent with qualitative data, 
and as a result validate inductive methods. 
Drawing on the information in this section and that of previous chapters it is argued 
that although a phenomenological approach to the study of human-centred contexts 
is preferred, other more positivistic methodologies have something to offer also. This 
theme is developed in the next section where they will be drawn together in the 
construction of a research model. 
4.3 Towards an Interventionist Framework 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
4.3 Towards an L 
.1 
Introduction Interventionist 
4.5 Role of the 4.7 Research 
Framework Researcher Plan 
4.2 Positivism vs. 
14.4 
Analysis of 4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology 
Framework Success of 4.8 Conclusions 
JConstituents Intervention 
From the previous section it can be argued that a multi-methodological approach 
using a range of techniques from both paradigms may have something to offer. This 
is now developed further towards the construction of a research model. 
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It has been suggested (Stenhouse 1975) that any research technique is valid, and 
those researchers that develop a research methodology should do so in line with 
what is appropriate at the time, and what meets the needs of people using it. More 
recently Romm (1999) has argued that techniques like surveys and ethnographic 
studies, don't have to be 'on' or 'about' subjects, rather, that they can be 'with' those 
being studied. Following this reasoning, whilst it is held (McKay 1999) that action 
research brings together the knowledge of process and intellectual framework from 
the researcher and the knowledge of context from the problem owner, there is no 
compelling case for why this 'collaboration' must be peculiar to action research. 
By developing this theme a little further, it is possible to construct a research model 
(Figure 4-1) that provides a theoretical underpinning but also leaves the researcher 
with the freedom to use elements and approaches that are most applicable at a given 
time. It can be seen in the research model that broadly speaking, the research 
methodologies move from a largely positivist approach on the left and towards a 
largely phenomenological approach towards the right. 
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Exploration of underlying themes 
Inductive 
Portable 
Study Objectives 
1. Devise a new model for the evaluation of information security practice which is explicitly based on a recognised social 
theory. 
2. Establish a means of embedding information security into organisations rather than relying on a set of rules and functions 
around which information security is practised. 
3. Empirically test and revise the model. 
4. Critique this study 
5. From the outcomes of the critique, record contributions to knowledge provided by this study, suggest additional contributions 
that could be made and recommend additional research projects for the domain. In particular, ways to bring about action- 
based remediation should be proposed. 
Experiment Survey Case Literature Action Ethnographic 
Study Review Research Study 
Literature Review - searching through communications to answer questions brought by researcher 
Observations - watching and/or listening to events and then recording what occurred 
Interviews - researcher (typically orally) asking questions for individuals to answer 
Questionnaires - printed questions that participants answer with either facts or opinions 
Inventories - document on which participants record their preferences, e. g. likes and dislikes 
Tests - questions or apparatus designed to discover how skilled a participant is in a particular domain of knowledge 
Focus Groups - participants with common demographics, attitudes etc are led through discussion of particular topic 
Directed Discussions - informal gathering of participants to capture ideas and issues 
Figure 4-1 Model of the rcesearcn Approacn 
The theories underpinning each of the six strands of this model provide the 
grounding for the methodology, the fundamental requirements of which are 
summarised in the `umbrella' at the top. 
The study objectives are the 'glue' that binds these two elements together. They 
create a constant check against the methodological requirements, and ensuring that 
the current approaches are appropriate. There is no intention at this stage to finalise 
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the number and nature of the research strands in advance of gaining deeper 
understanding of the context through carrying out the actual research. The iterative 
process present in most of the work in this study is no less appropriate in the 
selection of research methodology. The strands identified are those that are 
available in the context of this research. 
In the course of conducting this investigation, a significant volume of 'textual data' in 
the form of reports, user awareness documents and other written material will be 
encountered. The relatively unstructured nature of this material makes it difficult to 
extract meaning from it in an unbiased manner. The most significant piece of textual 
data is BS7799 (ISO 2000c; BSI 2002a). These publications will be analysed using 
the evaluative model which was developed in the theory chapter. This analysis will 
allow the model to be refined and also add specific security controls into the model to 
further enrich it. Other textual data will be in the form of industry surveys which will 
provide additional weight to some of the key themes developed, particularly in 
describing the current status of the domain (Chapter 2). Finally, organisational 
manuals and industry periodicals will be used to provide depth when carrying out the 
research but are not considered significant data sources in their own right. 
The model constructed in this section includes methodologies that it is believed will 
provide an adequate grounding for the study. In the next section these 
methodologies are briefly explored to determine their nature, how they might be of 
use to this study, and most importantly considerations as to their use and constraints. 
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4.4 Analysis of Framework Constituents 
Paul Drake 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
4.3 Towards an 4.5 Role of the .7 
Research 
4.1 Introduction Interventionist Researcher Plan 
Framework 
4.2 Positivism vs. 
=Analwysm 
4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology Success of 4.8 Conclusions Intervention 
The purpose of this section is to surface the facets and nature of the methodologies 
presented in the previous section, and in particular in the model at Figure 4-1 so that 
their advantages and disadvantages are understood. 
4.4.1 Overlying Requirements 
The model at Figure 4-1 is constructed to be flexible in use. To ensure focus is 
maintained, the research methods used and the way in which they are used, meet 
the following three criteria. 
4.4.1.1 Exploration of underlying themes 
This requirement ensures that sufficient depth is afforded the research. It would be 
inappropriate to seek a relatively narrow understanding of the themes and concepts 
across a wide range of different research subjects. Research methods selected, and 
the way in which they are utilised will ensure depth of study to surface underlying 
themes. 
4.4.1.2 Inductive 
Whether induction or deduction is to be used is dependent in large part on the nature 
of the research (qualitative versus quantitative) and to what extent the theory which is 
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to be used has been established. In Section 4.2.2 the nature of qualitative and 
quantitative research approaches are compared. In Section 4.2.1 deductive and 
inductive methods are discussed. A comparison of the most successful settings for 
each of the research methods is presented at Section 4.2.4. 
In the previous chapters, the current domain of information security has been 
discussed at length. It has been argued that the domain is devoid of explicit theory 
and some of the problems that seem to arise from that have been presented. 
Additionally, it has been extensively argued that information is not treated as a social 
domain and as such the needs of people have been largely ignored. 
In terms of this part of the research design, the consideration left is: how much of an 
inductive approach should be used? 
It is necessary to draw on the findings of the previous chapter which explored 
available social theories and developed a model which will be applied for the 
purposes of this research. A fully inductive study would be devoid of any structure 
prior to the commencement of the empirical work. This is not the case in this study. 
Chapter 3 has provided an evaluative model for the domain, and this chapter has 
provided a research model, albeit a highly flexible one. Also, it has been established 
through reference to current information security documentation (as opposed to 
theory) and the experience of the author's practice in the current domain, that there is 
a requirement for application of essential controls in almost all information security 
systems. This implies at least some nomothetic application of the controls rather than 
fully ideographic. Therefore, if the inductive/deductive nature of the research 
approach were considered a continuum rather than a choice, the approach could be 
identified as shown in Figure 4-2 below. 
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Inductive Approach Neither Deductively 
Deductive 
Fully Inductive 
with 
Approach with Fully Deductive 
Approach Deductive 
Nor Inductively Inductive Approach Influences Biased Influences 
Figure 4-2 Research approach for this thesis (shaded blue) 
4.4.1.3 Portable 
It is important that the research subjects are selected for their suitability based on the 
way in which they practice information security rather than their fit to the research 
approaches selected. It is therefore necessary that the research is designed to be 
used in a variety of types of organisation and industry sector. For example, some 
organisations have a federal approach to information security practice, whereby the 
local general or divisional manager is responsible. In other organisations 
responsibility is centralised and compliance is expected in a similar way as for 
compliance with financial standards. 
The research design needs to allow for a range of types of information security 
practice, and therefore needs to be flexible and portable across a number of types of 
practice. It also needs to be portable in terms of industry sector, and cater for a 
variety of ways of selecting and implementing information security controls. 
4.4.2 Study Objectives 
Bonding the research model with the objectives of any given study will guard against 
the research becoming contingent. In other words, the study objectives are set (see 
Table 1-1) and established as part of the research model before the research starts. 
By embedding the objectives into the research design model it can be assured that if 
the empirical research proves inconclusive or at odds with the expected objectives, it 
is the research design itself that will be modified and reapplied rather than simply 
amending the objectives to meet the findings achieved. 
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4.4.3 Analysis of Research Types 
This section summarises the principal tools that will be used to exercise the research 
methods described above 
4.4.3.1 Experiment 
"Experiments are one of the key elements of scientific method" (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe et al. 1995: 37). In what has been established as a sociological approach it 
may not be obvious what value there may be in this method. However, Easterby- 
Smith et al refer to 'quasi-experimental' designs. Amongst the most popular of these 
is the 'pre test/post test comparison'. It is not envisaged that this research approach 
will be used within this study as it is considered too positivistic to be useful in a thesis 
concerned with human behaviours. 
4.4.3.2 Survey 
Surveys are used to obtain information concerning a specific group or population. 
This may include a whole country as in the case of a census or a particular 
demographic grouping such as gender, age and ethnicity. 
In the context of this study surveys will be used as secondary data source to help 
explain the current position in the information security domain and also to provide a 
benchmark against which the practice of organisations under study can be assessed. 
The surveys used in this thesis can be found in Chapter 1. 
4.4.3.3 Case Study 
A case study typically consists of a description of an entity and the actions of that 
entity in particular circumstances. Case studies can also offer explanations as to why 
such entities act as they do. Entities studied using case study methodologies typically 
include individuals, groups, organisations and events. 
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(Yin 1989) regards a case study in much the same way that the natural scientist 
regards a laboratory experiment. According to Bell (1993) the case study approach is 
an umbrella term for a family of research methods that focus around a specific 
instance or event. 
More formally, a case study may be defined as an empirical study that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used (Yin 1989; Yin 1993). In this context the case study is 
independent of the research strategy and thus may be used with positivistic oriented 
tools of analysis or with a more phenomenological approach. In this study the case 
study approach is used in a more phenomenological manner, and specific tools used 
are in the manner of revisiting a former action research project, observations and 
literature reviews. 
4.4.3.4 Literature Review 
Any research project, irrespective of its size, should include some review of what has 
been written about the subject being studied. Information from this review should be 
gathered together into a logical sequence which demonstrates that the researcher 
has awareness of the current state of knowledge. At doctoral level, shortcomings and 
limitations in the current knowledge should be identified and contributions to address 
these limitations made. 
4.4.3.5 Action Research 
There is some controversy concerning the origins of action research, but it has been 
considered as a distinctive research approach since the 1940s. Kurt Lewin is 
generally considered to be one of the creators of this technique (Checkland 1981; 
Argyris, Putnam et at. 1985) and was the first to use the term "Action Research" 
(Lewin 1946). 
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As a process, action research is dependant on an external view of a situation and it 
essentially involves: taking a status picture of the organisation situation; formulating a 
hypothesis based on the picture; manipulating variables under the control of the 
researcher, and; taking and evaluating a second status picture of the situation. This 
cyclical approach to action research provides an opportunity to strengthen the 
research findings by building on previous iterations in the cycle (Ketchum and Trist 
1992). 
The action researcher is thus involved in a real manner in an organisational situation 
where there is not only an expectation that a contribution to knowledge should be 
made, but also to directly produce usable knowledge that can be applied and 
validated in action (Gummesson 1991). In addition Gummesson points out that there 
is an expectation that the researcher should also develop sensitivity to the theoretical 
concepts that are being used so that they are transcended and transformed into 
better theory. 
Often the hardest part in research is deciding on a focus. Action research does not 
require a precise hypothesis. In fact it is not even necessary to begin with a problem. 
Hopkins (2002: 63) suggests that" All you need is a general idea that something 
should be improved. Your general idea may stem from a promising new idea or the 
recognition that existing practice falls short of aspiration. " Once the focus of the 
research has been decided, planning for data collection followed by actual data 
collection and analysis occurs. 
4.4.3.6 Ethnography 
Real ethnography, like anthropology, often takes a very long time; sometimes years 
of observation. According to Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991) ethnography is the type 
of field observation in which a society's culture is studied. Although this approach has 
some application in business and management studies it is not used extensively. 
Largely due to the substantial investment in time that is required. Typically, in its 
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original anthropological environment an ethnographic study would involve a 
researcher living with a 'tribe' for a number of years and then returning to their 
institution to write up their findings. In an organisational context this type of study can 
be used where the researcher is employed by organisation for a number of years. 
It is in this context, along with action research and case study techniques, that 
ethnographic research is utilised within this study. 
4.4.4 Analysis of Research Methods 
In addition to the case study/ethnography/action research approach developed in the 
previous sections, the research will utilise the following tools in surfacing the issues 
to be studied. 
4.4.4.1 Literature Reviews 
The process of literature review in this context entails searching through one or more 
communications to answer questions that the investigator brings to the search. 
Literature reviews are not limited to written or printed documents but extend as well 
to audio and video recordings, photographs, speeches, meetings and the like. 
The analysis of a communication's contents is guided by a question, set of questions 
or hypotheses that the researcher hopes to answer. These questions and 
hypotheses can be limited to qualitative features of the communication or can 
concern quantitative aspects as well. 
4.4.4.2 Observation 
The aim of observation in research is to gain an understanding of a research subject 
or context by sharing the space of the research site at least for some part of the 
duration of the research. The argument for adopting observation as an evidence- 
collecting strategy is that real understanding will come about through extended 
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observation as this enables an understanding of both the context and process of 
behaviour. 
Observation is closely aligned with the ethnographic study. Both being widely used in 
anthropological research projects. 
4.4.4.3 Interviews 
This is a most common tool for the collection of qualitative data. Interviews may be 
structured to a greater or lesser extent depending on the nature of the research. 
Interviews can be used successfully as one of the main tools in researching a case 
study. This is because research into strategic issues requires the collection of 
complex evidence concerning 'Why? ', 'How? ', 'Who' etc. Simple survey techniques 
are not appropriate in such circumstances. 
4.4.4.4 Questionnaires 
The main purpose of questionnaire research is to obtain information that cannot be 
easily observed or that is not already available in documentary form. Evidence from 
the questionnaire survey is then used for one or more of: description; explanation, 
and; hypothesis testing. 
The types of information sought when surveying individuals or objects, such as 
organisations, often include evidence on demographic and socio-economic variables. 
In addition, depending on the study, evidence may be sought on opinions or beliefs 
related to behaviours, experiences, activities and attitudes. 
4.4.4.5 Inventories 
An inventory is a particular type of questionnaire in which respondents are asked to 
express attitudes, opinions and preferences. 
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4.4.4.6 Tests 
Tests are sets of printed questions designed to discover how well a test-taker 
commands the information and skills of a particular domain of knowledge. This tool 
can be used to furnish either qualitative or quantitative data. 
4.4.4.7 Focus groups 
This is a research approach used to collect data and evidence from a specialised 
group of individuals. The group is formed to debate an issue of interest to the 
researcher. This is a relatively easy way for the researcher to accumulate some data 
from a number of experts. 
4.4.4.8 Directed discussions 
Directed discussions are a particular type of focus group in which there is no 
particular agenda or specific subject to be discussed, although the general direction 
of the discussion is directed by the researcher. 
4.5 Role of the Researcher 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
X4.3 
Towards an 4.5 Role of the 4.7 Research 4.1 Introduction Interventionist 
Framework Researcher Plan 
4.2 Positivism vs. 
4.4 Analysis of 4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology 
Framework Success of 4.8 Conclusions 
Constituents Intervention 
There are a variety of roles the researcher may adopt depending on the degree of 
involvement of the researcher at the research site. These roles are summarised in 
Table 3-3 below. This table outlines the types of role which researchers may choose, 
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the potential problems that need to be avoided, and the various methodologies 
discussed earlier in this chapter which are most likely to be successful. In this way 
the various strands in this chapter will be drawn together and moved forward into the 
research plan tabulated at the end of the chapter. 
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4.6 Testing the Success of Intervention 
Paul Drake 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
4.3 Towards an 4.5 Role of the 4.7 Research 
Erodudion 
Interventionist 
Framework 
Researcher Plan 
4.2 Positivism vs. 
4.4 Analysis of 4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology 
Framework Success of 4.8 Conclusions 
Constituents Intervention 
Whilst wishing to allow the research approach to develop within the loose framework 
identified above, qualitative approaches started to surface more strongly than 
quantitative ones, quite naturally, as more relevant to the problem domain. This 
strong dependence on qualitative methods, however, raises the question of how to 
ensure the reliability of the outcomes of the research, since repeatability and 
refutation cannot be relied upon. The solution is seen to lie, again drawing from the 
domain of social theory, in seeking validity and confirmation in the form of `normative 
validity': outcomes are valid if supported by a critically informed dialectic drawn from 
those involved in and affected by the system of concern. In addition, the concepts of 
triangulation, saturation and critical reflection will be used within the research 
programme. 
Triangulation is seen to be a key factor to minimise misconceptions and the invalidity 
of conclusions (Yin, 1993, p. 92-93; Gummensson, 1991, p. 121; Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Lowe, 1991, p. 133-4); and therefore is built into the research methods of 
the present study. 
Besides triangulation, critical reflection is an integral part of the research. Critique, in 
the form of examining and re-examining taken-for-granted assumptions, is seen to be 
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important in enhancing the reliability of the research results (Saunders and Lewis 
1997: 196). 
Finally, it could be argued that any human-centred intervention should include an 
opportunity for those being studied to contribute to, and reflect upon the validity of the 
findings. 
The previous sections within this chapter are fairly general in nature. They are 
intended to lay the foundations for the construction of the research plan in the next 
sections. To facilitate the research plan, and to draw together the previous sections, 
Figure 4-3 below provides a summary of the methodological research process. 
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Philosophy Positivism I Phenomenology 
Manifests as 
Method Nomothetic I Ideographic 
Leads to 
Methodology Experiment Survey Case Study Literature Action Review Research 
Ethnography 1 11 
Influenced by 
Role of the 
Researcher 
Constraints and 
Normal or 
Controlled Setting 
Followed by 
Testing the 
Effectiveness Success of 
Intervention 
Figure 43 Summary of methodological research process 
This structure can now be taken forward as the basis for the research plan which is 
developed in the next section. 
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4.7 Research Plan 
Paul Drake 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
4.3 Towards an 4.5 Role of the 4.7 Research 
Entroduction 
Interventionist Researcher Plan Framework 
4.2 Positivism vs. 
4.4 Analysis of 4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology Framework Success of 4.8 Conclusions Constituents Intervention 
It is recognised that organisations sometimes do not wish to be identified as research 
subjects. This is especially so in situations where the information being sought is 
considered sensitive. In this project the information presented could increase the 
risks of malicious attack on one or more of the subject organisations. For this reason 
their privacy will be respected and any information that would specifically identify 
them has been removed. 
Table 4-4 below provides an overview of the research plan and an audit of the 
research that has been carried out so far. 
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4.7.1 Initial Stages of Empirical Research 
The purpose of this section is to prepare for the empirical work to follow by 
developing a specific approach to the action research project described in Chapter 5 
and the case studies in Chapter 6. This section also surfaces the means for 
triangulation to further validate the research. Finally, this section provides a 
framework that allows the knowledge and experience of the author to be exposed 
using Figure 3-9. This framework can then be used as a means for triangulation 
within the empirical research. This is a fairly lengthy and complex section as it draws 
together the generic analyses that has taken place so far in this chapter and uses 
this to prepare for and design the specific empirical research that takes place in the 
following two chapters. To help the reader navigate this section, as before, a map of 
the main subject areas is provided. However, this time the map includes the key 
purposes of the subjects discussed. 
Author's experiential framework 
3.7.1 Initial Stages 
of Empirical 
Research 
Author's 
Experiential 
Framework 
To surface and 
formalise the key 
issues in the author's 
experience as a 
practitioner in the 
information security 
domain, that have a 
bearing on the 
empirical research and 
the application of the 
evaluative model 
Empirical Research 
Plan 
The specific types of 
research that will be 
used in the empirical 
chapters 
Metaphorical 
Explorations 
To provide background 
and authority for one of 
the research 
approaches that has 
not been discussed 
previously 
Validating the 
Empirical Research 
Through 
Triangulation 
To provide an overview 
of the different strands 
of research in this 
thesis and how they 
interrelate to provide 
rigour and validation of 
the outcomes 
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For the purposes of this exercise the key part of Figure 3-9 is the AGIL functions 
because they enable a discussion of the specific types of information security 
practice. These are reproduced in Figure 4-4 below along with indicators which 
reference to the explanations beneath Figure 4-4. These explanations surface what 
an information security practice would look like from the perspective of the relevant 
AGIL function based on the author's experience and knowledge of the domain. For 
example, reference 1 in Figure 4-4 indicates an explanation from the perspective of 
an information security practice which is dominated by 'Adaptation' functions. 
Figure 4-4 Framework of author's experience of information security practice 
viewed from the 4 AGIL functional perspectives 
As the current information security domain is rooted in the A&G functions (at least 
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it is argued so in this thesis), only perspectives 1 and 2 are exposed directly from 
approaches to information security observed and experienced by the author. 
Perspectives 3 and 4 are characterised on the basis of observations from the 
current domain, but informed by consideration of what ought to be having regard to 
the issues surfaced within this thesis. 
Perspective 1: Adaptation 
Characterised as a security practice that seeks attainment of resources from within 
the organisation to make systems secure, and succeeds in attaining these 
resources. Such a practice will most likely be considered successful within the 
organisation but measured against intangible benefits such as mitigation of risks 
rather than tangible improvements or benefits. 
This characterisation is the most common approach to information security which in 
many cases would be based upon adherence to industry-wide controls such as 
those present in the British Standard for Information Security Management (ISO 
2000c; BSI 2002a). Within this approach, adherence to such controls is used to 
legitimise the practice, draw resources from the organisation to maintain the 
practice, and indeed to increase its influence. 
Perspective 2: Goal-Attainment 
This perspective is characterised as an information security practice dependent on 
the attainment of measurable improvements and benefits for survival of the practice. 
Such a practice is most likely starved of resources, being only able to secure those 
resources clearly linked to attainment of a benefit or improvement. The delivery of 
measurable benefits and improvements is especially difficult in the domain of 
information security which is for the most part concerned with stopping undesirable 
events from happening, i. e. the avoidance of negative impacts as opposed to the 
enhancement of positive ones. 
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In such a practice it would be acceptable to deliver controls established by some 
industry best practice, but not for its own sake. There must be delivery of tangible 
improvements in terms of reduced effort or cycle times as a result of the deployment 
of such controls. Risk is accepted within the organisation as undesirable but basic 
avoidance of such risk is unlikely to be accepted as a reason to deploy resources, or 
even to maintain existing levels of investment. 
Efficiency savings through process definition and improvements would be normal in 
this less common approach to information security practice. 
Perspective 3: Integration 
This perspective would be characterised by sensitivity to the needs of the business. 
Information security controls should not be deployed that would disrupt the normal 
operation of the business more than any potential threat would if left unchecked. 
Under this perspective a balance is required between the potential harm posed by a 
security threat and the actual disruption caused by the deployment of counter- 
measures. 
Perspective 4: Latency 
Latency would be characterised by sensitivity to the needs of people affected by the 
information security system. Consideration should be given to the impact of security 
controls on people affected by them who should be given the opportunity for their 
voices to be heard. 
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Empirical research plan 
3.7.1 Initial Stages 
of Empirical 
Research 
Author's Validating the 
Experiential Empirical Research Metaphorical Empirical Research 
Framework 
Plan Explorations Through 
Triangulation 
To surface and 
formalise the key 
issues in the authors To provide background 
To provide an overview 
experience as a 
practitioner in the a 
The specific types of and authority for one of of 
the different strands 
of research in this 
information security 
research that will be the research 
used in the empirical approaches that has thesis and how they domain, that have a chapters not been discussed 
interrelate to provide 
bearing on the 
previously rigour and validation of 
empirical research and the outcomes 
the application of the 
evaluative model 
Paul Drake 
The following tables (4-5 and 4-6) build on Tables 4-3 and 4-4 to provide an 
overview of the non-empirical and empirical research and how it has taken place or 
will take place. 
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Metaphorical explorations 
3.7.1 Initial Stages 
of Empirical 
Research 
Author's 
Experiential 
Empirical Research Metaphorical 
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Empirical Research 
Through 
Framework Triangulation 
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Metaphorical structure 
Paul Drake 
Issues of language as a means for communication have already been established as 
the core approach in this study. Indeed, the evaluative model at Figure 3-9 was 
constructed using language and communicative action as its core principles. 
Continuing this theme, this section uses metaphors to attempt to break through some 
of the barriers to effective language based communication. 
In his study of William Faulkner and his work, Joseph Gold (1966) offers an 
interesting insight into how language itself is structured on the use of symbols. 
As an example, Gold begins with the word `whale' which evokes a picture of a sea 
creature. He then offers the phrase `ferocious whale' which enriches the mental 
picture by increasing the imaginative response. Moving, Gold suggests, from a 'still' 
to a 'film strip. ' The phrase `white whale' enriches cognitive responses even further 
(particularly if the recipient has read Moby Dick). 
Gold suggests three levels of symbolic structure. He suggests that a word produces 
an object; a phrase produces a qualified object; and a series of phrases can produce 
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an object so qualified and of such complex associations that it in turn evokes whole 
range of associations. This third level of symbolic structure is, in effect, the 
metaphorical representation of reality within which negotiation can take place. In the 
case of this research, this negotiation takes the form of a reframe of the core 
metaphor to surface an improved model of reality. 
Terms and phrases based on the structure of metaphor have entered normal 
communication. For example, a stereotype is, amongst other things, a metaphor that 
has to some degree overtaken reality. Paradoxically, the fact that an object has been 
identified as a stereotype detracts from an otherwise total immersion in the 
metaphorical representation. Other examples include the words understatement and 
overstatement. Understatement suggests an acceptance of the deficiencies of a 
particular metaphorical representation. Overstatement suggests an attempt to 
strengthen a point of view through negotiation within the third level of symbolic 
structure, as described above, rather than broadening the metaphors representation 
of reality. 
A disagreement may be characterised as a 'battle' of wills; a person on whom one 
can rely in times of crisis might be described as a 'rock'. In each case, the metaphor 
evokes an image that emphasises a specific quality of the subject. Metaphors are 
useful and most successful when they associate an unfamiliar or abstract concept 
with something familiar or concrete. However, this familiarity runs the risk of 
obscuring or distorting. It is sometimes difficult to see what lies behind the metaphor 
used, and what other facets of a subject are obscured or not addressed by a 
metaphorical representation. For example, calling a disagreement a battle distracts 
attention from the normal co-operative aspects of the relationship, and indeed may 
reduce the possibility of a successful compromise; calling a person a rock hides the 
sensitivities and feelings that the subject may possess. 
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Metaphors within human cognitive processes 
Metaphors are a fundamental means through which people forge relationships with 
the world (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Morgan 1986; Morgan 1993). As the word 
reality signifies, people have come to believe that they are living in a domain of 
meaning that seems much more real and concrete than it really is. This theme of 
truth and reality has already been explored in this thesis when discussing the 
contribution of Kant to social theory. Metaphors are a useful means for 
conceptualising the non-physical in terms of the physical and the less clearly 
delineated in terms of the more dearly delineated. 
Gareth Morgan (1986) encourages people to become theorists, forging 
understandings and interpretations of situations and negotiating within the 
metaphorical representation of reality that has been conceived or provided. This 
seems to be a useful and realistic proposition. but it has drawbacks. Lakoff & 
Johnson (1980) argue that metaphors are a fundamental part of human cognitive 
structure. To be able to'play' with a metaphorical model of reality, it must first be 
elevated from the unconscious mind to the conscious mind. In so doing the model 
becomes flawed as, for example, inconsistencies are ignored and compromises 
made between the conscious and unconscious. The acid test seems to be whether 
something useful can come out of this inter and intra-metaphorical negotiation. 
Metaphors In organisational diagnosis 
In Images of Organisation, Morgan (1986) explores a series of 'what if ...? ' 
questions: 
" What if we think about organisations as machines? 
" What if wo think about organisations as organisms? 
" What if we think about organisations as brains? 
" What if we think about organisations as cultures? 
" What if wo think about organisations as political systems? 
" What if we think about organisations as psychic prisons? 
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9 What if we think about organisations as flux and transformation? 
" What if we think about organisations as instruments of domination? 
All of these questions provide different metaphorical representations of the way an 
organisation works. Sometimes these representations conflict, such as the 
'organisations as machines' metaphor and the 'organisations as organisms' 
metaphor. Sometimes the representations are complementary, such as the 
'organisations as brains' metaphor and the 'organisations as instruments of 
domination' metaphor. Fundamentally, reality rests in ways of thinking and acting 
and, Morgan proposes, in principle, there are no limits to the number of images and 
metaphors that can be used to enrich this process of understanding reality. In effect, 
Morgan argues that two metaphors taken together can provide a better 
representation of reality than just one. In a similar way that two eyes are better than 
one. Gibson Burrell (1996) questions whether this 'duality' of metaphorical use can 
be sustained within the human mind in the same way that bifocal vision can. A more 
accurate representation of what occurs might be more progressive rather than 
cumulative. As a better metaphorical representation appears through additional 
information or through reasoning, the now flawed model is discarded in favour of the 
new improved representation. 
It therefore becomes vital that people are prepared and equipped to forge 
understandings and relationships within the metaphor, and understand the 
metaphorical representation for what it is - an incomplete approximation. 
Metaphors as tools for transformation 
As part of normal discourse, people frequently slip into an attempt to impose their 
own metaphorical interpretation on the other party. Phrases such as 'I know what 
you're saying', 'I see what you mean', and much more explicitly'So what you're 
saying is' all have the effect of reframing (Adler 1994) a metaphorical interpretation 
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offered by one party into a form that can be positioned within the knowledge and 
experience of another party. As explored above, metaphors are important to the 
whole realm of human thought. They are a core process by which people make 
sense of things by'borrowing' metaphors from something else, and framing them into 
a current perception of reality. 
There are at least three ways in which metaphors lead to a transformation of 'reality': 
1. Direct change corrects a deficiency by tackling it head on. For example, 
perception is lack of communication so more staff briefings are arranged. 
2. Reframing involves restating the metaphorical representation of reality and 
working towards the new metaphor. For example, taking the organisation 
from being a 'camel' to being a racehorse'. There is a need to agree the 
reframed metaphor with the organisation or team first - "is this where we want 
to be? " 
3. Negotiation within the metaphor whereby reality is created, sustained and 
modified through communication within the boundaries and constraints set by 
the metaphorical representation. 
In summary, metaphors can be a useful means for surfacing issues within an 
organisational context in such a way that normal discursive constraints such as 
coercion and reaching understanding are reduced. Metaphors have significant 
limitations of their own, not least the tendency to obscure other facets of a subject 
which may be important. 
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Validating the empirical research through triangulation 
Paul Drake 
3.7.1 Initial Stages 
of Empirical 
Research 
Validating the 
E periential 
Empirical Research Metaphorical Empirical Research 
Framework 
Plan Explorations Through 
Triangulation 
E 
a 
To surface and 
formalise the key 
issues in the author's To provide background 
To provide an overview 
experience as a The specific types of and authority for one of 
of the different strands 
practitioner in the research that will be the research of research 
in this 
information security used in the empirical approaches that has thesis and 
how they 
domain, that have a chapters not been discussed 
interrelate to provide 
bearing on the previously rigour and validation of 
empirical research and the outcomes 
the application of the 
evaluative model 
Figure 4-5 below shows how a series of triangulations provides a means to increase 
the validity of the research and maintain academic rigour. Three sources of primary 
empirical research across disparate industry sectors are utilised to validate the use 
and effectiveness of the evaluative model. The outcomes of secondary research in 
the form of surveys of information security practices and opinions within the current 
domain are compared with literature that describes and comments on current 
practice. This is in turn compared with available literature concerning social theory in 
general and communicative action in particular. Theories derived from this review are 
used as the basis for the evaluative model against which the `empirical triangle' is 
assessed, and the model is also used to evaluate the British Standard to provide 
further validation of the evaluative model and to add weight to the findings of the 
surveys and current information security literature. Finally, these two triangles, 
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literature and empirical, are contrasted with the author's experience of the domain 
which is surfaced and formalised through use of a subset of the evaluative model. 
Authors 
Experience 
Framework of author's 
experience of information 
security practice from AGIL 
perspectives 
Research Validation 
Literature Empirical 
Research 
/\\ 
it 3- BS7799 
AR 1- Pharmaceutical Case 2- Retail ands 
Organisation -- Leisure Organisation 
Cases 
Case 1- Local Authority 
Figure 4-5 Research validation through triangulation 
In Figure 4-5 above the research that has already been carried out in Chapter 2 is 
shown shaded blue and that carried out in Chapter 3 is shown shaded green. The 
research so far carried out in this chapter is shown shaded red. As the research is 
completed through successive chapters the model at Figure 4-5 will be updated to 
show progress towards the validated research planned here. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
Paul Drake 
4. Explorations 
in Research 
Methodologies 
4.3 Towards an 4.5 Role of the 4.7 Research 
Ftroduction 
Interventionist 
Framework 
Researcher Plan 
4.2 Positivism vs. 
4.4 Analysis of 4.6 Testing the 
Phenomenology Framework Success of 
L4.8 
Conclusions 
Constituents Intervention 
The main objective of this chapter has been to construct a research model that is 
flexible (necessary for human-centred, ill-defined contexts) and reliable. It is argued 
that this has been achieved through the development of a multi-methodological 
approach, which employs contemporary thinking around the deployment of a range 
of approaches. Analysis of the chosen methodologies, in particular the way in which 
they will be used and the boundaries of their practicality, have helped minimise 
problems of contingency that are sometimes present in flexible and multi- 
methodological research approaches. 
In the following two chapters this research model will be applied. In the next chapter 
the model is applied in an organisation in the form of an action research project. In 
Chapter 6 the model is applied to BS7799 and also to organisations in the form of 
case studies. The action research project is specifically required to surface a method 
by which the essential controls could be successfully applied. 
Two additional models have been developed and updated in this chapter in 
preparation for the empirical research that follows. The models are referenced in 
Table 4-7 below together with their use in navigating the following two chapters. 
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Reference Title Purpose 
Table 4-6 Empirical research plan Identifies the different research 
approaches and how they will be 
used. Table 4-6 will be shown before 
each empirical research project. 
Figure 4-5 Validation diagram Builds up the research validation 
strands as the studies progress. 
Figure 4-5 will be shown at the end 
of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 to show 
progress in validating the empirical 
research 
Table 4-7 Additional models developed in this chapter to aid navigation 
through empirical research 
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5 Action Research Project 
Paul Drake 
Chapter Outcomes 
" Introduction to this thesis 
Introduction " Hypotheses and and objectives of the research, and where in the 
thesis they are fulfilled 
" Information security domain and how information security is 
Current Position currently practiced. 
" Rationale for approach to improving the domain 
Explorations in Development and detailed analysis of new model for evaluating 
information security practice 
Social Theory . Critical information security reforms 
Explorations in Rationale for research approach 
Research Development and detailed analysis of research model 
Methodologies Research plan and validation process 
Action Research Tested information security model in AR context 
00 
" Use of evaluative model and author's experiential framework as Project basis for empirical research 
Empirical Tested evaluative model against British Standard and two cases N" Refined and revised evaluative model 
Research Completed research validation model 
Critical Review Key contributions made by this research " Critique of research from philosophical standpoint 
and Conclusions Future research opportunities 
The following table will be used throughout Chapters 5 and 6 to orientate the reader 
to the current subject of research (shaded dark yellow) and the research that has 
already been completed (shaded light yellow). This table is derived from Table 3-4. 
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Identifier Industry and Research approach How will research take 
approximate size place? 
Survey 1 Information security Survey 
Lit 1 Social theory Literature review 
Lit 2 Information security Literature review 
AR 1 Pharmaceuticals. Action Interviews, focus groups, 
Approximately 100,000 Research/Ethnographic study meetings, assessments, 
employees questionnaires, tests and 
observations to allow a status 
picture of the organisation to be 
taken. 
Formulate an assessment based 
on the status picture. 
Take and evaluate further status 
pictures 
Lit 3 Information security Review of standard 
Case 1 Local Authority. Case study 
Approximately 14,000 
employees 
Case 2 Retail & Leisure Case study 
organisation. 
Approximately 50,000 
employees 
5.1 Introduction and Purpose 
5. Action 
Research Project 
5.1 Introducöon 5.3 First Status 5.5 Final Status 
and Purpose Picture Picture 
5.6 Findings and 5.2 Organisation 5.4 Second Conclusions 
Profile Status Picture 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the evaluative framework (Figure 3-9) 
developed in the theory chapter (Chapter 3) to an action research project within a 
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multi-national pharmaceutical organisation to test the model prior to its use in the 
main empirical work in the next chapter. Specifically, this project shows how the 
evaluative model could be used within an action research project to provide status 
pictures before and after intervention. In this particular study the method used to 
determine the security profiles (status pictures) is Figure 4-4, the author's experiential 
framework. Alternatively the data could have been captured using the quantitative 
count of controls method used for the review of BS7799 and for case 2, or a more 
qualitative method such as the metaphorical exploration used for case 1, or indeed a 
combination of approaches. In this instance the method was selected because the 
study took place at a time during which the organisation had recently been formed 
through the merger of two pharmaceutical companies. Accordingly, there was no 
stable control-based framework that could be reliably assessed and the volatility of 
the environment would have likely corrupted employee responses insofar as they 
would most likely have been more concerned about whether they had a job and 
where than what type of information security practice was in operation. The author's 
experiential framework was therefore chosen as most likely to give reliable results. Its 
validity was enhanced as the author was a security practitioner in one of the 
organisations prior to the merger and also within the merged organisation in the area 
under study - the operational security department. 
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5.2 Organisational Profile 
Paul Drake 
5. Action 
Research Project 
Land_Pur .1 rodu ctioFit 
Status Final StatuposePicture 
Picture 
5.6 Findings and 
5.2 Organisation 5.4 Second Conclusions 
Profile Status Picture 
This organisation is one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies. It makes 
significant contributions towards research & development. Its other main areas of 
operational focus are in sales & marketing and manufacturing & distribution. The 
organisation has sales, manufacturing and distribution representation across all 
continents which contribute to annual sales of approx £20bn. The organisation 
provides employment across the globe for some 100,000 people. 
5.3 First Status Picture 
5. Action 
ý Research Project 
5.1 Introduction 5.3 First Status 5.5 Final Status 
and Purpose eure Picture 
5.2 Organisation 5.4 Second 
5.6 Findings and 
Conclusions 
Profile KStatus Picture 
At the time of the merger the environment from an information security stand point 
was chaotic. Two disparate infrastructures with alternative approaches to information 
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security were connected together. Fundamentally, the merged organisation did not 
have the Essential (E) controls deployed coherently throughout the merged 
organisation. Several controls were deployed in the former organisations but their 
lack of consistency and coherence would have made them insufficient to protect the 
merged organisation. For the first 3 months of the new organisation's existence (the 
period covered by this first status picture) the information security practice concerned 
itself with developing short term and essential controls to allow the business to 
operate and to provide a rudimentary level of protection. This status is represented in 
the security profile shown at Figure 5-1 below. 
Pharmaceutical Organisation Status Picture 1 
Latent Latent 
Private 
Sphere 
A 
Lifeworld System 
Functions Manifest Functions 
G 
Public 
Sphere 
Latent Latent 
® Bias of AGIL Controls   Presence of Essential Controls 
Figure 5-1 Security profile representing first status picture 
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5.4 Second Status Picture 
Paul Drake 
5. Action 
Research Project 
5cand_PUPOS) 1 Introduction 5.3 First Status 5.5 Final Status 
e Pi cture Picture 
5.2 Organisation 5.4 Second 
5.6 Findings and 
Conclusions 
Profile Status Picture 
The second phase of development for the security practice involved the acquisition of 
sufficient resources to establish and run the information security practice to address 
current issues and for the future. The acquisition process to a large extent fed this 
bias with what felt like something of a `free for all' in the assignment of staff and 
technologies. The general sense was to acquire resources now because they may 
not be available later when they were needed. This approach was as evident in the 
information security practice as it was elsewhere in the organisation. There was little 
by way of specific improvements and certainly little by way of establishing a culture of 
information security. This is represented in Figure 5-2 below. 
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Figure 5-2 Security profile representing second status picture 
Following this period of acquisition, there began a period of rationalisation of security 
processes and the pursuit of specific improvements and positive impacts. The 
functions of the security practice were redefined as specific services and processes 
with establishment of customers, unit costs and outputs. Metrics were applied as the 
key determination of the effectiveness of the service or process and to provide a 
means to drive 'improvements' in the security practice. Resources were available but, 
for the most part, only if clearly linked to the improvement of a key service metric. In 
some cases, but not all, there were specific initiatives to capture and address 
customers' requirements. Generally speaking customers were defined as 
representatives from the corporation, key business managers and key IT service 
151 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
managers. There was little or no alignment with the needs of users of the systems 
that were influenced by the security practice. 
5.5 Final Status Picture 
5. Action 
Research Project 
5.1 Introduction 5.3 First Status 5.5 Final Status 
and Purpose Picture Picture 
5.6 Findings and 
5.2 Organisation 5.4 Second Conclusions 
Profile Status Picture 
This final status picture reflects the continued availability and acquisition of resources 
to sustain the practice, together with the highly directed drive for process 
performance definition and improvement, reflected in a dramatic rise in the Goal- 
attainment function. The moves towards capturing customer requirements are 
represented by moves into the Latency and Integration functions although this is at a 
low level because users were not comprehensively included in the survey of 
customer opinion. 
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Figure 5-3 Security profile representing final status picture 
5.6 Findings and Conclusions 
5. Action 
Research Project 
5.1 Introduction 5.3 First Status 5.5 Final Status 
and Purpose Picture Picture 
5.2 Organisation 5.6 Findings and 5.4 Second 
Profile 
Contusions 
Status Picture 
153 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
The foregoing status pictures and descriptions are summarised in the following 
model (Figure 5-4). This shows the stages of organisational development from the 
separate companies, through the merger and the two stages of information security 
practice bias. 
Org1 Org 2 
Group IT 
Security Infrastructu re Business 
Security Security 
UK Business UK 
Infrastructure Facing Infrastructure 
Security Security Security 
Merger: reactive 
with short term 
Initiatives 
(status picture 1) 
Perspective 1: 
Risk 
Concerned with Operational 
Management 
securing of resources 
and highly event Security 
and Policy 
driven (status picture 2) 
Formulation & 
Compliance Perspective 2: 
Concerned with Operational definition of ISee as 
processes and their Security 
continual refinement (status picture 3) and Improvement 
Figure 5-4 Summary of action research project 
This action research project shows that the evaluative model can be used to form a 
status picture at various stages of the intervention and has sufficient sensitivity and 
granularity to show a change in the information security practice after variables have 
been manipulated. 
Figure 5-5 below shows progress on the validation model with the empirical research 
carried out in the pharmaceutical organisation explored in this chapter starting the 
'empirical triangle', and the use of the author's experiential framework specifically 
used to drive the development of security profiles in the form of AR status pictures 
completing one point of the main validation triangle. These additions to the validation 
triangle are shaded orange. 
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Authors 
Experience 
Framework of authors 
experience of information 
security practice from AGIL 
perspectives 
Research Validation 
Literature Empirical 
Research 
\ 
/\/\ 
/\/ 
/\/ 
\\ 
Lit 1- Social theory review Lit 3- BS7799 AR 1- Pharmaceutical 
Organisation Case 2- Retail 
and Leisure 
Literature 
Organisation 
Cases 
Lit 2 and Survey 1- 
Review of Current 
Domain Case 1- Local Authority 
Figure 5-5 Progress through research validation model 
The main conclusion from this chapter is that no factors or considerations emerged 
that could not be handled using the evaluative model at Figure 3-9. That is to say, the 
model has been validated as a means for evaluating and describing an information 
security practice. The next chapter records further empirical testing of the evaluative 
model. 
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6 Empirical Research 
Paul Drake 
Chapter Outcomes 
" Introduction to this thesis 
Introduction " Hypotheses and and objectives of the research, and where in the 
thesis they are fulfilled 
Information security domain and how information security is 1\ 0 
Current Position currently practiced. 
" Rationale for approach to improving the domain 
Explorations in Development and detailed analysis of new model for evaluating 
information security practice Social Theory Critical information security reforms 
Explorations in Rationale for research approach 
Research Development and detailed analysis of research model 
Methodologies Research plan and validation process 
Action Research Tested information security model in AR context 
" Use of evaluative model and author's experiential framework as Project basis for empirical research 
Empirical Tested evaluative model against British Standard and two cases 
Refined and revised evaluative model Research Completed research validation model 
" Key contributions made by this research Critical Review Critique of research from philosophical standpoint 
and Conclusions Future research opportunities 
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6.1 Introduction and Approach 
Paul Drake 
6. Empirical 
Research 
6.2Lit3- 
6.1 Introduction BS7799 
[6.3 
Case 1- local 
6.4 Case 2-6.5 Conclusions 
and approach benchmarking authority 
retail and leisure and refinement of 
exercise organisation evaluative model 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply, test and improve the evaluative model 
constructed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-9) and tested in Chapter 5 (Action Research 
Project). This process of testing and improving is enabled by applying the model first 
to the British Standard for Information Security (BSI 2002a) and then to organisations 
that are known to have some effective information security practice. The approaches 
used to apply the model are described in the Research Methods chapter (Chapter 4). 
The first stage of the application of the model is to apply it to the British Standard 
(BS7799) to create a benchmark against which the target organisations can be 
assessed. The British Standard is in two parts, ISO17799 (part 1) which is a code of 
practice and BS7799 (part 2) which is a specification. BS7799 is used to inform the 
benchmark as it is against this specification that organisations are seeking 
certification. No certification exists against ISO17799. 
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6.2 BS7799 Benchmarking Exercise 
Paul Drake 
6. Empirical 
Research 
8.2 l it 3- 
6.1 Introduction BS7799 6.3 Case 1- local 
and approach benchrnarking authority 
exercise 
6.4 Case 2-6.5 Conclusions 
retail and leisure and refinement of 
organisation evaluative model 
Identifier Industry and 
approximate size 
Research 
approach 
How will research take 
place? 
Survey 1 Information security Survey 
Lit 1 Social theory Literature review 
Lit 2 Information security Literature review 
AR 1 Pharmaceuticals. Action Research 
Lit 3 Information security Review of standard Review of BS7799 using evaluative 
model 
Case 1 Local Authority. Case study 
Case 2 Retail & Leisure Case study 
This benchmarking exercise provides a means against which organisations can be 
assessed and mapped in terms of their approach to information security. It is argued 
that lifeworld biased organisations are establishing, or have an opportunity to 
establish a culture of information security whereas system biased organisations are 
treating information security as a purely functional and technical domain. 
The approach taken in developing this benchmark is to assess each of the BS7799 
controls to determine towards which of the four AGIL functions it is particularly 
aligned. In some cases a control is considered particularly important for more than 
one AGIL function. Where this is the case the key part of the control is drawn out 
using italics and assessed. The bias of an organisation will be influenced by the 
approach taken in the implementation of these 'dual-purpose' controls. 
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The first stage is to review the four AGIL controls. The reference information is drawn 
from the theory chapter and tabulated here for convenience. 
159 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
Type of Purpose Key factors of information security 
Control implementation 
Adaptation (A) Concerned with o Getting organisational support though 
securing and funding, equipment, and skilled personnel. 
distributing the 
means from the o 
Developing a channel of improvements to 
environment for 
the information security system 
social systems' o Building trust with users and management 
survival and maintaining a consistently professional 
service 
Goal-attainment Concerned with o Determining short term and long term needs 
(G) defining and 
prioritising social o 
Differentiating between local/on-site security 
system goals requirements 
from the needs for remote 
working 
o Distinguishing between security standards 
for internal users and those for third-parties 
o Ensuring high-impact events gain highest 
attention 
Integration (I) Concerned with o Demonstrating to stakeholders that risks are 
the co- managed and resources are being used 
ordinating of appropriately 
relationships 
within the social o 
Having due consideration for those affected 
system 
by the system and information security 
controls. 
o Ensure they understand the purpose of the 
information security requirements and listen 
to their suggestions for improving the system 
o Appreciating the concerns of the 
practitioners implementing the system 
Latency (L) Concerned with o Providing incentives and rewards for the 
motivating the right behaviours - positive reinforcement desired 
behaviours and o 
Clarifying disincentives and consequences 
for the wrong behaviours - negative managing 
tensions within reinforcement. 
social systems o Establish a culture of security within the 
organisation 
o Frequently reviewing the information security 
system (policies, procedures etc) to ensure 
the administrative processes support and 
align with organisational objectives 
Table 6-1 AGIL Functions and their purposes 
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Through the course of the detailed analysis of the standard (see Appendix 1 for 
detail) it has become apparent that, by looking at the domain as a social system, 
other functional categories are required because not all controls that are present in 
the standard fit comfortably into one of the four functions developed in Figure 3-9. 
These additional functions are summarised in Table 6-2 below: 
Paul Drake 
Type of 
Control 
Factors Comments and alignment to 
evaluative model (Fig 2-9) 
Neutral (N) 
Counter- 
productive (C) 
Essential but 
technical (E) 
Controls that are either too vague or 
too pointless to be applied within 
social systems. Their presence 
would therefore appear to be of no 
consequence other than to make the 
information security implementation 
larger and more complex. 
Implementation of these controls will 
not affect the position of an 
organisation on the map. 
Concerned with controls that would 
seem to deliver a less secure 
environment within a social context. 
This could be because the control in 
and of itself would create insecurity 
once implemented, or because the 
control (due to its wording or 
implications) would cause people to 
act insecurely. As the purpose of this 
new information security model is to 
create a culture of information 
security rather than functional and 
coercive controls to achieve a more 
secure information system, the 
implementation of these 'C' controls 
will 'pull' an organisation and further 
into the A/G half of the map or it 
would make the organisation less 
secure 
Concerned with controls that, due to 
the nature of the threats that they 
address will be required within social 
systems even though they are 
fundamentally technically and 
functionally biased. These controls 
have limited social context, therefore 
their implementation does not affect 
the information security culture of an 
organisation. However effective the 
Controls within this function 
should be discarded from the 
information security practice as 
they provide no useful purpose 
to the information security 
practice or to the positioning of 
the practice within a lifeworld- 
biased context. 
Controls in this category would 
be a manifestation of either 
Attainment controls or, more 
likely, Goal-Attainment 
controls. However, their 
negative effects would likely be 
unrecognised and as such, 
these counter-productive 
controls would fall into A or G 
functions but in a latent context 
rather than a manifest one. 
These controls are 
fundamentally Goal-attainment 
in nature but are of a particular 
kind. Because the absence of 
these controls would make the 
security practice fundamentally 
insecure, their implementation 
is essential in almost all cases 
and organisations. 
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culture of security is within an 
organisation, the avoidance of these 
controls will almost certainly make 
the information system insecure. 
This is the principal reason why this 
thesis argues that information 
security is a socio-technical domain 
and not purely social. 
Other Concerned with controls that are These controls are important 
responsibility considered part of the day-to-day to the implementation of an 
(0) routine responsibilities of some other effective security practice, but 
process or part of the organisation. are generally the responsibility 
There is an important point to be of some other part of the 
made here. There is no assumption organisation. As such, their 
made that information security is the implementation becomes a 
responsibility of a single department dependency rather than a 
or group of people. Indeed, the direct function of the security 
central hypothesis of this study practice. For example, there is 
would suggest exactly the opposite. an assumption that the HR 
Therefore, an O-biased control is not department captures 
solely a security control owned by signatures on confidentiality 
someone else. Rather, it is a control agreements when employees 
which is part of the normal day-to- join. There is an assumption 
day responsibilities of a non-security that the legal department 
function. ensures legal agreements with 
third parties restrict access to 
confidential records etc. 
Table 6-2 Additional information security based functions 
These additional functions can be plotted onto the basic AGIL functions to enhance 
Figure 3-9 and make it more practical in use. Figure 6-1 below shows these 
additional functions mapped onto the AGIL functions. 
In Figure 6-1 the yellow area shows the manifest AGIL functions, and the green area 
shows the latent AGIL functions. That is, the unintentional aspects of the functions. In 
the context of this section, these would be the counter-productive (C) controls that 
have an unintentionally negative effect on either the security of the organisation or 
the pursuit of a lifeworld-biased security practice. These counter-productive controls 
are shown lilac on Figure 6-1. 
The blue area shows the domain outside of the security practice and the `other 
responsibility' controls are shown grey in this region. The orange region shows the 
goal-attainment controls that are essential to an effective practice. 
162 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems 
Other responsibility controls 
Paul Drake 
Latent Latency Latent Adaptation 
Manifest Manifest 
Latency Adaptation Q 
8 
. 15 
Essential Controls 
Manifest Manifest 0 
Integration Goal-attainment 
Latent Integration Latent Goal-attainment 
Figure 6-1 Expanded AGIL functions to show manifest vs. latency and the 
domain outside of the security practice 
6.2.1 Detailed Analysis of BS7799 Using Evaluative Model 
There are 128 controls in the standard. Two of these effectively contain 2 separate 
controls. This brings the total to 130. The new information security model has been 
applied to these 130 controls. The detailed analysis appears at Appendix 1 to this 
study. The results are summarised in Table 6-3 below: 
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Control-bias Number present 
A 10 
G 33 
5 
L 7 
N 50 
E 9 
C 4 
O 12 
Total 130 
Rationalised 
Total 
64 
Table 6-3 Spread of functions in the British Standard 
Paul Drake 
The rationalised total is calculated after removing N-biased (unnecessary), C-biased 
(counter-productive) and O-biased (resolved outside of the security system) controls. 
E-biased controls are included in the rationalised total because their implementation 
is mandatory in this model and therefore their presence can be assumed in all cases. 
Figure 6-2 below shows this data on a `security profile' diagram: 
164 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
Figure 6-2 Security profile for British Standard 
An organisation that avoided the N-biased, O-biased and C-biased controls, 
implemented fully the E-biased controls and implemented the remaining AGIL 
controls as stipulated in the standard would expect a `security profile' that looks like 
Figure 6-2. 
In terms of the author's experiential framework (see Figure 4-4 and following 
descriptions of the four perspectives), the above security profile is most closely linked 
to perspective 2: Goal-attainment with some significant contribution from perspective 
1: Adaptation. This is represented in Figure 6-3 below. Where light shading in 
perspectives 3 and 4 indicate few controls, darker shading in perspective 1 indicates 
more controls, and full shading in perspective 2 indicates most controls. 
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4 
Latency Adaptation 
3 
Figure 6-3 Strongest controls focus in author's experience 
Paul Drake 
Figures 6-2 and 6-3 would suggest a security system which is heavily rule-based and 
functional. One in which the deployment of security rules is probably considered the 
main measure of success. The security profile and the controls focus would suggest 
little if any consideration has been given to the creation of a security culture within 
the organisation. The organisation's information systems are most probably 
considered by the organisation and its management as physical appliances and 
technical domains rather than social or socio-technical domains. 
Important note: the security profile in Figure 6-2 and the following security profiles 
represent the essential controls as follows: as essential controls are a special case of 
goal-attainment control they are included in the overall score of goal-attainment as 
well as being shown with the purple trace. For example, in the profile above a total of 
42 goal-attainment controls are shown. This is made up of 33 goal-attainment and 9 
essential controls. The number of these that are essential controls (9) are shown on 
the purple trace. 
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6.2.2 Interim conclusions 
This second test of the evaluative model, in this case against the British Standard, 
has surfaced a number of additional control categories that were not in the evaluative 
model as it was developed in the theory chapter. These additional controls do not 
readily sit within the original model and are probably better dealt with by refining the 
methodology for using the evaluative model. At this stage it is unclear how best to do 
this as the new categories have not yet been tested in a 'live' setting. This will be 
picked up again in the conclusion of this chapter (Section 6.5) once further empirical 
research has taken place. 
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6.3 Case 1- Local Authority 
Paul Drake 
6. Empirical 
Research 
1(6.2 Lit 3-6.4 Case 2-6.5 Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction I BS7799 6.3 Case 1- local 
retail and leisure and refinement of 
and approach I benchmarking authority organisation evaluative model 
exercise i 
Identifier Industry and 
approximate size 
Research 
approach 
How will research take 
place? 
Survey 1 Information security Survey 
Lit 1 Social theory Literature review 
Lit 2 Information security Literature review 
AR 1 Pharmaceuticals. Action Research 
Lit 3 Information security Review of standard 
Case 1 Local Authority. Case study Interviews, observations, literature 
review and inventory in the form of 
metaphorical exploration 
Case 2 Retail 8 Leisure Case study 
6.3.1 Organisation Background 
With some 14,000 staff this organisation is the largest employer in the county in 
which it is located, providing services such as schools, roads and transport schemes, 
libraries and care for the most vulnerable in society. Around half of its £500 million 
annual budget is spent on the education service and a further quarter on social care. 
One of the directorates within the organisation provides services to the authority itself 
such as information technology (IT), human resources and finance. The IT 
department incorporates the local authority's information security practice which 
forms the subject of this research 
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6.3.2 Description of Research and Findings 
The approach used in this phase of the empirical research is based on the ideas of 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980) and Gareth Morgan (1986). However, the people involved in 
the research will be asked to create their own metaphors rather than basing the 
research around set metaphors such as those developed by Morgan. People within 
the IT Department (ITD) of the local authority were asked to provide metaphors that 
describe the information security practice as it is and as it ought to be. These 
individuals were also asked to provide a metaphor that describes how they believe 
the information security practice is viewed by people outside of ITD and also to 
provide a metaphor to describe the environment external to ITD. The responses were 
then unpacked and reframed to prepare for analysis against the evaluative model 
(Figure 3-9) and against the author's experiential framework (Figure 4-4). The full 
responses appear at Appendix 2 and the question asked is shown at Appendix 3 to 
this thesis. 
Practical Experiment - Approach and Responses 
The experiment took the form of a simple questionnaire (see Appendix 3) delivered to 
staff through a pilot in the form of direct face to face discussion and to the whole 
department via email for the main research. The question sheet was accessed by 
over 50 staff. Of these, 12 responded either fully or partially. 
The responses were followed up with a large section in the departmental newsletter 
that asked for additional reflection on the broad themes and feedback on what staff 
felt were the most representative metaphors and what they thought the underlying 
messages were. A simple vote for the most popular metaphors allowed the research 
to focus on a smaller number of metaphors which were probably also the most 
insightful and representative. This technique of reducing the metaphors to a smaller 
more manageable number is known as pyramiding. A similar approach was taken to 
unpacking the metaphors to identify the main underlying themes. The whole 
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department was asked to identify the main themes and key words within the favoured 
metaphors. The most popular metaphors and main themes are tabulated in Appendix 
4. 
170 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
6.3.3 Explanation through the evaluative model and through the author's 
experience 
Figure 6-4 Copy of evaluative model (Figure 3-9) for reference 
Analysis of the 'as is' metaphors strongly suggests a bias towards Adaptation and 
Goal-attainment functions. The herd of wild animals metaphor gives an indication of 
lack of direction ("we go off on our own deliberately or get lost without meaning to") in 
an information security practice this kind of response is highly representative of the 
Goal-attainment function in which goals and targets are set without sufficient 
involvement from the people affected. This metaphor also shows some significant 
Adaptation ("losing some members along the way"). The performing seal act is very 
highly biased towards Adaptation with frequent references to insufficient resources 
("2 out of 6 seals missing", "trainer missing", "trying to juggle too many balls" and so 
on). There is also an impression of Goal-attainment with, as in the wild animals 
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metaphor, indications of lack of direction ("[lack of] co-ordination [and] leadership", 
"random and frantic" and the like). These biases towards Adaptation and Goal- 
attainment are very typical, and, in the author's experience of information security 
practices in general, and the practice within this local authority in particular, an 
accurate representation of the way in which information security was delivered. There 
was very significant bias towards perspective 1 and to a slightly lesser extent, 
perspective 2 (with reference to Figure 4-4). The reframe in both cases indicates a 
significant opportunity for a shift towards lifeworld functions. The Integration function 
is about co-ordinating relationships within the social system and Latency is about 
motivating the right behaviours and managing tensions within the social system. The 
beehive reframe suggests a strong Integration bias with references to individuals 
making their own journeys, communication of fertile grounds and interrelating 
towards a coherent whole. There is also a significant Latency element and almost a 
negotiation - bringing back the nectar to make honey as a prerequisite to making 
individual journeys of discovery. This latter form of negotiation is classic lifeworld 
insofar as the individuals are motivated rather than coerced. The dolphin reframe 
also has strong links to lifeworid functions. Motivating co-ordination not through 
coercion, but in pursuit of the common good (seeing off sharks). Probably most 
significant of all in this reframe is the 'first among equals' concept with no clear 
leader, but again driven as a group towards some common goal (food) and by 
instinct and experience. 
In some ways what the individuals felt was the best metaphor for how things ought to 
be was somewhat less useful than the reframes of how things are currently. Ideas 
such as the unseen driver, the engine that pushes from the back which is forgotten 
about by the driver, and the inability to stop the train once it is moving are all highly 
indicative of system biased functions in general and the Goal-attainment function in 
particular. The train taking passengers well out of their way is also suggestive of the 
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Adaptation function indicating insufficient resources. The reframe is particularly 
helpful in terms of moving towards the lifeworid biased functions where an ability to 
make changes in the route to avoid trouble spots is again suggestive of co-ordinating 
relationships (amongst passengers), motivating the right behaviours towards a 
common good and managing tensions within the social system. 
How others see the practice and the external environment were not as useful as the 
other metaphors, either in terms of the core metaphor or the reframe, as a means of 
identifying opportunities to recast the information security practice with a lifeworld, 
rather than a system, bias. How others saw the practice was compared with a game 
of mah Jong and specifically cast as something others probably don't understand. 
The external environment was compared with a badly organised village fair with 
specific focus on poor organisation. These metaphors are probably more akin to an 
exercise in organisational analysis than an attempt to shift an information security 
practice from system to lifeworld bias. 
6.3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This exercise has demonstrated that the evaluative model (Figure 3-9) can be 
effectively applied and used to analyse an information security practice without 
simply counting up the number of controls of different types to identify the biases. 
Figure 6-5 below shows the security profile of the organisation as derived (albeit 
somewhat subjectively) from the metaphorical exploration exercise rather than from 
the presence of absence of controls. As previously the darker blue areas show the 
extent of bias of each function. The lighter blue areas show representation of the bias 
that the respondents in the metaphor exercise feel the practice ought to be. 
173 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
Figure 6-5 Security profile of Local Authority 
The strong bias towards adaptation and goal-attainment controls indicates that the 
organisation did not consider social issues when developing its security practice and 
did not create or maintain a broad culture of information security. 
With reference to Section 4.7.1 and Figure 4-4 above, this organisation is 
significantly biased towards the adaptation and goal-attainment (perspectives 1 and 
2) functions which is in line with the organisations observed security practice and the 
organisation's intent to pursue BS7799 certification. 
One of the more significant findings of this research has been the clear opportunity to 
shift the practice towards a more socially-aware lifeworld biased approach. The 
metaphorical approach taken here was specifically selected as a contrast to the 
'controls counting' approach used in the review of the British Standard and in the 
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other case studies employed in this research. The enhancement required to the 
evaluative model surfaced through this empirical research is the addition of 
representation of what ought to be rather than just what currently is. The addition of 
this enhancement is also in line with a critically informed study which underpins this 
thesis. 
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6.4 Case 2- Retail and Leisure Organisation 
Paul Drake 
6. Empirical 
Research 
6.2 Lit 3-6.4 Case 2-6.5 Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction BS7799 6.3 Case 1 local I retail and leisure and refinement of and approach benchmarking authority 11 exercise ) organisation evaluative model 
Identifier Industry and 
approximate size 
Research approach How will research take 
place? 
Survey 1 Information security Survey 
Lit 1 Social theory Literature review 
Lit 2 Information security Literature review 
AR 1 Pharmaceuticals. Action Research 
Lit 3 Information security Review of standard 
Case 1 Local Authority. Case study 
Case 2 Retail & Leisure Case study Interviews, meetings, observation 
and literature review 
6.4.1 Background 
This organisation is one of the UK's leading hospitality companies, managing several 
number one brands in retail and leisure. The business employs some 50,000 people 
who in turn serve 10 million customers in 1,400 outlets across the UK. In the financial 
year ending in 2004, the organisation generated profits of £250m on sales of £2bn. 
6.4.2 Controls implemented and Security profile 
Unlike the previous case study, this one is assessed on the basis of which controls 
have been implemented and how they were implemented along with supporting 
interviews, observations and meetings. A series of open interviews and meetings 
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with the organisation's Head of Information Security, Head of Computer Operations, 
Head of Internal Audit and Director of Information Technology were held. These 
discussions were used to identify and discuss major challenges that the organisation 
faced in implementing an information security practice and to identify the general 
approaches taken. Broadly speaking these senior managers did not consider that 
they implemented controls for the simple purpose of meeting good security practice. 
Nor did they consider that the only measure of success for their information security 
practice was the reduction in risk. In fact, they did not see risk reduction as a major 
issue. Their rationale being that if they had experienced no significant security 
failures previously then the likelihood is that they had more or less the right controls 
in place. It was explained that the external environment changes as do the risks that 
organisations face but this did not cause any major shift in opinion. The senior 
managers' general measure of success is whether the implementation of a security 
control yields a positive, and preferably measurable, impact on the organisation 
which is directly attributable to the control(s) implemented. They were also very 
interested in process improvement and refinement as a measure of success. 
Analysing the results of these interviews and meetings clearly showed a bias towards 
the Goal-attainment (G) function. There was also some bias towards the Adaptation 
function although the author's observations and informal discussions with-individuals 
within the IT department suggest that resources were insufficient for a fully effective 
information security practice. The author observed that some of the Essential (E) 
controls had been implemented, but not all. Finally, in regards to Integration (I) and 
latency (L) functions, the view of the senior managers was that their expectation is 
that people within the organisation would naturally do the right thing and that this 
would naturally lead to a security culture within the company. The position 
established through discussions provides a means by which the review of controls 
that yields Figure 6-6 can be compared as a means of validation. 
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The controls implemented are detailed at Appendix 5. The security profile 
represented by these controls is shown in Figure 6-6 below. The data for the review 
of controls was captured mostly by reviewing and assessing the various information 
security policies and security procedures, standards and training courses published 
by the organisation. It can be seen that there is good alignment between the controls 
implemented by the organisation and the intent as stated by the senior managers 
interviewed. 
Figure 6-6 Security profile for retail and leisure organisation 
This security profile would suggest an organisation which has paid too little attention 
to the implementation of essential controls and is therefore at significant risk of a 
destructive security incident. The profile also indicates a strong bias towards the 
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goal-attainment function which suggests too little attention has been paid to the 
implementation and maintenance of security as a social domain. 
With reference to Section 3.7.1 and Figure 3-4 above, this organisation is 
significantly biased towards the goal-attainment (perspective 2) function which is in 
line with the organisations observed security practice. 
6.4.3 Interim conclusions 
The main conclusion from this case study is that no observations, issues or problems 
have emerged that could not be addressed using the evaluative model (Figure 3-9). 
This case was assessed on the basis of controls that were implemented in a similar 
way to the review of the British Standard. However, the capturing of information was 
obviously different with various research methods such as literature reviews and 
interviews being employed to surface the data. 
6.5 Conclusions and Refinement of Evaluative Model 
6. Empirical 
Research 
1ý6.2Lit3- 
6.1 Introduction BS7799 6.3 Case 1 -local 
6.4 Case 2-6.5 Conclusions 
and approach benchmarking authority 
retail and leisure and refinement of 
organisation evaluative model exercise 
The empirical research carried out in Chapters 4 and 5 has, it is argued, provided a 
reliable and verifiable series of tests on the evaluative model (Figure 3-9). The 
second case study did not add anything that hadn't already been identified in the 
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review of BS7799 and the metaphorical exploration, and that could not be addressed 
using the existing evaluative model. 
6.5.1 Introduction 
This section draws together the main conclusions and findings from the empirical 
chapters and uses them to refine the evaluative model and, more importantly, to 
refine the methodology through which the evaluative model is used. It is in the 
methodology that the requirements for changes in the evaluative model will be 
addressed rather than in changes to the model itself. 
Two approaches to the research have been explored in this chapter. A quantitatively 
biased approach has been used in the analysis of the British Standard - quantitative 
in the sense that the security profile was struck using a count of the controls that are 
biased towards one or other of the AGIL functions. Clearly there was significant 
judgement, experience and subjective reasoning in determining the AGIL function to 
which the controls were aligned. Nevertheless the way in which the security profile 
was built up did result in some quantitative analysis. The second approach was 
highly qualitative and involved no reference to controls. This approach, which formed 
the major case study in this thesis, was constructed around how people feel about 
things. These feelings, in the form of metaphors, were then analysed and assessed 
by the members of the team under study. Once the cleansing of the data was 
complete, it was left to the author to explore and determine themes that were 
valuable to the application and testing of the evaluative model (Figure 3-9). 
The second, minor case study reverted back to a similar quantitative controls count 
and subjective judgement in determining to which AGIL function the controls applied. 
This exercise did not add anything to the research over and above what had been 
surfaced in the review of the British Standard. The same basic judgements were 
involved in aligning the controls to the AGIL functions. There were no cases of 
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controls being incapable of alignment with existing functions, and therefore no further 
functional categories were required. No additional essential (E) controls were 
determined to be required. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the research has reached a natural point of 
saturation as neither of the cases, using alternative research methodologies, yielded 
anything new in terms of amendments to the evaluative model. Further, it seems 
reasonable to state that the evaluative model has been proven to work as a means of 
evaluating an organisation's security practice against this socially aware framework. 
As has been shown earlier in this thesis, the British Standard is in some senses a 
culmination of the security practices of a number of organisations, albeit an 
incomplete representation of any particular practice. The analysis of this standard 
was therefore most likely a very effective means of assessing the evaluative model 
against a number of organisations in a single piece of research. 
6.5.2 Validation Model Revisited 
Figure 6-7 below reproduces the validation model developed in Chapter 4 and shows 
the additional research that has been completed in this chapter as yellow shading. It 
can be seen that all elements within the triangle are now complete. 
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Authors 
Experience 
Framework of authors 
experience of information 
security practice from AGIL 
perspectives 
Validation 
LAerature \ Empirical 
\/ 
Research 
\ 
/\/\ 
Lit 1_ Social theory review Lit 3- BS7799 
Literature 
Lit 2 and Surrey 1- 
Review of Current 
Domain 
1- Pharmaceutical Case 2- Retail 
Organisation and Leisure 
Organisation 
Cases 
Case 1- Local Authority 
Figure 6-7 Validation model with latest research indicated 
6.5.3 Revision of evaluative model 
It has become clear that the evaluative model requires a robust methodology if it is to 
be used successfully. A number of additional controls have been identified together 
with a need to represent other perspectives such as what ought to be rather than just 
what currently exists. In the latter case it is probable that only two perspectives can 
usefully be represented on the model. If further perspectives are required the model 
should be reproduced for each perspective, as was the case for the multiple 
situations in the action research chapter. Through the course of the empirical 
research certain techniques and methods in terms of how to use the model and the 
order in which things might best be carried out have emerged. Table 5-4 below 
tabulates the recommended approach to implementing a security practice based on 
the findings and use of the evaluative model. 
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Number Step Comments 
1 Assess presence of Essential Absence of essential controls puts 
controls. If there are gaps they the organisation at risk of loss of 
should be implemented unless information and access in a way that 
good reason not to. cannot be addressed through 
application of sociologically-biased 
controls. 
2 Assess security practice of As more organisations are assessed 
organisation against Evaluative the baseline of organisations' 
Model and create security profile security profiles will grow and 
map. Compare this profile with provide this additional dimension of 
other organisation of similar analysis 
size, industry sector, complexity 
etc. 
3 Determine whether any This represents the easiest step to 
implemented system-biased moving the very common goal- 
controls can be easily converted attainment focused security practice 
to lifeworld-biased by changing to a lifeworld focused one 
context, environment, people 
involved, means of capturing 
feedback etc. 
4 Determine whether any of the If an organisation has built its 
lifeworld-biased controls practice around audit requirements 
identified above have not been and/or functional concerns it is quite 
implemented but could be likely that not all lifeworld-biased 
deployed reasonably easily. controls have been implemented. 
5 Reassess security profile and This gives a new baseline from 
compare with the previous which to measure improvements 
practice of target organisation towards a lifeworld-biased approach. 
along with other organisations of There are few measurements 
similar size, industry sector, available as the practice changes 
complexity etc but deployment of lifeworld controls 
is a useful indicator of progress. 
Other specific measures such as 
user satisfaction, number of security 
incidents etc should be formulated 
on a case by case basis. Have 
regard for the outcomes that are 
sought by the organisation. 
6 Identify Neutral (N), Counter- It is critically important that N and C 
productive (C) and Other- controls are not just dropped and 
responsibility (0) controls and ignored. Careful thought should be 
eliminate or reassign. given to determine whether they are 
correctly classified and consideration 
of whether they are important to 
some other organisational function 
(in which case, presumably, they 
would be reassigned as O. 
183 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
If 0 controls remain a dependency 
after they have been reassigned the 
dependency must be surfaced and 
appropriate service levels agreed 
and documented. 
7 Use the action loop through This action step is out of scope for 
public and private spheres to this thesis but is outlined in the 
drive the security practice Critical Review and Conclusions 
towards a lifeworld focus chapter as it is the subject of post- 
doctoral research 
8 Reassess security profile and This becomes a long-term (perhaps 
compare with last baseline. continual) process to achieve 
Redo action loop at action step desired outcomes and sustain the 
6. required focus. 
Table 6-4 Adapted approach to information security 
The following figure (6-8) provides some structure to these steps, indicating that the 
process through these steps should be continuous. It also shows that in terms of 
priority, getting the essential controls in place is highest priority because failure to do 
this would most likely undermine the whole security practice irrespective of its 
social/technical biases. Next priority is to make sure the practice is continually 
reviewed to ensure it is meeting the means of its users and the business. Thirdly, use 
the evaluative model to identify opportunities to move the practice towards a more 
socially aware, life-world biased approach. Underpinning all of this is the need to 
identify and deal with Neutral, Counter-productive and Other-responsibility biased 
controls. The general ways that these would be dealt with are to remove Neutral and 
Counter-productive controls altogether and to reassign Other-responsibility to the 
appropriate department within the organisation but clearly maintain such controls as 
dependencies for the information security practice. 
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Review Neutral, Counter-productive and Other responsibility controls 
Review essential controls and implement 
programmes to address gaps 
Provide means to continually review 
security practice 
Assess security practice 
against evaluative model 
(Figure 2-9). Determine 
desired approach and 
implement appropriate 
controls and initiatives 
Figure 6-8 Revised framework for applying security practice 
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7 Critical Review and Conclusions 
Paul Drake 
Chapter Outcomes 
" Introduction to this thesis 
Introduction " Hypotheses and and objectives of the research, and where in the 
thesis they are fulfilled 
" Information security domain and how information security is 
Current Position currently practiced. 
Rationale for approach to improving the domain 
" Development and detailed analysis of new model for evaluating Explorations in 
information security practice Social Theory Critical information security reforms 
Explorations in Rationale for research approach 
Research Development and detailed analysis of research model 
Methodologies Research plan and validation process 
Action Research J Tested information security model in AR context 
" Use of evaluative model and author's experiential framework as Project basis for empirical research 
Empirical G1 Tested evaluative model against British Standard and two cases 
Refined and revised evaluative model Research Completed research validation model 
" Key contributions made by this research Critical Review 
Critique of research from philosophical standpoint 
and Conclusions - Future research opportunities 
This final chapter comprises three sections. The first provides a critique of the study 
from a philosophical standpoint, and a critical review of the aim, research questions 
and objectives. In the second section opportunities for further research are identified 
186 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
and explored. The third and final section provides a summary of the thesis in terms of 
key contributions to knowledge that have been made. 
7.1 Critique of the Study 
7. Critical review 
and conclusions 
of 7.2 Future 7.3 SEO 7.1 Critique of research this 
ns 
The purpose of this section is to raise a critique of the underlying philosophy, and to 
critically review the aim, research questions and objectives within this thesis. 
7.1.1 Philosophical Critique 
This exercise was particularly difficult because the philosophy and theories used 
within the thesis are, by definition, those that the author finds most attractive and 
most in fitting with the objectives of the study. 
The process employed for this critique is to reflect on what has been written in this 
thesis from an alternative philosophical position. 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that the current information security domain 
is practical in that it is not informed by explicit theory and technical in that it pays too 
little attention to the social issues within what is essentially a social domain. 
The first stage of this critique was therefore to build from the assumption that the 
current information security practice is appropriate and desirable. If that assumption 
is accepted then a doctoral study would probably seek a philosophical position to 
support the status quo, rather than to change it, which has been the thrust of the 
previous chapters within this thesis. 
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The next stage was therefore to seek a philosophy that supports the current position. 
Turning first to Russell (1946) and then supported by Bhaskar (1991) and Hospers 
(1997) the idea of philosophical pragmatism emerges along with it's founders: C. S. 
Pierce; William James; and C. I. Lewis. 
The main characteristic of pragmatism, also known as pragmaticism, is that efficacy 
in practical application provides a standard for the determination of truth in the case 
of statements, value in the case of attributes and rightness in the case of actions. 
It was the standard of truth that was probably the central feature of pragmatism for 
James, who seemed willing to count any belief as equating to truth if it satisfied the 
interest of the person who held it. In Pragmatism (James 1907) James suggests as a 
starting point for'an idea to be true ... what concrete difference will its being true 
make in anyone's life? How will the truth be realized (sic)? What experiences will be 
different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the 
truth's cash-value in experiential terms? ' The answer which James immediately gives 
is that 'True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. 
False ideas are those that we cannot. ' He goes on to argue that 'The truth of an idea 
is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is 
made true by events. ' (James 1907: 97). 
The third strand in this grounding for a philosophical critique comes from Clarence 
Lewis. In Mind and the World Order (Lewis 1929) Lewis shows some alignment of 
ideas with those of James. A central thesis of this book is that all knowledge of the 
world results from alignment of what is sensorily given with concepts that are 
fashioned a priori. This is of course very similar to the ideas of Kant, with common 
agreement that sense-data (empiricism) without concepts (rationalism) are 
unknowable. However, this is where the similarities end. For Lewis there are no 
synthetic a priori propositions, and there is no distinction between things as they 
appear to us and things in and of themselves. That is not to say that Lewis does not 
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distinguish between appearance and reality, rather that he conceives of them both 
falling wholly within experience. In other words, unlike Kant, Lewis does not see the 
existence of truth and in particular our ability to access truth questionable. 
This alternative view of truth and its accessibility places one of the pivotal 
philosophical positions within this thesis into a crisis of legitimacy. If there is truth, for 
example a secure system, and moreover if that truth can be known to us, there is in 
itself no need for a normative and interpretive approach to information security 
practice. It would be a relatively simple task of identifying the meaning of a secure 
system and deploying controls to approach it. This is of course precisely the 
approach taken by the current information security domain. The fact remains though, 
that security breaches do still occur, and organisational practice within the domain is 
erratic (see findings of Current Position within Chapter 2 of this thesis). It is possible 
that the meaning of a secure system and the means to achieve it are simply not well 
understood. 
Whilst it may well still be desirable to recognise the social issues within an 
information security system, the pragmatic philosophical position would no longer 
require it as a way of gaining some shared understanding of a secure system, how to 
achieve it and the impact on human stakeholders. Even if social issues are to be 
addressed within a pragmatically informed philosophy, a functionalist approach would 
most likely be entirely ample and appropriate as a means to carry out the research. 
The research design could be based around a more positivistic method such as 
survey. The survey method is of course used extensively within the current domain 
(see Chapter 2 of this thesis). 
The main conclusion from this critique is that there is likely to be considerable value 
in a further study based on this alternative philosophy. The strong alignment between 
current practice and a pragmatic philosophy has been made clear throughout this 
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thesis in which the practical approach to the development of the current domain has 
been extensively argued. 
7.1.2 Critical Review of Aim, Research Questions and Objectives 
Aim 
The overall aim of this research was to design and test an evaluative model of 
information security in order to provide a credible basis through which a broad range 
of organisations could adopt a sound socially informed approach to information 
security. 
The evaluative model has been designed based on the context of the domain of 
information security, theoretical support from social theory, and more specifically the 
work of Habermas, Merton, Parsons, Weber, Austin and Marx, and a critically 
informed approach underpinned by the work of Kant. The model has been subjected 
to testing against the industry standard for information security (BS 7799) and three 
organisations in disparate industry sectors. The British Standard provides a 
benchmark of the practice of thirteen major commercial and public sector 
organisations; testing against this therefore effectively exposes the model to this wide 
range of practice. Credibility can be judged against the outcomes of the evaluations, 
for which the research methods used have ensured the reliability of the results. 
Research Questions 
In this section the five research questions outlined in Chapter 1 are revisited, and an 
analysis of given of the extent to which they are met within the thesis. 
1. Can social theory be applied to a practical and instrumental domain? 
The thesis applies a model explicitly based on social theory to a domain which has 
been argued to be currently dominated by pragmatism and instrumentalism. The 
outcomes of the research confirm that this has been achieved. 
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2. How would the current domain be improved through the application of a suitable 
theoretical underpinning? 
The evaluative model draws on a foundation drawn from a well established base in 
social theory. In synthesising these theoretical perspectives, the evaluative model 
gives a more complete picture of the domain than is currently available, enabling 
transparent analysis of the extent to which each element is addressed. 
3. How can managers be assisted in their practice of information security through 
the application of social theory? 
Drawing on the outcomes of the previous two research questions, the thesis offers a 
series of practical action steps that managers can take to provide a more socially 
aware approach to the implementation of information security systems. 
Objectives 
1. Devise a new model for the evaluation of information security practice which is 
explicitly based on recognised social theory. 
A new model for evaluating information security practice is derived at Section 3.6.2, 
Figure 3-9, based on a recasting of the domain, underpinned by a range of 
theoretical and philosophical constructs, and further refined by empirical testing in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The final refined model (Figure 6.8) is at the end of Chapter 6. 
2. Establish a means of embedding information security into organisations rather 
than relying on a set of rules and functions around which information security is 
practised. 
Chapter 3 argues that grounding an approach to information security on social 
theories drawn from the sources identified in Aims (above), provides the means by 
which the evaluation and (ultimately) the practice of information security can be 
shown to be culturally relevant, and hence offers the opportunity to more successfully 
embed information security into the organisation. Whilst for the purposes of this 
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research the objective has been met, as identified in future research opportunities, 
more research is seen to be required in respect of. actioning the model derived; the 
longitudinal effectiveness of the approach. 
3. Empirically test and revise the model. 
Evidence of empirical testing and revision of the model through action research and 
other empirical analyses is provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
4. Critique this study. 
Within Chapter 7 the theory of pragmaticism is used to critique the entire study at a 
philosophical level. Additionally, a thorough critical reviewis conducted, based on 
analysis of the extent to which the aims, objectives and research questions have 
been satisfied. 
5. From the outcomes of the critique, record contributions to knowledge provided by 
this study, suggest additional contributions that could be made and recommend 
additional research projects for the domain. In particular, ways to bring about 
action-based remediation should be proposed. 
Contributions to knowledge, directions for future research, and proposals for an 
action orientation, are addressed in Chapter 7. 
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7.2 Future Research Opportunities 
Paul Drake 
7. Critical review 
and conclusions 
7.2 Future 7.3 Summary of 7.1 Cntpue of research this thesis and the Study opportunities key contributions 
This study offers a significant opportunity for a researcher to carry out a longitudinal 
study to test the entirety of the new approach. Whilst there would be considerable 
benefit to the practice of information security if such a study were carried out in that 
domain, it would also be of considerable benefit to test the portability of the models 
devised during this research. 
A significant area of improvement that has not been sufficiently explored in this study 
would be the development of a means to maintain the currency of security practice 
using this new approach. The maintenance of security practice using the traditional 
functionalist/technological approach can be maintained using the ISMS explored in 
this study and in the British Standard. However, the ISMS has been demonstrated to 
be inappropriate for a lifeworld-biased security practice. This is a highly 
recommended area for future research. 
Further testing of the new approach is required across many more organisations and 
industry sectors. Not only will this bring value to the approach itself, but will bring the 
added benefit of continuing to increase the database of security profiles that can be 
used for comparative purposes. 
The following sections explore two further very significant areas for future research. 
Firstly, the evaluative model (Figure 3-9), whilst used within this thesis to evaluate 
information security, points to the possibility of an improved practice based on 
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system-biased controls being replaced by controls which are lifeworld-biased (Table 
6-4). 
Secondly, it looks at how the approach derived from this thesis might be applied in 
domains which, although different to information security, have similar characteristics 
(e. g. pragmatically biased; technologically dominated). 
7.2.1 The Two Approaches to Decolonisation 
This study has focused on what might be termed an evolutionary shift from system- 
biased controls to Iifeworld-biased controls. This shift can best be characterised as a 
removal of system-biased controls, deployment of lifeworld-biased controls and a 
recasting of existing system-biased controls as lifeworld-biased ones. This is a valid 
approach but is likely to bring only incremental benefit. 
The alternative approach is included in the evaluative model (Figure 3-9) but is out of 
scope of this study which is primarily focused on the evaluation and comparison of 
security practices. 
The evaluative model provides a more culturally enriched means of shifting practice 
towards lifeworld by navigating around the AGIL media. It can be argued that the red 
and blue lines form actual barriers to navigation. It is not possible to move from a 
system-dominated domain into a lifeworld-dominated one just by deciding that it is 
desirable to do so. That is the purpose of the cycle that runs around the outside of 
the AGIL functions in Figure 3-9. If it is desired to move away from the system- 
dominated domain then the individuals within the system have to be influenced. The 
private spheres which represent those individuals and their families, work groups etc. 
have to be modified. Once all the actors have been 'privately' influenced the 
organisation can 'go public' through engagement in the public sphere which is when 
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the organisation starts to win back some of the richness of the lifeworid. This is 
analogous to 'winning hearts and minds' in organisational/leadership terms. 
Once lifeworld-bias has been achieved care must be taken to guard against 
accidentally (or deliberately) restricting the physical manifestations of where this 
lifeworld exists. For example if an environment where this lifeworld exists is changed, 
a communal area for example, then the public sphere is being destroyed because 
people will stop congregating there. The public sphere is a big part of lifeworld. If it is 
allowed to be colonised then the dependent lifeworld(s) will be too. The manifest vs. 
latent function idea basically operates when a lifeworld is deliberately colonised 
(manifest) vs. when it happens by accident because someone hasn't thought through 
the consequences or is not paying enough attention (latent). 
The point is that decolonisation is not just a simple decision which can be taken by 
managers. To achieve this in action requires that research research is informed from 
other domains, including organisational culture, management and organisational 
theory, change management, boundary theory and so on. Further research informed 
from these perspectives, within a critical approach would seem to be of value. 
7.2.2 Expansion Into Other Domains 
Although it has been argued that the models devised through this study are portable 
across other applications this needs to be tested. It is likely that further refinement of 
the models will take place through this testing process. 
It is suggested that certain factors or pre-requisites should be present in an 
alternative domain to make the reapplication effective. First and foremost the target 
domain should benefit from constructing a culture around the required behaviours 
rather than implementing controls or rules. Secondly the domain should be large 
enough in terms of the number of entities within it such that a base of comparative 
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data can be constructed. Third the domain should be dominated or at very least 
strongly influenced by people. Finally, the domain should be changeable. If the 
domain is so deeply entrenched in functionalism that this has virtually become its 
pseudo-sociological practice then the models in this study probably won't work. 
A domain which has no explicit theory and which would derive value from a flexible 
approach to research would also benefit from the models derived for this study but 
these are not pre-requisites. 
Any area of research which is dominated by instrumental controls, but is significantly 
impacted by human issues is a candidate for this. Change management, budgetary 
control, and the wider domain of information systems development and management 
are all clear candidates. 
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7.3 Summary of This Thesis and Key Contributions 
Paul Drake 
7. Critical review 
and conclusions 
7.2 Future 7.3 Summary of 7.1 Critique of research this thesis and the Study 
opportunities key contributions 
This section summarises the thesis in terms of its contributions to knowledge and 
revisits the hypotheses and objectives set at the beginning of the research. 
1. The principal contribution is the application of a social theory to a domain 
which is dominated by instrumentalism and pragmatism 
This theme runs throughout the thesis from the initial setting of hypotheses and 
objectives; through exploration of the current domain, exploration of theories, 
research approaches, and empirical work; to this final chapter. The application of 
social theory into the domain of information security has, in my view, never before 
been successfully executed. Contributions 5,6 and 7 provide more detail of this 
general contribution. 
2. Contributions are made to the way in which the current domain of 
information security is or should be viewed 
It is important to note that, throughout Chapter 2, many of the figures and tables 
which consolidate the perspective taken on information security have been 
developed specifically within this research. 
The information security domain tends to be complex. The key purposes of 
information security have been condensed down to a basic flow which is shown at 
Figure 2-1 and is unique to this thesis. Figure 2-2 brings together the two parts of the 
British Standard in a way which has not been done before and which provides clarity 
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to the way in which the parts interrelate and, if properly considered, can complement 
each other. Walter Shewhart's contribution to the development of the PDCA model 
within the British Standard (reproduced at Figure 2-3) is acknowledged in this thesis 
although not in the British Standard. Table 2-2 and Figure 2-5 provide a unique 
contribution to understanding the bias of the currently available information security 
literature. It is demonstrated that operational/technical and business/organisational 
biases dominate the literature within the domain. The only humanist literature 
available tends to be aligned to the study of ethics. Table 2-3 which contrasts and 
trends differing approaches and attitudes to information security from the years 2000 
through 2004 through reference to government surveys is unique in the way it 
identifies causes, effects and demographics which were not present in the original 
surveys. The discussion that follows, together with the comparison of the government 
surveys with those from IAAC is also unique to this thesis and makes a significant 
contribution to understanding the current domain. In Section 2.3.1.8 conclusions are 
drawn which argue that the current domain is technology-centric and devoid of 
sufficient theory. This is a key contribution to the way in which information security 
should be viewed, and goes towards proving the working hypothesis. 
3. A unique comparison of social vs. technical domains with theoretical vs. 
practical biases 
An overview of the main differentiators for each comparator is provided on page 41, 
Figure 2-9. The argument builds (see page 44), through synthesis of established 
social theory as represented by Figures 2-10 and 2-11 together with Figure 2-9 to a 
rigorous and demonstrable position for information security which is provided on the 
model at Table 2-6. This model has been developed uniquely for this study and 
makes a significant contribution to knowledge in allowing non-social domains to be 
mapped using principles drawn from social theory. 
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4. Broad and deep interrogation of social literature and communicative action 
literature in particular 
Figure 3-1 and the descriptions that precede and follow it provide a novel contribution 
to understanding how critical social theory in general and communicative action in 
particular developed from the fundamentals of Greek philosophy. The pages between 
56 and 58 also provide a significant contribution to understanding the part that Kant 
made in this development and also that of Karl Marx. 
5. Mapping information security on to a social theory context 
Figure 3-4 and Table 3-1 provide a unique insight into information security in terms of 
both what it is and what it ought to be. This is achieved by mapping how information 
security might be applied if informed by Burrell and Morgan's four social paradigms. 
This theme is further explored by mapping information security against Hirschheim 
and Klein's paradigms and contrasting this with that of Burrell and Morgan (see page 
65). This approach to understanding how information security might be perceived if 
informed from social theory was developed specifically within this research project, 
and again provides a unique contribution to understanding the information security 
domain. 
6. Recasting the domain of information security 
It is easy to underestimate the problems associated with recasting the domain. It has 
been demonstrated within the thesis that much of the existing literature uses 
concepts drawn from social theory without explicitly recognising or justifying this. 
Within this study, firstly an argument is put forward to justify approaching information 
security from a particular direction within social theory, and secondly it is 
demonstrated that there is a strong argument for this direction being critically 
informed. 
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On page 68 Table 2-6 is reproduced as Table 3-3 and expanded to provide focus for 
a view of what a socially informed information security practice ought to look like. 
This again provides a unique contribution towards a view of the current domain, and 
provides strong argument for recasting it as something more effective. The chapter 
then builds gradually, with reference to a broad range of theories from a variety of 
theorists and philosophers that are synthesised into a unique evaluative model 
(Figure 3-9). 
7. Toward the application of communicative action 
One of the most significant of the numerous syntheses within this thesis is that which 
melds Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action with Merton's theories of manifest 
and latent functions. Throughout the two volumes of Theory of Communicative 
Action, and in particular when Habermas critiques Weber's concept of rationalisation 
into the colonisation of lifeworld by system (see for example Habermas 1984: 186, 
295,332 and Habermas 1987: 138-141,335,399), Habermas alludes to the 
unintended colonisation of lifeworld by system. Habermas does not adequately 
pursue this line of enquiry explicitly. In fact, the work of Merton is not referenced 
within either volume of Theory of Communicative Action. A significant contribution to 
the Theory of Communicative Action has therefore been made by this thesis in 
addressing this weakness in the theory. The synthesis of Habermas' and Merton's 
work has allowed the evaluative model to be fully theoretically underpinned. Other 
examples of syntheses include bringing Marxian Historical Materialism into the 
exploration of critical social theory rather than pursuing a direct line of descent from 
Kant to the Frankfurt School. These Habermas/Merton and Marx/Kant syntheses 
advance knowledge in both social theory and social philosophy. 
8. The contribution of theoretical issues raised by Figure 3-9 
In addition to mapping Parsonian theory of functional prerequisites into the manifest 
(intended) part of the evaluative model, a further cycle is introduced by synthesising 
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Habermasian theory of public and private spheres, Lifeworld and System concepts, 
and Mertonian latent functions. In effect this makes a unique contribution to 
managers' understanding of the effects of the unintentional results of their actions. 
For example, consider a situation where a particular organisation's systems functions 
are currently balanced with lifeworld ones. Referring now to Figure 3-9, let us 
assume that management take a decision to close the coffee lounge at certain times 
during the day because this is considered to be more efficient. In manifest terms this 
decision would be an Adaptation-driven function - the acquisition and effective use of 
resources. Management did not realise the coffee lounge had previously been used 
by staff for informal meetings and discussions, and this move has an unintentional 
(Latent according to Merton) effect on the lifeworld within the organisation, insofar as 
it is degraded in a way that can be perceived by employees. In manifest terms, this 
has a negative effect on the Integration function which is concerned with freedom of 
communication within a social system. If these discussions included the transfer of 
knowledge, this would also have a negative effect on the Parsonian Latent function 
which is concerned with the transfer of knowledge in a social system. Small groups of 
employees (private spheres) meet to discuss this move by management (Integration) 
who in turn react against the time wasted (again an Adaptation function) by such 
meetings and implement new rules (systemisation) to restrict such activities for all 
employees. These rules would be in pursuit of specific goals which is, in Parsons' 
terms, Goal-setting. A general work-to-rule begins (public sphere) which affects the 
lifeworld balance because the normal day to day communication and knowledge 
transfer activities are restricted. So the cycle continues with management 
implementing more systemised restrictions and staff, through public and private 
sphere activities acting against the rules. The escalation forces the Iifeworld to be 
colonised by system. The cycle also works the other way, and indeed movement 
clockwise and anti-clockwise takes place constantly as the environment in which it 
operates evolves. Section 3.7.1 provides some critical reforms that can be 
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implemented within an existing information security practice to make it more 
lifeworld-biased without going to the expense of fully redesigning the information 
security system. These reforms allow the theoretical underpinning developed for the 
model to be used directly to assist managers in their information security practice. 
9. Novelty and knowledge advancement in terms of research design and 
methodological selection 
Table 4-2 provides a unique approach to contrasting quantitative and qualitative 
studies using key comparative points. Figure 4-1 provides a flexible model for 
carrying out research whilst utilising the study objectives to avoid problems of 
contingency. This model is unique to this thesis and makes a significant contribution 
to knowledge in the design of research. Table 4-3 takes a novel approach to 
surfacing the various roles that a researcher can take ranging from total participation 
to commentary on materials. Figure 4-4 and the discussion surrounding it provides a 
unique contribution to surfacing the experience and biases of the author and using 
this as a positive and useful research tool rather than as a hidden and potentially 
negative bias to and author's research and conclusions. Again this tool draws on the 
theoretical exploration from the previous chapter to afford it greater credibility. Figure 
4-5, and its development in other figures through the thesis, provides a novel 
contribution to research validation through triangulation in a most accessible form 
which draws on the entire thesis such as earlier literature reviews and surveys, as 
well as the author's own experience as an aid to validation rather than just the 
empirical research. This provides a significant contribution to validating through 
breadth as well as depth. 
10. Contributions within the action research project 
Figure 5-1 is the first example of using the evaluative model as a basis for mapping 
security practices in a most novel and accessible way whilst still maintaining the 
richness of the original model. The figure clearly demonstrates the extent to which 
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information security in the target organisation is focused, in terms of social theory, 
only on Goal-setting, and in terms of critical social theory, on the issues of what is, 
rather than what ought to be. Adaptation, Integration and Latency are ignored; 
lifeworld functions are not addressed; focus is on a part of only the public sphere. 
This provides a very clear link between the social theory underpinning the evaluative 
model and organisational practice in such a way that managers can readily access 
the underlying theory, and understand shortcomings, within their information security 
practice. 
11. Contributions from other empirical research 
a. Section 6-2 makes a significant contribution in terms of understanding the 
limitations of the British Standard from a social-theoretical standpoint. Such a 
mapping of the standard against social theory has simply never been 
successfully carried out before. Indeed, one of the key findings to emerge 
from this research has been the value of critically mapping a domain such as 
information security insofar as it is seen to be represented by the British 
Standard; mapping IAAC controls against those of the British Standard is an 
example of this within the thesis. 
b. Further significant contributions to knowledge within this section include 
Tables 6-2 and 6-3 which identify many controls within the standard that 
should not be there or that should be implemented in most cases. This is a 
significant contribution to the knowledge of implementing information security 
systems even if a socially aware approach is not considered desirable. These 
additional categorisations are remapped onto the evaluative model to provide 
an improved model at Figure 6-1. 
c. Following the empirical research in three organisations in disparate industry 
sectors the evaluative model is refined again into Figure 6-8 together with 
guidance to managers on its use at Table 6-4. Together the model and 
203 
Communicative Action In Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
guidance for use provide a significant contribution to knowledge in delivering 
an approach to information security practice which is informed and 
underpinned by social theory, well tested empirically, and is accessible and 
useable by managers wishing to implement a socially aware information 
security practice. 
12. Contribution from the approach to critique 
Chapter 7 provides a further novel philosophical approach to underpinning the 
current information security domain which has the added advantage of being closely 
aligned to the way the domain was developed and still operates: that is, practical and 
instrumental. 
13. Contributions to knowledge made in the construction of the thesis 
Novel approaches to assisting the reader in navigating the thesis have been 
developed throughout. On page iii a chapter structure model is provided which is 
reproduced at the start of each section. On page xiv a model showing the flow of the 
whole thesis in the form of an integrated flowchart is provided. Figure 1-1 on page 3 
provides another model providing an overview of the thesis which is again 
reproduced at the start of each chapter. To assist in navigating the empirical 
research a further model is provided that guides the reader through each of the initial 
stages together with its purpose. This model is introduced on page 129 and used 
throughout the initial stages of the empirical research design. On page 146 all of the 
research is brought together into a single model so that the reader can easily 
determine what research has been carried out, what is left to do, and the current 
focus of research. Again, this model is reproduced at successive stages of the 
research. The extent of assistance to the reader in navigating what is a complex 
project is a significant contribution to knowledge in the design and layout of theses. 
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Appendix 1 Review of BS7799 
Paul Drake 
For ease of review: Adaptation controls are shaded red; Goal-attainment controls are 
shaded blue; Integration controls are green; Latency controls are shaded yellow; 
Neutral controls are grey; Essential controls are shaded orange; Counter-productive 
controls are shaded purple; and Other responsibility controls are shaded brown. 
BS7799 Summary of Control Rationale 
Ref 
A. 3.1.1 Information security policy document Depends on wording of document. 
approved by management and communicated Opportunity to achieve L, 
to all users motivating the right behaviours 
and managing tensions within the 
social system. 
A. 3.1.2 Review policy regularly to ensure it remains L, motivating the right behaviours 
appropriate and managing tensions within the 
social system 
A. 4.1.1 a Implement a management forum to provide I, co-ordinate relationships within 
clear direction and visible management the social system 
support. Promotes security through 
commitment and provision of adequate 
resourcing 
A. 4.1.1 b implement a management forum to provide A, secure and distribute means for 
clear direction and visible management social system survival 
support. Promotes security through 
commitment and provision of adequate 
resourcing 
A. 4.1.2 Provision of cross-functional forum to co- I, co-ordinate relationships within 
ordinate implementation of security. the social system 
A. 4.1.3 Allocation of responsibilities for protecting G, define and prioritise social 
individual assets and for carrying out specific system goals 
security activities 
A. 4.1.4 Provision of process to gain management A, secure and distribute means for 
authorisation for new information processing social system survival 
facilities. 
A. 4.1.5a Provision of means to seek specialist security I, co-ordinate relationships within 
advice from internal and external advisors the social system 
A. 4.1.5b Provision of means to seek specialist security A, secure and distribute means for 
advice from internal and external advisors social system survival 
A. 4.1.6 Establish appropriate contacts with law I, co-ordinate relationships within 
enforcement authorities, regulatory bodies, the social system 
key service providers etc 
A. 4.1.7 Implementation of the information security A, secure and distribute means for 
policy is independently reviewed social system survival 
A. 4.2.1 Risks associated with third party access to G, define and prioritise social 
information processing facilities are assessed system goals 
and remediated 
A. 4.2.2 Third party access to information processing G, define and prioritise social 
facilities is based on a formal contract system goals 
containing all necessary security 
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requirements 
A. 4.3.1 When information systems are outsourced G, define and prioritise social 
ensure security requirements are included in system goals 
the contract agreed between the parties. 
A. 5.1.1 Maintain an inventory of all important assets A, secure and distribute means for 
associated with each information system social system survival 
A. 5.2.1 Classifications and associated protective G, define and prioritise social 
controls take account of business needs in system goals 
determining the extent of sharing and 
restricting access 
A. 5.2.2 Procedures are defined to ensure appropriate G, define and prioritise social 
information labelling and handling system goals 
A. 6.1.1 Security responsibilities are documented in L, motivating the right behaviours 
job descriptions and managing tensions within the 
social system 
A. 6.1.2 Verification checks are carried out on all L, motivating the right behaviours 
employees at the time of job application and managing tensions within the 
social system 
A. 6.1.3 Employees sign a confidentiality agreement L, motivating the right behaviours 
as part of terms and conditions of and managing tensions within the 
employment social system 
A. 6.1.4 Terms and conditions of employment state L, motivating the right behaviours 
the employee's responsibility for information and managing tensions within the 
security social system 
A. 6.2.1 All employees and third-party users receive L, motivating the right behaviours 
training and regular updates on policies and and managing tensions within the 
procedures social system if training designed 
to inspire a culture of information 
security. Otherwise N, controls 
that are either too vague or too 
pointless to be applied, or controls 
adequately covered elsewhere in 
the standard 
A. 6.3.1 Security incidents are escalated through G, define and prioritise social 
management as soon as possible system goals 
A. 6.3.2 Users of information systems are required to G, define and prioritise social 
report any observed or suspected security system goals 
weaknesses and threats 
A. 6.3.3 Procedures are established for reporting G, define and prioritise social 
software malfunctions system goals 
A. 6.3.4 Mechanisms put in place to allow types, A, secure and distribute means for 
quantities and costs of incidents to be social system survival 
quantified 
A. 6.3.5 Violation of security policies and procedures G, define and prioritise social 
by employees are dealt with through formal system goals (if motivating no 
disciplinary process violations, rather than imposing 
disciplinary procedures against 
anyone who violates procedures, 
would have been L) 
A. 7.1.1 Use security perimeters to protect areas N, controls that are either too 
containing information processing facilities vague or too pointless to be 
212 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard 
A. 7.1.2 Use appropriate entry controls within secure E, functional/technical controls 
areas to ensure only authorised personnel can which are nevertheless essential. 
gain access In practice, will require clarity of 
what is appropriate. Will also 
require criteria for a secure area 
and authorised personnel. 
A. 7.1.3 Create secure areas for offices, rooms and N, controls that are either too 
facilities with special security requirements vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard 
A. 7.1.4 Use additional controls in secure areas to N, controls that are either too 
enhance their security vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard 
A. 7.1.5 Delivery and loading areas to be controlled N, controls that are either too 
and if possible isolated from information vague or too pointless to be 
processing to avoid unauthorised access. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Doesn't provide anything over and 
above that provided by A7.1.2 
A. 7.2.1 Equipment shall be sited or protected to E, functional/technical controls 
reduce the risks from threats and hazards. which are nevertheless essential. 
(Note, the standard refers specifically to In practice, will require clarity of 
`environmental threats and hazards'. This is threats and hazards. Will also 
considered unnecessarily restricted and gives require assessment of the actual 
rise to requirement for additional controls reduction in risk vs. cost of 
which with broader scope are not required) locatin and protecting equipment 
A. 7.2.2 Equipment shall be protected from power 
failures and other electrical anomalies. 
N, controls that are either too 
vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Doesn't provide anything over and 
above that provided by A7.2.1 
A. 7.2.3 Cabling carrying data or supporting N, controls that are either too 
information to be protected from interception vague or too pointless to be 
or damage. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Doesn't provide anything over and 
above that provided by A7.2.1 
A. 7.2.4 Equipment shall be correctly maintained to N, controls that are either too 
enable its continued availability. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Doesn't provide anything over and 
above that provided by A7.2.1 
A. 7.2.5 Management authorisation needed for any N, controls that are either too 
use of equipment for information processing vague or too pointless to be 
outside the organisation's premises. applied, or controls adequately 
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This control is unworkable in 
practice. Specific equipment may 
require this protection. If this is the 
case would be covered by A7.2.1 
A. 7.2.6 Information to be erased from equipment E, functional/technical controls 
prior to disposal or re-use. which are nevertheless essential. 
Needed to protect organisation 
from accidental disclosure of IPR 
and to protect copyright of 
licensed software products. 
Consideration should be given to 
the appropriate level of rigour for 
information deletion vs. cost in 
im lemcntin = it. 
. 
3.1 Organisation to have clear desk and clear C, controls that would seem to 
screen policy this is aimed at reducing the provide scope for making the 
risk of loss or damage to information. system less secure 
A. 7.3-2 E. llllipiuýilt, I'll t1l u Uiof1 or software 
N, controls that are either too 
belonging to the organisation is not to be vague or too pointless to be 
removed without management authorisation. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
This control is unworkable in 
practice. Specific equipment, 
information or software may 
require this protection. If this is the 
case would be covered by A7.2.1 
A. 8. I. 1 The operating procedures identified in the G, define and prioritise social 
security policy shall be documented and system goals 
niaintaincd. 
A. 8.1.2 Modifications to information processing 0, operational requirement rather 
facilities and systems are to be controlled. than a security requirement. This 
is about change control procedures 
which are only secondarily a 
security control - e. g. poor change 
control => unstable system => 
lack of availability 
A. 8.1.3 Established incident management E, functional/technical controls 
responsibilities and procedures to ensure which are nevertheless essential. A 
quick, effective and orderly response and to key requirement of the improved 
collect incident related data such as audit rails ISec model. Real-time response to 
and logs. threats, weaknesses and attacks 
and continuity of business 
operations 
A. 8.1.4 Segregate duties and areas of responsibility in G, define and prioritise social 
order to reduce opportunities for unauthorised system goals 
changes or misuse. 
A. 8.1.5 Development and testing facilities to be N, controls that are either too 
separated from operational facilities vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A8.1.4 
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A. 8.1.6 Before using external facilities management G, define and prioritise social 
services, all risks to be identified and system goals 
appropriate controls agreed and incorporated 
in the contract. 
A. 8.2.1 Capacity demands to be monitored and 0, operational requirement rather 
projections of future capacity requirements than a security requirement. This 
made to enable adequate processing power is about capacity planning 
and storage to be made. procedures which are only 
secondarily a security control - 
e. g. poor capacity planning => 
unstable system => lack of 
availability 
A. 8.2.2 Establish acceptance criteria for new Depends on how the acceptance 
information systems, upgrades and new criteria are captured. If all 
versions and suitable tests carried out on stakeholders (including users) 
systems prior to acceptance. contribute would yield; I, co- 
ordinate relationships within the 
social system 
A. 8.3.1 Implement detection and prevention E, functional/technical controls 
measures to protect against malicious which are nevertheless essential 
software 
A. 8.4.1 Backup-up copies of important information E, functional/technical controls 
are taken and tested [as fit for purpose] which are nevertheless essential 
regularly 
A. 8.4.2 Operational staff maintain a log of their C, controls that would seem to 
activities which are regularly and provide scope for making the 
independently checked system less secure 
A. 8.4.3 Fault: arc rcportcd ands corrective action N, controls that are either too 
taken vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard 
A. 8.5.1 A range of controls are implemented to N, controls that are either too 
achieve and maintain security in networks vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard 
A. 8.6.1 Management of removable computer media N, controls that are either too 
(tapes, disks, cassettes and printed reports) to vague or too pointless to be 
be controlled. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 8.6.2 Safely and securely dispose of media when N, controls that are either too 
no longer required. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.6 
A. 8.6.3 Establish procedures for handling and storing N, controls that are either too 
information in order to protect from vague or too pointless to be 
unauthorised disclosure or misuse. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 8.6.4 S tem documentation shall be protected N, controls that are either too 
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from unauthorised access. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 8.7.1 Establish agreements (some of which may be G, define and prioritise social 
formal) for exchanging information and system goals 
software (whether electronic or manual) 
between organisations. 
A. 8.7.2 Transported media shall be protected from N, controls that are either too 
unauthorised access, misuse or corruption. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 8.7.3 Electronic commerce to be protected against For fraudulent activity and 
fraudulent activity, contract dispute and contract dispute; 0, operational 
disclosure or modification of information. requirement rather than a security 
requirement (both matters for legal 
department). 
For disclosure or modification of 
information; N, controls that are 
either too vague or too pointless to 
be applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 8.7.4 Develop a policy for the use of electronic G, define and prioritise social 
mail and controls put in place to reduce system goals 
security risks. 
A. 8.7.5 Prepare policies and guidelines to be G, define and prioritise social 
implemented to control the business and system goals 
security risks associated with electronic 
office systems. 
A. 8.7.6 A formal authorisation process required G, define and prioritise social 
before information is made public and the system goals 
information protected to prevent unauthorised 
modification. 
A. 8.7.7 Policies, procedures and controls to be in G, define and prioritise social 
place to protect the exchange of information system goals 
through the use of voice, facsimile and video 
communications facilities. 
A. 9.1.1 Define and document business requirements N, controls that are either too 
for access control. Access to be restricted to vague or too pointless to be 
what is defined in the access control policy. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.2.1 There shall be a formal user registration and G, define and prioritise social 
de-registration procedure for granting access system goals 
to all multi-user information systems and 
services. 
A. 9.2.2 The allocation and use of privileges shall be G, define and prioritise social 
restricted and controlled. s stem goals 
A. 9.2.3 The allocation of passwords shall be G, define and prioritise social 
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controlled through a formal management system goals. 1, if training and 
process. awareness provided to users and 
they were free to use tools 
embedded in multi-user systems to 
manager their own accounts. Key 
criteria for procuring information 
systems. 
A. 9.2.4 Management shall conduct a formal process G, define and prioritise social 
at regular intervals to review users' access system goals 
rights 
A. 9.3.1 Users shall be required to follow good G, define and prioritise social 
security practices in the selection and use of system goals. I, if advice given 
passwords. through trainin and awareness 
A. 9.3.2 Users shall be required to ensure that N, controls that are either too 
unattended equipment is given appropriate vague or too pointless to be 
protection. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.1.2 and A7.2.1 
A. 9.4.1 Users shall only have direct access to the G, define and prioritise social 
services that they have been specifically system goals 
authorised to use. 
A. 9.4.2 The path from the user terminal to the N, controls that are either too 
computer service shall be controlled. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.4.3 Access by users shall be subject to N, controls that are either too 
authentication. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.4.4 Connections to remote computer systems N, controls that are either too 
shall be authenticated. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.4.5 Access to diagnostic ports shall be securely N, controls that are either too 
controlled. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.4.6 Controls shall be introduced in networks to C, controls that would seem to 
segregate groups of information services, provide scope for making the 
users and information systems. system less secure. Questionable 
benefit in protecting IPR. Costly to 
maintain properly (which probably 
means it won't be maintained 
properly). Counter-productive in 
terms of availability 
-- ------ ----- - A. 9.4.7 I he ck)nncdtiýýn capability of users shall be 
restricted in shared networks, in accordance 
N, controls that are eithe too 
vague or too pointless to be 
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with the access control policy. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.4.8 Shared networks shall have routeing controls N, controls that are either too 
to ensure that computer connections and vague or too pointless to be 
information flows do not breach the access applied, or controls adequately 
control policy of the business applications. covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.4.9 A clear description of the security attributes .. N, controls that are either too 
of all network services used by the vague or too pointless to be 
organisation shall be provided. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
A. 9.5. I Automatic terminal identification shall be N, controls that are either too 
considered to authenticate connections to vague or too pointless to be 
specific locations and to portable equipment. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.52 Access to information services shall use a N, controls that are either too 
secure log-on process. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 953 All users shall have a unique identifier (user G, define and prioritise social 
ID) for their personal and sole use so that system goals. I, if training and 
activities can be traced to the responsible awareness provided to users and 
individual. A suitable authentication they were free to use tools 
technique shall be chosen to substantiate the embedded in multi-user systems to 
claimed identity of a user. manager their own accounts. Key 
criteria for procuring information 
systems. 
A. 9.5.4 Password management systems shall provide G, define and prioritise social 
an effective, interactive facility which aims to system goals. I, if training and 
ensure quality passwords. awareness provided to users and 
they were free to use tools 
embedded in multi-user systems to 
manager their own accounts. Key 
criteria for procuring information 
systems. 
A. 9.5.5 Use of system utility programs shall be N, controls that are either too 
restricted and tightly controlled. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.5.6 Duress alarms shall be provided for users E, functional/technical controls 
who mi t be the target of coercion. which are nevertheless essential. 
A. 9.5.7 Interactive terminals in high risk locations or G, define and prioritise social 
serving high risk systems shall shut down system goals. 
after a defined period of inactivity to prevent 
access by unauthorised persons. 
A. 9.5.8 Restrictions on connection times shall be G, define and prioritise social 
used to provide additional security for high system goals. 
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risk applications. 
A. 9.6.1 Access to information and application system N, controls that are either too 
functions shall be restricted in accordance vague or too pointless to be 
with access control policy. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.6.2 Sensitive systems shall have a dedicated N, controls that are either too 
(isolated) computing environment vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 9.7.1 Audit logs recording exceptions and other C, controls that would seem to 
security-relevant events shall be produced provide scope for making the 
and kept for an agreed period to assist in system less secure. If `access 
future investigations and access control control monitoring omitted, E, 
monitoring. functional/technical controls 
which are nevertheless essential. 
A. 9.7.2 Procedures tier monitoring the use of G, define and prioritise social 
information processing facilities shall be system goals 
established and the result of the monitoring 
activities reviewed regularly. 
A. 9.7.3 Computer clocks shall be synchronised for G, define and prioritise social 
accurate recording. system oals 
A. 9.8.1 A formal policy shall be in place and N, controls that are either too 
appropriate controls shall be adopted to vague or too pointless to be 
protect against the risks of working with applied, or controls adequately 
mobile computing facilities, in particular in covered elsewhere in the standard. 
unprotected environments. Covered by A3.1.1 and A7.2.1 
A. 9.8.2 Policies, procedures and standards shall be N, controls that are either too 
developed to authorise and control vague or too pointless to be 
teleworking activities. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A3.1.1, A7.1.2 and 
A7.2.1 
A. 10.1.1 Business requirements for new systems, or A, secure and distribute means for 
enhancements to existing systems shall social system survival 
specify the requirements for controls. 
A. 10.2.1 Data input to application systems shall be E, functional/technical controls 
validated to ensure that it is correct and which are nevertheless essential. 
appropriate. 
A. 10.2.2 Validation checks shall be incorporated into N, controls that are either too 
systems to detect any corruption of the data vague or too pointless to be 
processed. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A3.2.1 
A. 10.2.3 Message authentication shall be used for G, define and prioritise social 
applications where there is a security system goals 
requirement to protect the integrity of the 
message content. 
A. 10.2.4 Data output from an application system shall G, define and prioritise social 
be validated to ensure that the processing of system goals 
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stored information is correct and appropriate 
to the circumstances. 
A. 10.3.1 A policy on the use of cryptographic controls N, controls that are either too 
for the protection of information shall be vague or too pointless to be 
developed. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A3.1.1 
A. 10.3.2 Encryption shall be applied to protect the N, controls that are either too 
confidentiality of sensitive or critical vague or too pointless to be 
information. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A7.2.1 
A. 10.3.3 Digital signatures shall be applied to protect G, define and prioritise social 
the authenticity and integrity of electronic system goals 
information. 
A. 10.3.4 Non-repudiation services shall be used to N, controls that are either too 
resolve disputes about occurrence or non- vague or too pointless to be 
occurrence of an event or action. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A 10.3.3 
A. 10.3.5 A key management system based on an 0, operational requirement rather 
agreed set of standards, procedures and than a security requirement. This 
methods shall be used to support the use of is about key management. Only 
cryptographic techniques. required if A3.1.1 requires 
cryptographic controls 
A. 10.4.1 Procedures shall be in place to control the 0, operational requirement rather 
implementation of software on operational than a security requirement. This 
systems. is about licence management. 
A. 10.4.2 'l'est data shall be protected and controlled. N, controls that are either too 
vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Might be covered by A7.2.1 
A. 10.4.3 Strict control shall be maintained over access C, controls that would seem to 
to program source libraries. provide scope for making the 
system less secure. Consider 
whether `strict control' is really 
necessary and whether source 
libraries are likely to be 
com romised. 
A. 10.5.1 I he iinplenientation of changes shall 
be N, controls that are either too 
strictly controlled by the use of formal vague or too pointless to be 
change control procedures. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A8.1.2 
A. 10.5.2 Application systems shall be reviewed and N, controls that are either too 
tested when changes occur. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A8.1.2 
A. 10.5.3 Modifications to software packages shall be N, controls that are either too 
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discouraged and essential changes strictly vague or too pointless to be 
controlled. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A8.1.2 
A. 10.5.4 The purchase, use and modification of N, controls that are either too 
software shall be controlled and checked to vague or too pointless to be 
protect against possible covert channels and applied, or controls adequately 
Trojan code. covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A8.3.1 
A. 10.5.5 Controls shall be applied to secure N, controls that are either too 
outsourced software development. vague or too pointless to be 
applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard 
A. 11.1.1 There shall be a managed process in place for E, functional/technical controls 
developing and maintaining business which are nevertheless essential. A 
continuity throughout the organisation. key requirement of the improved 
ISec model. Real-time response to 
threats, weaknesses and attacks 
and continuity of business 
o erations. See also A8.1.3 
A. 11.1.2 A strategy plan, based upon appropriate risk N, controls that are either too 
assessment, shall be developed for the overall vague or too pointless to be 
approach to business continuity. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A11.1. l 
A. 11.1.3 Plans shall be developed to maintain or N, controls that are either too 
restore business operations in a timely vague or too pointless to be 
manner following interruption to, or failure applied, or controls adequately 
of, critical business processes. covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by Al 11. 
A. 11.1.4 A single framework of business continuity N, controls that are either too 
plans shall be maintained to ensure that all vague or too pointless to be 
plans are consistent, and to identify priorities applied, or controls adequately 
for testing and maintenance. covered elsewhere in the standard. 
- 
Covered b A11.1.1 
A. 11.1.5 Business continuity plans shall be tested N, controls that are either too 
regularly and maintained by regular reviews vague or too pointless to be 
to ensure that they are up to date and applied, or controls adequately 
effective. covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered by A 11.1. l 
A. 12.1.1 All relevant statutory, regulatory and 0, operational requirement rather 
contractual requirements shall be defined than a security requirement. All 
explicitly and documented for each matters for legal department 
information system. 
A. 12.1.2 Appropriate procedures shall be implemented 0, operational requirement rather 
to ensure compliance with legal restrictions than a security requirement. All 
on the use of material in respect of matters for legal department 
intellectual property rights, and on the use of 
proprietary software products. 
22.1.3 Important records of an organisation shall be 0, operational requirement rather 
protected from loss, destruction and than a security requirement. All 
221 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
falsification. matters for legal department and or 
Company Secretary's department 
A. 12.1.4 Controls shall be applied to protect personal 0, operational requirement rather 
information in accordance with relevant than a security requirement. All 
legislation. matters for legal department 
A. 12.1.5 Management shall authorise the use of A, secure and distribute means for 
information processing facilities and controls social system survival 
shall be applied to prevent the misuse of such 
facilities. 
A. 12.1.6 Controls shall be in place to enable 0, operational requirement rather 
compliance with national agreements, laws, than a security requirement. All 
regulations or other instruments to control the matters for legal department 
access to or of cryptographic controls. 
A. 12.1.7 Where action against a person or organisation 0, operational requirement rather 
involves the law, either civil or criminal, the than a security requirement. All 
evidence presented shall conform to the rules matters for legal department 
for evidence laid down in the relevant law or 
in the rules of the specific court in which the 
case will be heard. This shall include 
compliance with any published standard or 
code of practice for the production of 
admissible evidence. 
A. 12.2.1 Managers shall take action to ensure that all A, secure and distribute means for 
security procedures within their area of social system survival 
responsibility are carried out correctly and all 
areas within the organisation shall be subject 
to regular review to ensure compliance with 
security policies and standards. 
A. 12.2.2 Information systems shall be regularly A, secure and distribute means for 
checked for compliance with security social system survival 
implementation standards. 
A. 12.3.1 Audits of operational systems shall be 0, operational requirement rather 
planned carefully and agreed to minimize the than a security requirement. A 
risk of disruptions to business processes. matter for internal audit 
department 
A. 12.3.2 Access to system audit tools shall be N, controls that are either too 
protected to prevent any possible misuse or vague or too pointless to be 
compromise. applied, or controls adequately 
covered elsewhere in the standard. 
Covered'--- A7.2.1 
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Appendix 2 Metaphor responses from ITD 
The information security practice is like: 
Ref: I 
Paul Drake 
A herd of wild animals, making progress across the plain but losing some members 
along the way. (We go off on our own deliberately or get lost without meaning to). 
We are not trained to be a group and don't always move along an agreed 
path/direction at the same speed. 
Ref: 2 
Alice playing chess through the looking glass - running very hard to move forward 
very slowly. 
Ref: 3 
A camel - still has overall direction - designed by committee. 
Ref: 4 
A chameleon - we have to keep reacting to changes all around us. 
Ref: 5 
A tortoise - it keeps going and eventually gets there - the trouble is, the destination 
has changed in the mean time. 
Ref: 6 
Batting up the motorway in third gear - because is expends a lot of energy 
progressing slowly. 
Ref: 7 
A school outing for infants - you can get most of them lined up and moving in the 
same direction most of the time, but you have to watch out because there are always 
a few wandering off on their own. 
Ref: 8 
A French lesson - because despite everyone's best efforts you never have a clue as to 
what's going on and are convinced everyone else is speaking a different language. 
Ref: 9 
Lighting a firework (with reference to ideas! ) - light the blue touch paper and retire 
immediately. It will either light up and fizz out with a small puff, or explode into 
something worthwhile! 
Ref: 10 
An old fashioned gay night-club - you keep going back regularly, meeting up with 
your friends and having a good time. It needs to be more up beat and there are 
generally some things that you would rather not do. 
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Ref: 11 
A performing seal act where 2 out of the 6 seals are missing and the others are 
jumping through hoops - trying to juggle too many balls and standing on their heads 
etc. in a random and frantic fashion. The trainer being missing and therefore the 
necessary co-ordination, leadership and co-ordination etc. is missing and the fish 
bucket is empty i. e. appropriate rewards are not forthcoming. 
Ref: 12 
A Staff Canteen 
9 We have many customers sitting at many different tables. 
" Some tables want to order full 3-course meals - some just want a snack or take- 
away. Often, the food they want is exotic and outside of our repertoire. Some just 
want to get the recipes and basic ingredients from the chef so that they can go 
back home and cook it up themselves. 
" We are the harassed waiting staff, serving each table as best we can, trying to 
please everyone, though we're not sure we can manage it. We are getting more 
sure that we can't as time goes on. 
" In the kitchen, the head waiter and manager are attempting to draw up a fixed 
'menu du jour'. They fear any customer leaving in disgust and cooking for 
themselves. Who knows what unsavoury dishes they may poison themselves 
with? Worse still, they could bum their houses down when cooking - in which 
case, we will be called in as temporary firemen 
"A letter has arrived from the owner of the property - he is effectively putting the 
rent up, though we are not making enough profit to cover it. We can't make profit 
anyway - we're a staff canteen, not a public restaurant. So our customers can go 
elsewhere if they like, but we can't have members of the public dining on our 
premises! 
" As for the staff, they see what predicament the manager and head waiter are in, as 
they pick up a lot of comment from customers at first hand. Sometimes staff view 
each other as lazy, not knowing what purpose they serve, and not seeing them do 
very much. Some of them would rather be working in a commercial restaurant - 
some of them would rather be at home. Most of them wonder if 
" the customer will eat what is put in front of them, because they've seen it 
prepared 
" whether the customer will pay their bill at the end of their meal 
" whether the customer will come back again! !! 
224 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
I would like the information security practice to be like: 
Ref: 1 
A train - each different section linked and going in the same direction at the same 
speed, happily moving toward a known destination at an agreed speed taking 
everyone (including its passengers/clients) along with it happily. 
Ref: 2 
A bottle of wine to go with a meal - does the job in an effective, efficient and 
pleasurable way. 
Ref: 3 
A symphony orchestra - playing a harmony to one lead. 
Ref: 4 
A coiled spring - it's better able to react to pressure but it keeps its shape/identity. 
Ref: 5 
An eagle - it can see where it is going far enough in advance to avoid the problem. 
Ref: 6 
An elegant quickstep - because its a partnership between leader and follower 
progressing apace in harmony with the world around them, elegantly avoiding 
collisions through nifty footwork. 
Ref: 7 
A well drilled sports team - co-ordinated and well practised routines, but retaining 
scope for individual flair. 
Ref: 8 
The Waltons - because despite the large number, they act as a team. 
Ref: 11 
The performing seal act with the necessary numbers present - perform the planned 
variety of tricks, with the correct and appropriate equipment. A trainer providing the 
organisation, leadership, co-ordination and routine order etc. and a full bucket of fish 
to provide the appropriate rewards. I. e. there are not enough fish. 
People outside the information security practice probably 
think it is like: 
Ref: I 
People outside DIT probably think it is like an ant hill - lots of workers and effort but 
no distinct direction other than to continue to exist. 
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Ref: 2 
Relaxing in a jacuzzi - generally easy going & relaxing with the occasional nice 
surprise. 
Ref: 3 
A headless chicken - because of lack of communication and attention to detail in 
customer care. 
Ref: 4 
An emergency service - because we are always there when we are needed. 
Ref: 5 
A hydra - too many different voices telling too many different stories 
Ref: 6 
A washing machine - because anything put in goes round and round for a long time 
and life is only marginally better when it comes out 
Ref: 7 
Watching a game of mah Jong - lots of people working frantically away, doing 
unfathomable things and speaking a language they don't understand. 
Ref: 8 
A Chinese take-away - because the order takes twice as long as anticipated; they 
think they've ordered one thing and then end up with something entirely different 
and then half an hour later they want another order! 
The general environment (external to ITD) is like: 
Ref: I 
The general environment external to DIT is like a badly organised village fair - lots 
of well meaning individuals manning stalls all competing for the same customers and 
all desperate to please the vicar (chief exec). No real agreed theme or purpose other 
than to save the church spire. 
Ref: 3 
A beehive - workers going like hell with very little support, drones necessary to look 
after the organisation but no-one really knows what they do, and a queen bee 
(perhaps several? ) that doesn't really know what's going on outside its own cell. 
Ref: 3 
Jurassic Park - exciting but frightening, some dinosaurs, some new technology, lots 
of sticky mud. 
Ref: 4 
A rugby scrum, sometimes without a ball - everybody thinks they are doing what 
they should but often there is changes to direction/purpose. 
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Ref: 5 
The ocean - lots of currents sweeping us along, over which we have no control. 
Ref: 6 
A game of cricket - because it's a constant round of ins and outs, over and over, 
boring to watch and sometimes interesting to play. 
Ref: 7 
A bar of soap - just when you think you've got a grip on it, it slips away. 
Ref: 8 
A black hole - because it's a total unknown. 
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Appendix 3 Questions set for ITD staff 
`My organisation is like a rubbish compactor. It has pressures from all sides: upper 
management, peers, subordinates and finally the consumer. As a rubbish compactor 
operates, the end result or return on your efforts is continually smaller than what 
was put in. ' 
I am currently carrying out an assignment that describes the practical application of 
the use of metaphors in organisational diagnosis. 
As you can see in the above example, metaphors are a very effective means of 
breaking down barriers to understanding that are present in more traditional means of 
analysing organisations. The respondent's feelings are vividly conveyed through the 
metaphorical comparison of the organisation with a rubbish compactor. 
For the purpose of this assignment, a metaphor is taken to mean a description of an 
organisation through a comparison with something other than itself. In strict 
grammatical terms these metaphors might actually be termed similes, but it has 
become common in organisational theory to use the term metaphor to cover all 
figures of speech. 
I am asking for your help in building up a picture of ITD and our information 
security practice which is as complete as possible. Please consider the following 
questions and have a go at providing a metaphor that describes your feelings in each 
case. The answer to `Why? ' in each case is extremely important, as the reasons 
behind your choice of metaphor may not be obvious to others. Naturally, all 
responses will be treated in confidence - the authors will not be divulged either 
within the assignment or elsewhere. Please don't restrict yourself to the space 
provided here, use a separate sheet if necessary. 
In relation to the IT department only (i. e. not the organisation as a whole), what 
metaphors best describe what it is really like and how our information security 
practice operates, how it could be better, how others probably perceive it and 
what it's like outside? 
" The information security practice is like ......... 
" Why? ......... 
"I would like the information security practice to be like ......... 
" Why? ......... 
" People outside the IT department (e. g. the rest of the authority, suppliers 
etc. ) probably think the information security practice is like ......... 
" Why? ......... 
" The general environment (external to ITD) is like ......... 
" Why? ......... 
Thanks very much 
Paul Drake 
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Appendix 4 Main themes from metaphor-based 
research in local authority 
What the information security practice is like 
The `herd of wild animals' metaphor 
Paul Drake 
A herd of wild animals, making progress across the plain but losing some members 
along the way. (We go off on our own deliberately or get lost without meaning to). 
We are not trained to be a group and don't always move along an agreed 
path/direction at the same speed. 
The word(s) ... evoke(s) 
images of... 
herd lack of individuality. 
" `sheepness' which may lead to a lack of flair and flamboyance. 
" need for a shepherd. 
" root impulses for association with others of own kind. 
" hunt as a pack. 
" move together, particularly to avoid predators. 
wild animals " feeling confused. 
" discomfort. 
"a tendency to misunderstand order and to be misunderstood by 
convention. 
" chaos. 
" vulnerability. 
"a lack of direction. 
" not being part of the group. 
" being left out and ill-informed. 
" feeling embittered. 
progress advancement (personally, as a team or group, organisationally 
and within a societal context. ) 
" fighting to succeed. 
"a need drive forward. 
" making headway towards some goal or purpose. 
" trying to get ahead. 
"a willingness to recover lost ground 
" determination. 
" evolution/revolution. 
" being on a road to somewhere. 
plain a barren featureless and forsaken place. 
" having no navigational or guidance system. 
"a hostile environment that appears safe but provides few hiding 
places. 
"a wilderness. 
" loneliness. 
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The word(s) ... evoke(s) 
images of... 
" emerging from the jungle into an unfamiliar setting. 
"a mirage. 
losing " failure. 
" forfeiture of relinquishing some control. 
" sorrow at losing friends. 
" worthlessness and inadequacy. 
" being without purpose and unneeded. 
" labouring in vain, with no apparent goal. 
" papering over the cracks. 
" unfairness, and a situation that is perceived to be unjust. 
" people feeling hurt and angry. 
" being motivated to improve. 
members " teamwork and cohesion. 
"a particular school of thought. 
" feeling and being a part of some wider purpose. 
"a solid base from which to grow and expand. 
direction a way forward for the future. 
"a feeling of this being the only way, the one truth. 
" an `organisational trek'. 
"a through road or a permanent way. 
" clear objectives and route to achieve them. 
" agreed aim and goals. 
"a coherent and consistent plan with organisational intent and 
purpose to achieve an agreed target. 
The `performing seal act' metaphor 
A performing seal act where 2 out of the 6 seals are missing and the others are 
jumping through hoops - trying to juggle too many balls and standing on their heads 
etc. in a random and frantic fashion. The trainer being missing and therefore the 
necessary co-ordination, leadership etc. is missing and the fish bucket is empty i. e. 
annropriate rewards are not forthcoming. _ The word(s) ... evoke(s) 
image(s) of... 
performing " accomplishment 
" effecting change in a `playful' manner. 
" discharging one's duties. 
" causing change. 
missing " being lost or losing something. 
" having forfeited something (perhaps a purpose or goal). 
" absence. 
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The word(s) ... evoke(s) image(s) of... 
" lacking in some important way. 
" the situation being irrevocable. 
" missing the point somehow. 
jumping through 
"a circus, with individual performances all coming together as hoops 
part of an exiting and coherent show. 
" getting a quart from a pint pot. 
" lack of co-ordination and cohesion. 
" fire fighting and crisis management. 
" not really knowing the end result. 
juggle 
" constantly changing priorities. 
" uncertainty. 
" risks - many unknown or ill considered. 
" fast and skilful. 
" clever and dextrous. 
standing on their " acrobatic heads 
" working out 
" supple 
" co-ordinated 
random " being indiscriminate and haphazard. 
" feeling aimless and confused. 
" circumstances that are unplanned and seem purposeless. 
" being indistinguishable from 'reality'. 
frantic 
" feeling desperate. 
" careering headlong for something (a dangerous pursuit without 
direction). 
" being rash and reckless. 
trainer "a coach to demonstrate. 
"a tutor or instructor to teach. 
"a mentor - someone to look up to. 
"a manager to provide leaderchin_ 
co-ordination I. being alike or very similar in thought and deed. 
" equality and equity. 
" something corresponding to, or commensurate with another 
factor. 
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The words ... evoke(s) image(s) of... 
leadership 
" authority. 
" control. 
" administration. 
" effectiveness. 
" influence. 
" management. 
" guidance. 
" direction. 
" help. 
rewards " appropriate compensation. 
" recognition of merit. 
" sufficient pay. 
"a prize for effort and loyalty. 
What information security practice ought to be like 
The `train' metaphor 
A train - each different section linked and going in the same direction at the same 
speed, ha il movin toward a known destination at an agreed speed taking 
eve one (including its passengers/clients) along with it happily. 
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The word(s) ... evokes 
image(s) of... 
train 
" an ordered sequence. 
" logical succession. 
" a chain: pulling together; linking one thing to another; strength 
and permanence; a number of independent links forming a 
whole; the usefulness of the whole being dependant on the 
weakest link. 
" progress. 
" realising that only trains can move on railway tracks. 
" a series or events, activities, thoughts etc. 
section " division. 
" compartmentalisation. 
" a province or specialisation. 
" being part of a coherent whole. 
" dominion. 
" factions. 
linked 
" loosely coupled. 
" firmly joined. 
" solidly united. 
" irrevocably combined. 
speed " swiftness. 
" rapidity. 
" acceleration towards a destination or goal. 
" more haste less speed. 
" dispatch. 
" pace. 
" momentum. 
happily 
" being blissfully unaware. 
" cheerfulness. 
" delighted. 
" feeling favoured. 
" successful 
" befitting 
" advantageous 
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The word(s) ... evoke(s) 
image(s) of... 
moving " unstable. 
" shifting. 
" ascending/descending. 
" going somewhere. 
" stirring from a sleep or period of inactivity. 
" affecting someone or something. 
" driving forward. 
agreed " being settled and secure. 
" having decided a course of action with no room for dissent or 
doubt. 
" being determined to follow a process. 
" having concluded and finalised. 
" having closed forever. 
" a disagreement that has now been resolved. 
taking everyone " comprehensive. 
along 
" all-inclusive. 
" competitive. 
" complete. 
The `performing seal act' metaphor 
The performing seal act with the necessary numbers present - perform the planned 
variety of tricks, with the correct and appropriate equipment. A trainer providing the 
organisation, leadership, co-ordination and routine order etc. and a full bucket of fish 
to provide the appropriate rewards. Le. there are not enough fish. 
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The word(s) ... evoke(s) ima es of... 
necessary " something essential. 
" a key item. 
" feeling obliged to do or think something in a certain way. 
" urgency. 
" being or feeling indispensable. 
" something substantive. 
" a prerequisite. 
planned " being programmed. 
" being intended. 
" having been arranged. 
" something in the making. 
variety " diversity. 
" divergence of opinion or activity. 
" difference in approach. 
" change. 
correct " accuracy and precision. 
" legitimacy 
" a situation amended or rectified. 
organisation " an association or group. 
" a society or league. 
" an exclusive club. 
" being well established. 
" a fraternity. 
" order. 
routine " a habit or predictable pattern. 
" customary practice. 
" being methodical. 
" standardisation. 
" regular and well practised. 
" a system. 
order " a specific sequence. 
" planned progression. 
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The word(s) ... evoke(s) image(s) o ... 
"a regular pattern. 
" arrangement. 
" management 
" grouping 
" classification. 
How people outside ITD see the information security practice 
The `watching a game of mah-jong' metaphor 
Watching a game of mah jong - lots of people working frantically away, doing 
unfathomable things and speaking a language they don't understand. 
The word(s) ... evoke(s) image(s) of... 
watching " viewing from outside. 
" observation. 
" contemplation and reflection. 
" examination or inspection. 
" surveying. 
game " amusement, entertainment and fun. 
" a diversion or pastime. 
" play. 
" friendly contest. 
unfathomable " abysmal and deep. 
" infinite. 
" soundless. 
" boundless. 
" bottomless. 
" chaos. 
speaking " being articulate. 
" rhetoric. 
" fluency. 
" verbal and non-verbal communication. 
" making one's feelings known. 
" informing. 
" transmitting and receiving information. 
" impart in knowled e. 
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The words ... evoke(s) 
image s Of... 
language 
. an idiom. 
" use of jargon (information technology) or special terminology. 
" vernacular. 
don't understand " ignorance. 
" misinterpretation. 
" mistakes. 
" misunderstandings. 
" something unbelievable. 
What LTD's external environment is like 
The `badly organised village fair' metaphor 
The general environment external to ITD is like a badly organised village fair - lots 
of well meaning individuals manning stalls all competing for the same customers and 
all desperate to lp ease the vicar (chief exec). No real agreed theme or purpose other 
than to save the church spire. 
The words ... evoke(s) 
image(s) of... 
badly organised " being sloppy and slovenly. 
" disorder. 
" confusion. 
" chaos and jumble. 
" general disarray. 
well meaning " compassion. 
" lacking in malice. 
" sympathy. 
" benevolence. 
" good-nature. 
" not being in possession of all the facts. 
" doesn't have full picture and doesn't fully understand what's 
going on. 
individuals 
. separate. 
" specific, particular or distinctive. 
" . single 
competing " a contest. 
" vying for position. 
" striving to achieve. 
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The word(s) ... evokes 
image(s) of... 
" rivalry. 
customers " passengers. 
" patrons. 
" occupants. 
" clients and buyers. 
desperate 
" being frantic. 
" feeling despondent and forlorn. 
" despairing. 
" keenness. 
" achieving something at all costs. 
please " delight. 
" appealing. 
" captivation. 
" enticing. 
" attraction. 
theme 
" a particular topic or subject. 
" a point of view. 
" an issue. 
" a proposition. 
" an argument. 
purpose " a specific aim or direction. 
" an agreed design. 
" a determination. 
" a shared aspiration. 
" an ex ectation. 
save " a rescue and salvage. 
" delivering. 
" preservation and conservation. 
" the status quo. 
" keeping things as they have always been. 
" maintenance. 
" safeguarding. 
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Appendix 5 Review of controls deployed in retail 
and leisure organisation (case study 2) 
Summary of Control AGIL bias 
Information security policy document approved by management and L 
communicated to all users 
Review policy regularly to ensure it remains appropriate G 
Implement a management forum to provide clear direction and visible I 
management support. Promotes security through commitment and 
provision of adequate resourcing 
Implement a management forum to provide clear direction and visible A 
management support. Promotes security through commitment and 
provision o ade uate resourcing 
Provision of cross-functional forum to co-ordinate implementation of I 
security. 
Allocation of responsibilities for protecting individual assets and for G 
carrying out specific security activities 
Implementation of the information security policy is independently A 
reviewed 
Risks associated with third party access to information processing G 
facilities are assessed and remediated 
Third party access to information processing facilities is based on a G formal contract containing all necessary security requirements Maintain an inventory of all important assets associated with each A information s stem 
Procedures are defined to ensure appropriate information labelling and G handling 
Security responsibilities are documented in job descriptions G 
Employees sign a confidentiality agreement as part of terms and G 
conditions of employment 
All employees and third-party users receive training and regular L 
updates on policies and procedures 
Security incidents are escalated through management as soon as G 
possible 
Mechanisms put in place to allow types, quantities and costs of A 
incidents to be quantified 
Violation of security policies and procedures by employees are dealt G 
with through formal disciplinary process 
Use appropriate entry controls within secure areas to ensure only E 
authorised personnel can gain access 
Equipment shall be sited or protected to reduce the risks from threats E 
and hazards. 
The operating procedures identified in the security policy shall be G 
documented and maintained. 
Before using external facilities management services, all risks to be G 
identified and appropriate controls agreed and incorporated in the 
contract. 
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Establish acceptance criteria for new information systems, upgrades G 
and new versions and suitable tests carried out on systems prior to 
acceptance. 
Implement detection and prevention measures to protect against E 
malicious software 
Backup-up copies of important information are taken and tested [as fit E 
for purpose] regularly 
Establish agreements (some of which may be formal) for exchanging A 
information and software (whether electronic or manual) between 
organisations. 
A formal authorisation process required before information is made A 
public and the information protected to prevent unauthorised 
modification. 
There shall be a formal user registration and de-registration procedure G 
for granting access to all multi-user information systems and services. 
All users shall have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal and G 
sole use so that activities can be traced to the responsible individual. A 
suitable authentication technique shall be chosen to substantiate the 
claimed identity of a user. 
Password management systems shall provide an effective, interactive G 
facility which aims to ensure quality passwords. 
Business requirements for new systems, or enhancements to existing A 
systems shall specify the requirements for controls. 
Managers shall take action to ensure that all security procedures within A 
their area of responsibility are carried out correctly and all areas within 
the organisation shall be subject to regular review to ensure compliance 
with security policies and standards. 
Information systems shall be regularly checked for compliance with G 
security implementation standards. 
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Appendix 6 Constructing an Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) based on BS7799 and some of 
the research carried out in this thesis 
To maintain the currency of its security practice an organisation should use a 
framework based on an Information Security Management System (ISMS) which 
forms the first sections of part 2 of the British Standard BS7799. This model utilises 
the basic Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle devised by Walter Shewhart in 1939. 
An organisation should implement a standard information policy which focuses on the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information. It should encompass the 
controls that can be found in the British Standard. 
The organisation should use a series of generic risks (represented in Table A5-1 
below) to determine the priority of remedial actions and to determine the threats that 
the organisation faces. 
Risk Details 
Loss of Where lack of sufficient control may allow confidential Information to 
confidentiality be available to unauthorised personnel 
Loss of integrity Where lack of sufficient control may allow information be changed 
without authority and reduce accuracy and/or completeness of 
information 
Loss of Where lack of sufficient control may lead to IT resources not being 
availability available to authorised personnel when they need access. This can 
inhibit business productivity 
Unauthorised Where lack of sufficient control may allow IT resources to be made 
access available to unauthorised personnel 
Impact on share Where lack of sufficient control may lead to activity that could impact 
value the organisation's share price 
Loss of credibility Where lack of sufficient control could damage GSK's reputation with 
regulators, suppliers and customers 
Out of compliance Any risk that would lead to GSK failing in its regulatory, legal and 
industry obligations 
Table A5-1 List of generic risks used by the organisation 
The organisation should use the controls within the British Standard as its baseline to 
determine which controls to deploy and the order in which they should be 
implemented. Table A5-2 below shows an extract from an organisation's `Statement 
of Applicability' (SoA). An SoA is a requirement of the BS7799 approach to 
implementing security controls, The SoA usually lists all 128 controls from the 
standard and allows the organisation to determine exactly which controls are relevant 
(applicable) to it, the risks that would be faced if the control was not implemented and 
therefore the priority with which the controls should be deployed. 
249 
Communicative Action in Information Security Systems Paul Drake 
rA 
Control Control 
Section 
01.1 0 'd 0 
Ü 
41 -1013 - 
0 
0 
a+ 
t: 
.... 
0 
ý m d , --i cý Ca 
Protection To protect the integrity of 8.3 
against software and information from 
Malicious Code damage by 
Malicious Code. 
Control 48 Detection and prevention 8.3.1 a-g 4 3 (1 N 
controls to protect against 
malicious software and 
appropriate user awareness 
procedures shall be 
implemented. 
Control 49 System Supportabilty - All n/a a-g 4 Z ('RI I I('AI N 
systems must be technically 
supported and patches levels 
maintained to current 
. standards. 
Housekeeping To maintain the integrity and 8.4 
availability of information 
processing and communication 
services. 
Control 49 Back-up copies of essential 8.4.1 B, f, g 4 2 M 
business information and 
software shall be taken and 
tested regularly. 
Control 50 Operational staff shall maintain 8.4.2 D, f, g 3 1 M 
a log of their activities. 
Operator logs shall be subject 
to regular, independent checks. 
Table A5-2 Extract from organisation's s tatement of wolicab ility 
It can be seen from the extract above that the organisation has added additional 
controls over and above those listed in the standard. It can also be seen that the 
organisation has prioritised Control 49 as critical. 
Figure A5-1 below comprises an organisation's risk assessment method. This should 
be included in the organisation's Risk Management documentation. 
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All controls in the Statement of Applicability must be assessed 
The method for assessing each control is as follows: 
1. Identify the risks that would apply if this control was not in place. 
Record these in the Statement of Applicability 
2. Identify all existing controls referenced in the Controls Framework 
document that would be applicable to this control. Record these in the 
Statement of Applicability 
3. With all controls identified in step 2, rate the likelihood of any of the 
risks occurring on a scale of 1-5 (1 low, 5 high) 
4. With all controls identified in step 2, rate the potential impact if any of 
the risks occurred (i. e. were exploited). Again this is rated on a scale of 1 
to 5 (1 low, 5 high) 
5. Record the likelihood and impact against the control in the statement of 
Figure A5-1 Organisation risk assessment methodology 
The Risk Management documentation then proceeds to define a risk treatment plan 
The risk treatment plan reviews and prioritises controls for 
implementation. 
The priority of the control can be assigned using the impact and likelihood 
ratings recorded in the Statement of Applicability. The priorities are high, 
medium or low and are assigned using the following table: 
Key: Yellow = Medium, 
Impact 
Likelihood 1 2 3 -1 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
4 5 6 7 89 
3 4 5 6 78 
2 3 4 5 67 
1 2 3 4 56 
I Record the priority in the Statement of Applicability. 
Figure A5-2 Organisation's risk treatment plan 
Finally, the organisation should provide a number of risk strategies, for example those 
which are represented in Table A5-3 below. 
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Risk Strategy Details 
Accept risk If the asset owner wants to accept the risk 
then they must get approval from [the 
risk management department] 
Apply controls New controls or changes to existing 
controls are used to reduce the risk. Such 
controls may be technological (such as 
installing firewalls), new/improved 
processes and/or new/improved policies. 
Transfer risk The risk is transferred to another party 
(usually an insurance company). In the 
event of a risk being exploited, this party 
will cover damage/cleanup costs. 
Eliminate risk This is the ideal solution but is often not 
achievable because the only way to 
eliminate a risk is to remove it from the 
environment. 
Table A5-3 Risk strategies available to the organisation 
An organisation's information security management system can be summarised in the 
flow diagram shown at Figure A5-3 below. The pink region shows what would 
amount to the PLAN phase of the PDCA cycle and the blue represents the DO phase. 
The organisation should include in its documentation (ISMS process) the process to 
ensure that it also CHECKS and ACTS (improves ISMS). 
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Establish/Update 
Information 
Security Policy 
Establish/Update 
Controls within BS7799 Statement of Organisations own Part 2 controls 
Applicability 
Generic risks Assess Risks 
K Risk assessment 
methodology 
Create Risk 
Treatment Plan 
RM "69 
Prioritise and 
Manage Risks 
Figure A5-3 Representation of organisation's ISMS 
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